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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 SCOPE  
This report summarizes the results of a study performed to determine the required 
properties of a command and control system which will allow different generic types of 
physical security sensors to be combined into a single display format. The primary types 
of sensors considered may be separated into four generic classes: (1) exterior point 
sensors as is illustrated by the Base Installation Security System (BISS) Small Permanent 
Communications and Display Segment (SPCDS), (2) interior point sensors such as those 
used currently with the U. S. Army Facility Intruder Detection System (FIDS), (3) limited 
area sensors such as the AN/PPS-15 radar system, and (4) wide area sensors such as the 
AN/PPS-5 radar system. The methodology applied during the study involved defining the 
salient characteristics of each class of sensor, developing concepts for interfacing each 
sensor type to a digital communications link, designing the data processor system 
architecture including the necessary algorithms which must be executed, and determining 
the major characteristics of a real-time computer-animated display that will enhance 
operator efficiency in interpreting information from many sensors of different generic 
types. 
1.2 BASE SECURITY - A STATEMENT OF THE BASIC PROBLEM  
Physical security is becoming more of a concern within the DoD community 
because of the increasing cost, complexity, and capabilities of modern weapon systems 
which result in them being valuable targets for terrorist groups, espionage activities of 
foreign powers, and demonstration activities for anti-establishment movements. Because 
of the current extremely high cost of labor in the United States, protection of these sites 
using security guards can account for a large portion of the total weapon cost for a 
system having a long operational life. Accordingly, it is desirable to take advantage of 
current sensor/surveillance system technology in order to reduce the total manpower 
requirements for system protection and to make the remaining personnel more effective. 
Sensor technology and security systems are currently available to provide 
assistance to security personnel in the detection and localization of potential intruders, 
but in general these systems have a number of problems including: (1) current sensor 
systems tend to be extremely labor intensive and require continuous operators (for 
1 
example radar displays, TV displays), (2) most of the current systems in development 
have unacceptable levels of false or nuisance alarms without easy methods of 
verification of potential intruders, and (3) single technology sensors which are currently 
used are more easily fooled by potential intruders than multiple sensor technology types 
which can also help to reduce nuisance alarms. 
A netted security surveillance system can provide a solution to these problems by 
allowing multiple sensor types to be tied together into a single display system which can 
provide sophisticated processing to reduce nuisance alarms and improve target detection 
capabilities. The desired features of a netted system are listed below. 
A netted security system should: 
o Allow the combined operation of several sensors as a common surveillance system. 
o Match the threat scenario matrix with an optimum distribution of sensor-
surveillance capability. 
o Allow targets to be monitored via multiple sensor technologies to provide 
verification techniques and improve the overall detection and false alarm 
characteristics of the netted system. 
o Provide operator assistance in the form of 
Automatic operation of equipment, 
Automatic status check of system, 
Automatic target detection and tracking, 
Threat evaluation of detected targets, and 
Multiple sensor information (radar and fixed location 
a common scenario-map presentation. 
sensors) combined into 
The general scenario of potential threats along with the applicable sensors are 
given in Figure 1. The netted system should provide for the inclusion of all these sensor 
types to be integrated so that their outputs can be monitored on a single display. 
Unfortunately, most sensors under current development have no provisions for interfaces 




Radar 	Sonar 	Sensors 
Airborne 
 
•-• Low Flying Aircraft 
	 Parachute Drop 
 
— Ultra-light A/C (Hand Glider, etc) 


















   
   
    
    
     
Figure 1. General threat scanario matrix. 
3 
(I/O) capabilities for a netted system. Thus, it is imperative that new sensors include 
such a capability and that interfaces be developed for currently available sensors. 
1.3 STUDY GOALS  
Radar has long been known to be an efficient surveillance device for monitoring 
large areas for moving vehicles and dismounted personnel. With the increasing cost of 
security personnel, radar cannot be used for physical security applications in the 
conventional mode with a single operator for each radar scope, or the operating cost will 
be excessively high. Operator efficiency decreases during long radar display 
observation. Therefore, techniques and algorithms are being developed and implemented 
to automate as many of the target detection, identification, and assessment functions as 
practical. 
Multiple radar sensors can be used to overcome the surveillance limitations 
inherent in a single radar due to radar scan speeds, sector scan limits, terrain masking, 
etc. Although multiple radar sensors can provide much better surveillance coverage of a 
given area than a single radar, the data processing load and the number of operators 
required could increase in proportion to the number of radar sensors. Advances in 
distributed processing technology and sensor netting techniques, however, make it 
possible to employ multiple radar sensors integrated with other (acoustic, seismic, etc.) 
sensors in a single netted configuration that provides a high degree of automated target 
processing and correlation so that all surveillance sensors can be monitored by one 
operator. 
Non-radar sensors (seismic, acoustic, etc.) are more practical than radar sensors 
for monitoring certain areas in many security/surveillance applications. The overall 
surveillance system effectiveness can be increased by integrating these non-radar sensors 
with the radar sensors so that the total area under surveillance can be monitored by a 
single operator. 
This research effort is directed toward defining concepts for netting (combining) 
ground surveillance radars and point sensors to present intrusion data on a situation map 
display so that all sensors for the entire surveillance area can be monitored by one 
operator. The principles for netting ground surveillance radars draw heavily upon the 
techniques and principles that were developed and tested by Georgia Tech for the MX- 
1,2 missile program. 	The fixed sensor netting technology is drawn from existing system 
concepts wherever possible. 
4 
The netting concepts considered in this study will accommodate (1) existing sensor 
systems and (2) desirable prototype technologies. The application configurations must 
provide a cost-effective solution to the limited netting configurations (possibly with one 
radar) and be expandable to the projected maximum capacity system using several radars 
and many point sensors. The netting concepts are directed toward applications involving 
rapid deployment for surveillance of temporary installations and surveillance of 
permanent base installations. The concepts investigated address sensor availability, 
preferred netting configuration, possible target detection and threat assessment 
algorithms, and data link and display concepts necessary for meeting the netted 
surveillance system goals. 
1.4 SUMMARY  
The study of concepts for the netting of selected BISS sensors was based on an 
assumed scenario that would employ the largest anticipated number of sensors. The 
assumed scenario is defined in Table 1, and a possible deployment configuration is shown 
in Figure 2. 
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The study was separated into four distinct tasks that could be performed serially. 
First, data on the specific characteristics of a typical example of each of the generic 
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Figure 2. One possible deployment configuration for the assumed sensor scenario. 
types of sensors were gathered. The specific sensors chosen included the BISS SPCDS 
system, the FIDS system, the AN/PPS-15(B) radar, the Foliage Penetration (FOLPEN) 
radar, and the AN/PPS-5 radar. After the characteristics of each system were defined, 
conceptual designs were formulated for sensor interfaces that would allow all 
information gathered by each sensor to be transmitted to a digital communications 
system. The sensor systems are described in Section 2 and Appendix A. 
Then, the system architecture for the communications and data processing system 
was structured around a distributed processing concept to maximize the system 
flexibility and minimize cost. Basically, the concept involves using microcomputers to 
perform first-level signal processing at a site near the sensors so that the data formats 
can be standardized, and the communication link data rates can be decreased. The 
system signal processing algorithms were based on experience gained during the 
development of a netted radar physical security system for the MX program. 1,2,3 
The characteristics of the communication link were based on a current Tri-Service 
specification for RF transmission links (SEIWIG-005). 3 An RF data link was chosen 
because it will facilitate rapid deployment of remote sensors (for the bare base situation) 
and it will handle high data rates from the radar sensors. Exceptions to the SEIWIG-005 
specification may be necessary because of the longer data words or higher data rates 
required to transmit radar data. Proposed interface descriptions for selected sensors are 
included in Appendix B. 
Once the system architecture was defined, display concepts were formulated to 
allow maximum use of the potentially large amount of data to be displayed to inform the 
physical security operator of the status of the protected area without overwhelming him 
with information. This part of the study drew upon the experience gained during the 
development of a real time computer-enhanced color display for the Target Detection 
Unit developed under the Waterborne Intrusion Detection Segment (WIDS) program. 495 
 This part of the study also included a survey of available computer-enhanced displays 
which is included in Appendix C. 
A specific design for the AN/PPS(B) radar interface to the netted system is given 
in Appendix D. Appendix E discusses some of the hardware considerations for the netted 
digital processor. 
The following sections of this report discuss the details of the results of the four 
tasks performed. 
SECTION 2 
CONCEPTS FOR NETTING 
RADAR AND FIXED SENSORS 
2.1 PROPERTIES OF A NETTED SYSTEM  
The netted sensor concept came about from attempts to overcome some of the 
limitations of previous security sensors. The two major problems with such previous 
sensor systems were that they required too many personnel for operation over large areas 
and they produced too many false or nuisance alarms. Another factor which has been 
encountered for high data rate sensors such as radar is operator fatigue. Typically radar 
operators observing a number of targets on a display will remain fully alert for only a 
few minutes at a time. Thus, the netting concept is an attempt to use modern computer 
technology to reduce the number of personnel required to operate a security system, 
reduce false or nuisance alarms, and eliminate operator fatigue by displaying only targets 
that have a high probability of being threats. 
A considerable amount of data processing and complex algorithms are inherent 
consequences of netted-sensor concepts. One way to simplify the processing problem 
and, thus, lower the cost is to use so-called distributed processing techniques. This 
simply means that, rather than using one large high speed computer to do all the 
processing, the processing task is broken up into several smaller components which can 
be handled by smaller less costly computers. The new microcomputer technology makes 
this highly feasible. Another advantage of distributed processing is the possibility of 
locating the first-level processor near the sensor. In the case of a radar, initial 
processing near the radar sensor can reduce the data rates from many megahertz to a 
few kilohertz, thus greatly decreasing the cost and complexity of the data link which 
carries the data to the central processing and display unit. 
The netted system can reduce false or nuisance alarms in two ways. First, if two 
or more similar sensors detect the same target, then the effective increase in data rate 
allows the use of more integration to reduce false alarms and more sophisticated 
algorithms to eliminate nuisance alarms. Second, if two generically different sensors 
detect the same target, the proper correlation of target reports from the two sensors can 
greatly enhance the likelihood that displayed targets are a threat. 
Once a threat is detected, the outputs from multiple sensors can be used to build a 
threat track so that the intended destination can be predicted to aid direction of security 
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forces to intercept an intruder. This is much easier to achieve through the use of wide 
area radars which provide continuous coverage of an area, but it can also be achieved to 
some extent with limited area radars and point sensors. 
To achieve the desired functions discussed above, the netted system should have 
certain properties. These include modular components to facilitate repair of the units, 
expandability so that additional sensors can be added, and flexibility so that new 
processing techniques can be implemented as they are developed. The system should be 
able to incorporate all types of sensors currently being developed for physical security 
applications, and the display should present system status and provide threat information 
to the operator in as simple a manner as possible. Furthermore, the operator should be 
able to interrogate those sensors which can respond to obtain additional information or 
change sensor parameters. The following pages will discuss methods for achieving these 
parameters. 
2.2 CURRENT SENSOR PROPERTIES  
Several sensor technologies that will be useful in a netted surveillance system are 
available off-the-shelf, and several of these sensors may be made more useful by 
including them in a netted system. Available sensors reviewed for this study included 
radar sets, fixed sensors, and fixed sensor systems. The radars considered for this 
application included the FOLPEN radar system, the AN/PPS-l5 short-range sector-
surveillance radar, and the AN/PPS-5 (or the AN/PPS-5 Modified) area-surveillance radar 
system. These radars were considered to have quailities useful in any netted radar-fixed 
sensor surveillance system. A summary of the operating parameters for these three 
systems is given in Table 2, and descriptions are provided in Appendix A. 
The FOLPEN system operates within the UHF frequency band and can provide 
surveillance of moving vehicles and personnel in regions covered with heavy foliage. An 
advanced design model of this radar system is currently under development. A summary 
description of this radar is included in Appendix A. 
The AN/PPS-15 radar is a short-range sector-surveillance radar transmitting at X-
band frequencies and is capable of detecting moving vehicles and dismounted personnel in 
open terrain at distances of 3 to 4 kilometers. This system is normally used to detect 
and track single targets under operator control. An improved version of this radar 
system (the EPSD - Exterior Perimeter Surveillance Device) is being developed and is to 
include a netting interface. A summary description of this radar is also included in 
Appendix A. 
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TABLE 2. RADAR SPECIFICATIONS 
YP II 	-r 	I 	F1FD) FOLPEN AN/PPS-15 (B) 	(EPSD Mod) 
DESCRIPTION 
PULSE DOPPLER 
'COHFRFNT ON KECEIVE CA-9oPPIEK FM-CW 
MAXIMUM *DETECTION RANGE 
5 so 	m  
FREOUENCY 
APpRox, 6 KM APPROX. 	1,5 KM APPROX. 	1.5 KM 
16 - 16.5 GHz 435 11Hz 10.25 Ggz 
POLARIZATION LINEAR HORIZONTAL 
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GATE. 
An area surveillance radar has been included in the design scenario of the 
maximum capacity system. This radar includes the following properties: (1) a 360 
degree surveillance sector, (2) a track-while-scan capability, (3) an extended detection 
range for large area coverage, and (4) a moving target indication (MTI) signal processor. 
A modified AN/PPS-5 radar was selected as being representative of this generic radar 
class. This modified radar system was used in the Long range Area Radar for Intrusion 
detection And Tracking (LARIAT) netted radar surveillance system developed by Georgia 
Tech to demonstrate the feasibility of a wide-area base security system for the MX-
missile program. A brief summary of the LARIAT netted radar system appears in 
Appendix A. 
The radar sensors considered in this concept definition study have characteristics 
thought to be needed for the netted security system. The radar sets described represent 
the capabilities of current technologies. The netting principles developed in this study 
are also be applicable for other radar sensor designs. 
The area surveillance radar provides the basis for a wide area security system for 
use in the maximum capacity netted surveillance application. This radar sensor should 
have: (1) a wide angle scan (preferably 360 degrees), (2) a moving target signal 
processing system, (3) a track-while-scan capability, and (4) a capability to operate 
remotely without operator attendance. The area surveillance radar will typically be 
mounted on a tower or on high ground to obtain a maximum unobstructed surveillance 
area. 
The sector surveillance radars represent a class of short range sensors for 
detecting moving personnel and vehicles. These sensors must also include: (1) a moving 
target processor, (2) a track-while-scan mode, and (3) facilities for remote operation. 
Neither the AN/PPS-15 radar nor the FOLPEN radar currently meet the requirements for 
remote operation. A remote netting interface for these two systems is planned, and a 
proposed interface definition for this application is included in Appendix B. This class of 
radar will be used as the primary sensors in limited radar surveillance applications and as 
gap filler sensors in areas not easily monitored by the area surveillance radar systems. 
Radar has long been recognized as an efficient area surveillance device. A radar 
sensor (or group of sensors) can provide a unique overview of the surveillance area. The 
use of multiple radars having overlapping coverage can reduce the problems encountered 
by terrain masking or shadowing since one radar can be positioned to view areas hidden 
from other radar sets. The gap filler radar is a special application of this concept. 
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The radars considered for this application use MTI processing to improve the 
target detection process by separating small moving targets from large stationary ground 
clutter (such as found in the radar returns from trees, rocks, buildings, etc,). While this 
signal processing method can significantly improve the sensitivity of a radar to moving 
targets, it depends on target movement radially toward or away from the radar. 
Tangential movement of the target is not detected by an MTI radar since no Doppler 
frequency return is produced. In this case, multiple radar sensors will eliminate many of 
the dropouts since it is much harder to move tangentially to a number of radars critically 
positioned. 
Fixed sensors have been effectively netted in at least two systems: (1) the 
Facility Intrusion Detection System (FIDS) and (2) the BISS Small Permanent 
Communications and Display Segment (SPCDS). Since these systems have successfully 
interfaced fixed sensors of many different technologies, they were considered as the 
basis for the fixed sensor sources in this study. Descriptions of these two fixed sensor 
systems are also included in Appendix A. 
2.3 NETTED RADAR-FIXED SENSOR SECURITY SYSTEM CONCEPTS  
2.3.1 STUDY GUIDELINES 
This investigation was directed toward development of netting concepts to (1) 
meet the projected requirements for future automation of target detection, track 
management, and threat assessment (a maximum capacity system with wide area radar 
surveillance), and (2) meet the current system needs for netting a limited number of 
personnel detecting radars (one or more) and a group of fixed sensors with a common 
operator/display system. Concepts for current system needs were primarily directed 
toward applications that do not require a full radar surveillance capability. Such a 
reduced capacity system may provide only modest computer assistance to the operator 
and may include only sector radars having limited overlapping coverage. Concepts 
meeting the current security system requirements will be expandable to the full system 
capability. 
The design philosophy also included a definition of the desired target handling 
priorities for the netted system. The following rules were factored into the signal 
processing hierarchy and algorithms. 
a. All radar targets shall be detected automatically. This is necessary due to the 
large target load (large number of targets) that a radar or group of radars presents to a 
single operator. 
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b. Targets may be detected by two or more radars when the radar sets are 
located to have overlapping coverage. The maximum capacity netting system should 
include automatic correlation of targets detected by radars having overlapping coverage. 
c. The same target may be detected by both radar and fixed detectors. Provision 
must be included in the signal processing algorithms to correlate radar target detections 
with those obtained from the fixed sensor arrays. 
d. Radar detections must be converted to a common coordinate system to 
facilitate automatic target tracking, target assessment, and display. Radar systems 
provide target data in a polar coordinate system, but a map grid system provides a more 
efficient means for developing the target handling principles described above. The X-Y 
coordinate system is very compatible with automatic analysis by computer, and this 
approach was adopted for this concept investigation. 
e. The detection rate of radar targets must be controlled to prevent data link and 
computer saturation. This process was addressed through radar preprocessing algorithms 
(processing algorithms located with the radar sensor) such as Constant False Alarm Rate 
(CFAR) thresholding, target verification algorithms, and target track algorithms. 
f. The radar sensors must include self-test functions to ensure correct operation 
and detect degraded sensor performance. Methods must also be included to detect 
tampering and indicate the use of electronic countermeasures. The radar sensor status 
indicatation modes parallel the capabilities of the fixed sensors that are used in the FIDS 
and SPCDS netted systems. 
2.3.2 NETTED SENSOR SYSTEM DESIGN  
A number of proposed requirements have been set forth for a netted radar-fixed 
sensor surveillance system, and a design philosophy has also been defined to guide the 
concept investigations. The basic netted security system approach uses a number of 
remotely operated radars that are connected to a central netting computer via a two-
way data link. A significant amount of radar signal processing and radar target 
processing at the remote radar sites is necessary to control the information rate on the 
data link channels. A general block diagram of the netting concept is illustrated in 
Figure 3. The netting computer contains: (1) the interface with the remote radar sets 
and the fixed sensor system, (2) algorithms for target detection by all sensors, and (3) the 
two-way interface to the operator-display system. For the maximum capacity system, 
the netting computer will contain the algorithms for automatic target declaration, 
tracking, and assessment. 
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Figure 3. Netted radar fixed sensor system concept. 
A rapid deployment requirement has been assumed for the netted radar-fixed 
sensor surveillance system. The principles included in the netting concepts apply equally 
well to permanent installation security systems as to temporary installation systems 
requiring a fast set-up time. One major impact of the fast deployment requirement is 
that it establishes a need for a radio frequency (RF) data link between the netting 
computer and the remote radar sensors. This capability will be specified in the design 
and will adhere to available RF data link specifications where applicable. 
Rapid deployment requirements also imply a high degree of portability in the 
radar sensors and influence the manner in which the sensors are mounted. Both the 
FOLPEN and the AN/PPS-15(B) sector surveillance radars are portable and can be 
routinely set up in a relatively short time on a short tripod by one or two personnel. The 
high degree of portability of the sector surveillance radars is ideal for this application, 
but it imposes some unique requirements in the area of tamper detection. These 
requirements are discussed in more detail in paragraph 2.3.7.4. 
The area surveillance radar will typically require a much higher mounting support 
to ensure maximum surveillance of open and unobscured terrain out to the instrumented 
range of the radar. This implies that this radar should be elevated above the local tree 
line to ensure a clear view of the surveillance area. While hilltop positions can provide 
good vantage points for this purpose, it will frequently be necessary to locate this radar 
on a tower. The AN/PPS-5 modified radar (considered here as having representative 
properties of an area surveillance radar system) was successively deployed on a trailer-
mounted telescoping tower to heights of 100 feet during a Georgia Tech field trip for 
clutter measurements at a number of desert sites. The unit used for these field 
measurements had a five section tower mounted on a trailer and stored in a horizontal 
position (25 feet long in the retracted condition) during transportation and installation or 
servicing of the radar set. The radar was transported as subassemblies in storage 
containers and could be assembled on the tower by a minimum of two persons in less than 
one hour. The trailer mounted tower had built in winches for rotating the tower to a 
vertical position and for extending the sections to a maximum tower height of 100 feet. 
The tower was stabilized by leveling pads on the trailer and a three-wire guy system 
attached to screw anchors placed in the ground. With careful design, this system can be 
self-contained with the radar storage containers and a portable power source (for the 
tower erection system) mounted directly on a single trailer. A total deployment time of 
less than one hour (including installation of the tower guying system) should be 
achievable by a three- or four-man crew by using parallel efforts for installation of the 
radar on the tower and installation of the ground anchors and the guying system. 
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2.3.3 NETTED RADAR DEFINITIONS 
Several complex concepts are addressed in the discussion of netted radars and 
fixed sensors. The following definitions will be adhered to for the remainder of this 
report to ensure a clear understanding of the concepts: 
a. Occupied Resolution Cell (ORC): A range-azimuth cell having a radar return 
greater than the detection threshold. 
b. Potential Target Verification: The algorithm for associating and correlating 
ORC's produced by the same potential intruder. 
c. Target Declaration: The establishment of a target track for a series of 
associated ORC's that represent a potential moving intruder. 
d. Initialization. Criteria: The minimum number of associated ORC's within a 
fixed time period or a fixed number of scans required for target declaration. 
e. Termination Criteria: The threshold number of associated ORC's (within a 
fixed time period or a fixed number of scans) below which a track is terminated. 
f. Split Track Algorithm: When two targets moving along the same path diverge 
to form separate paths, a new track will be generated for one of the paths. 
Correspondingly, converging paths will cause one track to be cancelled. 
g. Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR): An algorithm for adjusting the detection 
threshold for a given range-azimuth cell based on the events in adjacent resolution cells. 
h. Beam Splitting: An algorithm for estimating the azimuth position of a target 
return to increase the angular pointing resolution of the antenna. 
2.3.4 MULTIPLE TARGET DETECTION CONCEPT 
A basic reason for netting a number of radar sensors with a group of fixed sensors 
is to allow all surveillance information to be routed to a common processing/assessment 
system with a single operator-display interface. This system concept may have a number 
of points of overlapping coverage (between radar units as well as between radars and the 
fixed sensor array) to increase the effectiveness of the surveillance. Several advantages 
of overlapping radar coverage have already been mentioned. These include reducing the 
effects of terrain masking, minimizing target dropouts due to tracks that are tangential 
to the sensing radar, and using special radar properties of the FOLPEN (for searching 
areas in heavy foliage). Another obvious advantage is having knowledge that a potential 
intruder is approaching a fixed sensor. 
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The concept of overlapping coverage is illustrated in the diagram in Figure 4. The 
scenario depicted in this drawing shows two area radars (Radar 1 and Radar 2) being used 
with 4 sector surveillance radars. While this scenario would be considered the maximum 
capacity system, it illustrates the situation where a single target is simultaneously 
visible to three different radar sensors. The geometry for reporting the position of the 
target in this figure is seen to require a unique angle and range for each of the radars. 
Each radar typically detects targets (internally) in a polar coordinate system that is 
referenced to the location of the radar and to some arbitrary pointing angle. This 
example demonstrates the need for each ORC report to be expressed in Cartesian 
coordinates. The conversion can be made at the target preprocessor located at each 
radar site if the radar location is known (in Cartesian coordinates) and the pointing angle 
of each set is known. This requires that the position and reference pointing angle be 
furnished to the target preprocessing computers as part of the initialization process. 
These requirements will be addressed further in the section defining the characteristics 
of the control and data links connecting the radar sites and the central netting computer. 
2.3.5 TARGET HANDLING PHILOSOPHY 
The majority of the "reports" processed will be derived from the radar sensors due 
to the large area under surveillance. The large amount of expected personnel activity in 
the surveillance area supports an option for an identification friend or foe (IFF) 
transponder system. A basic principle of the target handling philosophy is that the radar 
surveillance system can provide a warning for the fixed sensor array. Under these ground 
rules, an intruder's approach to a secure area should be automatically tracked by the 
netted radars, and any alarm from a fixed sensor must be considered a definite threat if 
it is a continuation of a radar track. 
The ORC processing priorities for a combined radar-fixed sensor system are 
outlined in Figure 5 in a manner similar to the radar only case previously illustrated in 
Figure 4. Here, the potential intruder detected by the three radars is shown to have 
triggered a fixed sensor (or sensors). The radar data are first analyzed by the netting 
computer to correlate the ORC reports and possibly reduce any redundancy that would 
tend to load the automatic processing algorithms within the netting computer. This 
recognizes that ORC reports will be made from different radar sensors when overlapping 
radar coverage is used. It is also recognized that location errors may exist in the ORC 
reports from each radar due to limitations in the range and azimuth resolution of the 
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Figure 5. Sensor alarm processing priority. 
algorithms to reduce the errors in estimating intruder position. After the ORC reports 
have been processed, all sensor reports are analyzed to correlate fixed sensor alarms 
with the radar track data. 
2.3.6 TRACK GENERATION 
The first step in track generation is to correlate ORC reports having a high 
probability of belonging to the same potential target. This correlation process is 
accomplished by the ORC association algorithms that are used to examine the incoming 
data in a real-time mode and to flag the reports possibly generated from a common 
source. For several reasons, a unique approach to the association problem has been taken 
with the netting of personnel detecting radars. Conventional methods of target 
association that are used with scanning radars to track aircraft commonly use past track 
data to project a search area (or volume) for the next scan of the antenna. This works 
well for cases where the target has finite momentum relative to the scan speed of the 
radar (i.e., the target will continue moving at about the same speed with only a 
predictable change in speed or direction). These tracking principles can not be used with 
personnel detecting radars to automatically monitor the track of a walking man on a 
track-while-scan basis since the human target can effectively change speed and direction 
between steps (a time interval that will be small compared to the time between scans). 
This momentumless model of a human target requires that the ORC association 
algorithms be applied in the reverse order to that in which the reports were made. Each 
ORC report is compared to recent ORC reports to determine if a match can be made 
with any recent reports or tracks (a group of previously associated ORC reports meeting 
the track initialization criteria). ORC association in the netted personnel detecting 
radar system also must be made with little or no information on the size, speed, or 
direction of the motion of the target. Some radar signal processors are capable of 
measuring the radial velocity of the target with respect to the radar, but this 
information is of little use unless the direction of the target is known at the instant 
corresponding to the radial velocity measurement. 
ORC association can be accomplished for the netted personnel detection radar 
application through the use of a zero order filter having a search zone based on a 
preselected maximum velocity. The association process compares each ORC report as it 
is received at the netting computer to determine if any recent ORC reports lie within a 
preset association circle about the ORC being tested. The size of the association circle 
is determined by the time difference between the two ORC reports being compared and 
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t--le maximum velocity estimate established for the targets. The size of the association 
search circle may be different for each ORC pair processed by the association algorithms 
since the time between reports will vary. If a possible match is made with more than one 
ORC report in the computer file, then the association will be made with the one that is 
closest to the ORC report under test. These basic ORC association algorithms were 
developed and field tested during the LARIAT system feasibility demonstration (see 
Appendix A). 
"--)e association algorithm will depend upon a circular buffer storage table 
contained in the netting computer. The concept of this circulating ORC association 
table is illustrated in Figure 6. The table allows for temporary storage of several 
parameters for each ORC report. The total number of reports that can be 
accommodated will be determined by the amount of memory space allotted for this 
purpose. The size of this memory is a trade-off between computer resources and the 
minimum time that the track information must be stored in this short term memory 
(magnetic disk or tape may be used for long term storage of ORC reports and 
associations). The following example illustrates several considerations that impact on 
the computer memory space required for the circular ORC association buffer. If we 
assume a maximum limit of 20 target tracks at any instant with each track being 
simultaneously scanned at an average rate of 10 seconds per scan by at least two radars 
(overlapping coverage implied), a total of 4 ORC reports will be generated each second. 
If the minimum time that ORC information is to be retained is 10 minutes, then an ORC 
buffer file of at least 2000 reports must be maintained for this period. Each ORC report 
will contain a minimum of 5 words. These will include the X and Y coordinates, the time 
of the ORC report, the time flag of any previous ORC report that is associated, and a 
track identification (ID) number (when the associated ORC reports meet the 
requirements established by the track initiation algorithms). These items would require a 
total of five words per ORC report making it necessary to reserve a total of 10,000 
words in the ORC buffer to meet the minimum storage time for the assumed 20 target 
tracks. 
A simple example of the ORC association table is shown in Table 3. This example 
is limited to the movement of a single target for simplicity in the explanation. The ORC 
reports are received in near real time along with a time flag giving the time of 
detection. The reports are entered into the ORC buffer storage in the order that they 
were detected, but may appear in slightly different order if multiple radars are being 
used (depending on the multiplexing/communication format for receiving information 
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Circular Buffer File 
Figure 6. Recirculating ORC table. 
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TABLE 3. NETTED RADAR SENSORS ORC ASSOCIATION TABLE. 
X- POSITION 	Y-POSITION 	TIME 	ORC ASSOCIATION 
Xi 	 Y1 	Ti 	 - 
X2 	 Y2 12 T1 
X4 	 Y4 	T4 	 T3 
X5 Y5 T5 	 T4 
X6 	 Y6 	T6 T5 
X7 Y7 T7 	 T6 
X8 	 Y8 	T8 ) 17 
X9 Y9 T9 	 T 8 
ASSOCIATION GIVEN 
BY TIME FLAG OF 
LINKED ORC 
	
X3 Y3 -3 T2 
ASSOCIATION SEARCH 
{ 
MADE IN REVERSE 
TIME ORDER 
from the remote radars). The association search is made in the reverse time order as 
shown by the arrow between T-9 and T-8. When an association between two ORC reports 
is made, then the time of the associated ORC report is inserted into the ORC report 
being tested (as illustrated in the ORC association column of Table 3). This ORC 
association pointer allows the track history to be easily reconstructed as needed. An 
ORC association table generated from a multiple target track situation will contain 
interleaved ORC reports, and the different tracks can be resolved into individual tracks 
by following the appropriate track pointers. 
The drawing in Figure 7 illustrates the ORC association process for the single 
target example described above. The circular search zone is shown around the T-9 ORC 
report with a diameter that is determined by the time difference between the T-9 report 
and the T-8 report. Since the T-8 report falls within this search zone, an association is 
made and the T-8 time pointer is entered in the T-9 ORC report as described above. This 
figure illustrates that the points are not required to lie on a straight line or to follow a 
straight track for the ORC association algorithms to work. 
The simple example discussed above illustrates the string of associated ORC 
reports relative to a track path. When a track is generated in the computer using the 
string of ORC associations, it will be in the form of an estimated track that is fitted to 
the X-Y coordinates of the ORC reports. This fitting process will produce a filtered 
track giving (1) a predicted position and (2) a predicted velocity (speed and direction) of 
the actual target. This concept is further illustrated in Figure 8 where the string of 
associated ORC reports are represented by a dashed line. The ORC locations are shown 
to be staggered about the actual target track since this is the effect that is produced by 
the limited range and azimuth resolution of the radar sets. Notice that the spacing 
interval between adjacent ORC reports may not be constant. This effect is produced by 
random scan times when multiple radars detect the same target or a sector scan when 
the target is not in the center of the sector. The estimated position of the target 
(represented by the arrow head of the filtered track in Figure 8) is seen to lag the actual 
position of the target track (represented by the arrow head of the target track vector) 
since the radar data are available only when one of the radar sensors is scanning the 
actual target track. In practice, there will also be some lag in the output of the filtered 
track data when compared to the ORC report associations due to the computational 
demands of the track filter algorithms. 
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Figure 8. Netted radar sensors computer track generation. 
2.3.7 RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSING 
2.3.7.1 General Hierarchy  
The radar signal processing concepts include a number of algorithms that will be 
applied to the radar data in real time at the radar preprocessor (located at the remote 
radar site). A simplified block diagram of the signal processing hierarchy for the three 
types of radars is given in Figure 9. The three basic divisions of the netted radar system 
are illustrated here by the horizontal dashed lines dividing the system into the remote 
radar site equipment, the data link section, and the central facility that includes the 
netting computer and the operator/display functions. Additional radar inputs will be 
represented in the system by parallel inputs to the association algorithms block. A 
moving target processor is assumed to be included in all the radars to provide the needed 
target to clutter separation. 
The next block in the chain from the area surveillance radar is the CFAR 
algorithms. This functions as a variable threshold detector with the threshold value 
being adjusted by the activity in the range cells immediately adjacent to the cell being 
evaluated. In a pulsed radar system (typical of the AN/PPS-5 system assumed in the 
security system scenario), this can take the form of simple amplitude averaging of the 
contents of a number of cells adjacent to the cell being tested. This process is repeated 
for all range bins at each antenna azimuth (or several times while the target is within the 
beamwidth of the scanning antenna). Range-azimuth cells that have target signals above 
the CFAR threshold will be declared as occupied resolution cells (ORCs) and the ORC 
generator will initiate an ORC report (here in polar coordinates). The CFAR algorithms 
may take alternate forms particularly for the short range sector radars that typically 
transmit a modulated FM carrier. These alternate CFAR systems for the FM radars will 
have similar algorithms making the ORC rate dependent upon the activity in the adjacent 
resolution cells. 
The next function in the signal processing chain for the area surveillance radar is 
the R-Theta blanking. This function is seldom required, but is a principal tool for 
eliminating interference from adjacent radars. The algorithm allows for sectors or pie 
sectioned wedges where all ORC reports are ignored to be defined in polar coordinates. 
At this point, all ORC reports are converted to Cartesian coordinates. A similar 
blanking function is applied as a filter to the ORC reports in the X-Y coordinates. This 
second blanking function is necessary to eliminate areas previously identified from maps 
as being of little or no interest to the surveillance problem. The sections to be blanked 
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Figure 9. Radar netting signal processing hierarchy. 
The sector surveillance radars are shown to have a netting interface unit in Figure 
9 that is labeled "to be defined." This functional box will include the ORC generator 
along with any CFAR or integrator algorithms. This section of the signal processing is 
left undefined at this point since there is ongoing development activity in this area for 
the two sector surveillance radars being considered in this netting study. The provisions 
for blanking in polar coordinates is recommended for the sector surveillance radars. A 
provision for X-Y blanking is also recommended. 
The principal algorithms in the netting computer are the ORC association 
algor'thms. For a maximum capacity netted system having a high degree of overlapping 
radar coverage, these algorithms provide a degree of data reduction and form the basis 
for the automatic detection that is desired to reduce the operator load. 
2.3.7.2 Target Test - Threat Analysis 
Several tests of each associated ORC string will be made within the netting 
computer. The first tests will be to determine if an ORC string meets the requirements 
necessary to be declared a target track. This criteria has been previously defined as a 
preset number of hits within a given time period (or within a given number of possible 
scan events). When this threshold is met, a track flag is associated with the ORC reports 
in the netting computer and other track algorithms are initiated. Target threat  
assessment and alarms will only be made on declared tracks. This definition was made 
earlier, but the importance may only be seen after understanding the ORC association 
process. The data used for threat assessment and alarming are greatly reduced from that 
generated at the output of the radars. The basic tools for analyzing the target track 
data are the track filters and the scenario map giving predefined warning boundaries. 
This simple approach is used to provide some degree of automatic analysis of the radar 
information without requiring the development of new capabilities in the radar systems. 
The simple threat analysis criteria described here operated satisfactorily in the LARIAT 
field test against actual threat targets. Discussions of additional threat analysis tools 
are included in later sections of this report. 
Two alarm levels have been proposed, for the netted security system. A Yellow  
Alert has been defined for any declared target track that is within the base boundary (as 
stored in the netting computer). This alarm is used to call the system operator's 
attention to the condition that a new target is being tracked by the system. The 
operator can interact with the system at this point to request additional information on 
the target track or to enter track information to be associated with the track if he 
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possesses such knowledge. In the case of split tracks or merged tracks, this information 
may be obvious to the operator from the scenario map display. The identity of a track 
may also be known from other sources such as remote observers, remote TV-optical 
systems, or radio contact with the target. 
Crossing tracks are handled by the same track algorithms. Two tracks that cross 
will still be maintained as two separate tracks, but no guarantee can be made that the 
same identity of the tracks will be correct after they cross. This is not considered to be 
a severe limitation on the netted surveillance system since all intruders will be 
automatically tracked. 
The yellow alert is also proposed for use with reports from general purpose fixed 
sensors. The philosophy here is that a disturbance from a single fixed sensor is an 
unconfirmed intrusion report that requires the attention of the system operator, but does 
not demand immediate action. 
A Red Alert is proposed for conditions requiring immediate action from the 
system operator. A red alert will always be used for (1) any target track within a defined 
critical asset area, (2) any target track projected to enter a defined critical asset area, 
or (3) any target track of radar ORC data that is correlated with a fixed sensor alarm. 
The defined critical asset area is a predefined boundary (within the prescribed base area) 
that is set aside as requiring immediate action when an intruder alarm is received. This 
critical asset area may be reserved for such items as weapon storage, communication 
facilities, power distribution facilities, or remote radar surveillance sensors. 
Provisions for a conditional Red Alert will also be made for defined high priority 
fixed sensors. This will hold for unconfirmed alarms when the location of the fixed 
sensor is protecting an area or device that demands immediate response. 
The concept of alerting on tracks that are projected to enter a critical asset area 
is illustrated in Figure 10. The inner rectangle is the defined critical asset area, and the 
outer rectangle is the warning boundary that is used to initiate the track projection 
algorithms that test for possible intersection of track and the inner rectangle. All track 
projections are made from the filtered track vector. A Red Alert is issued when both of 
the following conditions are met: (1) a target track intersects or exists within the outer 
perimeter boundary and (2) the projected track intersects the defined critical boundary. 
31 
Projected Intercept 




I 	 I 	1 
Defined 
„---- 
1-1 '-Critical Assets 
1 	I 	 I 	(Boundaries „---- 	' defined in , 	1 I  I ---- computer) , 	 I  
1 	q 	 t 	s 





"Red" Alert occurs when all three of the following conditions exist: 
1, A target track exists within the outer perimeter boundary 
2. The target track intersects the warning boundary around 
the Defined Critical Assets 
3. The projected track intersects the Defined Critical Boundary 
Figure10. Netted radar sensors "red" alert. 
2.3.7.3 Operator Target Assessment Options  
Several possible options are available to assist the operator in determining the 
identity of a possible target. When an alert is made to the operator, several conditions 
have been met to ensure with high probability that the disturbance is a real target. The 
proposed algorithms have not defined a capability for eliminating responses due to 
unwanted real targets such as large animals. One criteria proposed (but not sufficiently 
tested during the LARIAT feasibility demonstration) is the use of the output of the track 
filters to measure the randomness of the speed and direction of the target track to 
separate feeding animals from targets moving with a purpose as though trying to reach a 
known destination. While this is a simple test to include in the target testing algorithms, 
it could be very useful in base areas where cattle graze in the open or large game (such 
as deer) exist in significant numbers. 
The first and most straightforward method for verifying the identity of a target is 
to send out a patrol. This can be very costly over a long projected system operating 
period of several years. Patrol response capability can also be easily saturated when a 
large number of tracks appear on the scenario map display. In some cases, the system 
operator can be helped greatly by the use of remote TV surveillance systems. These 
devices can be either fixed area surveillance units (such as monitoring the area around 
buildings or approach paths) or a remotely controlled system capable of changing the 
pointing direction, the pointing elevation, and the magnification. Automatic pointing of 
the remote TV sensors can easily be included within the netting compter and would 
require only that the system operator designate the track on the display and request TV 
verification. A TV target verification system can coexist on the same tower with the 
area surveillance radar. This addition can greatly reduce the number of security patrol 
responses necessary and can even operate in the dark with the use of low-light TV 
cameras. Other useful optical sensors are available to augment the TV target 
verification option. 
A very simple target assessment option already exists in some of the netted fixed 
sensor systems in the form of an acoustical microphone. This device can be activated to 
allow the operator to listen to sounds that may be generated by targets in the vicinity of 
the microphone. This technique is most effective when fixed sensors are deployed along 
a track that indicates an intruder plans to enter a critical asset area (i.e., an area also 
including fixed sensors). 
Radar Doppler analysis is a very powerful method for identifying a target from 
the reflected radar signal. The movement of the target produces return reflections that 
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are changed in frequency from those transmitted by the radar. This is the principle that 
makes possible the detection of small moving targets in the presence of large levels of 
ground clutter through MTI signal processing. It has long been known that a trained 
operator could identify many targets by listening to the Doppler return from a radar set 
while the antenna remains pointed at the target in a "search light" mode. 
The ability to acoustically monitor Doppler returns is currently instrumented in 
the AN/PPS-15 and AN/PPS-5 radars. The simplest method of using this target 
assessment tool is to provide the operator with a means of taking one of the radars out of 
the track-while-scan mode and to manually locate (via remote control) the Doppler range 
cell over the target. This concept was instrumented in the LARIAT system design but 
proved to require a longer than desired time to acquire the target within the Doppler 
range bin. A more interesting option would be to partially automate the process of 
positioning the Doppler range bin over the target. In this semiautomatic system, the 
operator would designate the position on the scenario map and the appropriate radar 
would automatically slew to the proper azimuth and adjust the Doppler range bin to the 
correct range. In either the manual or semiautomatic approach, an indication of the 
sampling bin position must appear on the scenario map. Either of these methods for  
Doppler monitoring of the target return provides a good analysis tool that is readily  
within the state of the art of both the radar sensors and the computer/software required  
for the netting computer. 
A very desirable capability for the netted surveillance system would be a 
completely automatic Doppler analysis of the radar return from targets. At present, this 
capability is not readily available, but with current target identification technology it is 
possible to develop the necessary algorithms for this function in the near future. Since 
this would improve the efficiency of the overall surveillance system, provisions should be 
included for this capability to allow this feature to be added at a later date. 
2.3.7.4 Radar Sensor Security  
A netted security system depending upon the remote operation of radar sensors 
should provide for detecting and alarming on possible conditions of (1) someone 
tampering with the equipment, (2) someone approaching the radar site, or (3) the 
presence of electronic tampering in the form of radar jamming countermeasures. Door 
switches can easily indicate when a unit is entered. An acoustic sensor with a high 
threshold setting can also be used to detect impacts of small arms fire which may 
indicate intruder activity and possible damage to the radar. The small sector radar 
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mounted on a tripod can be easily moved or pointed in a different direction. If the 
pointing direction of such a radar sensor was changed (by either friendly or unfriendly 
forces) without knowledge of the system operator, the operation of the netted 
surveillance system could be greatly impaired. For this reason, it is proposed that simple 
tilt and vibration sensors be included in this class of radars. 
In some applications, it may be desirable to include a capability for detecting 
personnel approaching the remote radar site. The capability would be in addition to that 
provided by the netted system through the use of defined critical asset areas. Short 
range proximity sensors such as leaky coax are available for this application. The output 
of the proximity detector would be interfaced to the radar set, and alarming conditions 
would be transmitted with the radar sensor security status reports. 
Electronic countermeasures can be a definite indication of attempts to cover an 
intrusion into the defended base area. From this standpoint, this event should be 
immediately passed on to the system operator so that appropriate action can be taken to 
determine the source of the interference and to possibly adjust the tactics for responding 
to detected targets. 
These detector/alarm functions are considered necessary for proper operation of a 
netted security system. While all of the functions may not be required for every type of 
radar sensor, for future expansion it is proposed that the capability be provided at this 
time since the two types of sector radars being considered in this study are either under 
development or are being considered for a product improvement program. A list of the 
proposed communication requirements and the corresponding sensor capabilities is given 
in Table 4. The actual mix of the sensors listed in this table may change from radar to 
radar. 
2.3.7.5 IFF Beacon Transponder Option  
One option that is possible for target track identification is the use of a beacon 
transponder system to identify as friendly troops target tracks that are generated by 
security patrols or maintenance crews. This concept option can provide automatic 
location and track information of the friendly forces on the situation display map. This 
capability will also provide a unique tool to assist in survey of the surveillance site (a 
problem in quick deployment applications) by returning a measure of the range and 
azimuth to the transponder interrogator. 
The IFF transponder system can be designed to operate through one of the radar 
systems, or it can be designed to be an independent facility. An IFF system was included 
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TABLE 4. SECURITY FOR REMOTE RADARS. 
o Equipment Tampering Sensors (8 Sensors Maximum - 3 Bits) 
o Door Switch - Detect Entry of Equipment 
Vibration - Detect Gross Movement of Equipment 
o Acoustic - Detect Impact of Small Arms Fire 
o Smoke - Internal Fire Sensor 
o Temperture - Internal Fire Sensor 
o Personnel Detectors (I Bit) 
Short Range Proximity Sensors 
o Electronic Tampering/Jamming-Countermeasures (2 Bits) 
o Electronic Monitoring of Radar Receiver 
(Receiver Noise and/or Isolated Resolution Cell) 
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in the feasibility test of the LARIAT system and proved to be a very useful addition to 
the surveillance system. In this experiment, the IFF system responded through either of 
the two AN/PPS-5 area surveillance radars and the system had a capability of using up to 
8 IFF transponders. The LARIAT system was tested with three transponders having a 
range reporting resolution of 6.25 meters. 
2.3.7.6 Radar Location Accuracy  
The three radar systems considered in this study have been described as having a 
finite range resolution as listed previously in Table 2. This basic limitation is controlled 
by such radar design parameters as pulse width (for the pulse modulated system). 
Azimuth resolution is determined by the antenna beamwidth and is also dependent upon 
target distance from the radar. These two location resolution concepts are illustrated in 
Figure 11. With these basic resolution limits, the location accuracy of a target is limited 
to one-half of the range bin resolution and to one-half of the beamwidth (assuming that 
no further processing has been performed and that the absolute accuracy of the system is 
equal to or greater than the location resolution). Processing algorithms exist for 
improving the location estimation resolution by averaging the target response in the 
adjacent resolution cells to predict the actual location of the target. The algorithm for 
increasing the range resolution is called range bin splitting. Azimuth resolution is 
increased by the beam splitting algorithm. These algorithms work only when there is one 
target within the resolution cell and the immediately adjacent cells are empty. When 
multiple targets are clustered in the same resolution cell, these algorithms typically 
predict the centroid of the target group. 
The limitations in the target location accuracy impacts on the data link 
specifications and the netting computer. The three radars considered in this concept 
study are representative of current technology and units that may be produced in the 
near future. The performance of these radar systems will be used to generate the 
recommended communication requirements for the data link and command links for the 
netted radar-fixed sensor surveillance system. A summary of the location accuracies of 
these three radar units appears in Table 5. The accuracy is a function of the range to the 
target as discussed above. 
The recognized limits on location accuracy of the radar sensors leads to a 
conclusion that the nominal location resolution will vary between 10 and 50 meters. In 
defining the requirements for a netted radar-fixed sensor surveillance system, the 
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Figure 11. Radar location accuracy. 
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AN/PPS-5(M) 0.5 KM ± 50 METERS ± 	3 METERS ** 
1.5 KM + 	9 METERS 
3.0 KM ± 	18 METERS 
10 	KM ± 	60 METERS 
FOLPEM 0,5 KM ± 30 METERS + 	90 METERS 
1.5 KM 1 ± 270 METERS 
* 
AN/PPS-15 0.5 KM ± 40 METERS 10 METERS *** 
1.5 KM 30 METERS 
3,0 KM 60 METERS 
EXCEEDS MAXIMUM INSTRUMENTED RANGE 
BASED ON NO BEAM SPLITTING 
BASED ON OPERATIONAL DATA 
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transmitted will be 10 meters, (2) the maximum reporting radius of any radar will be 10 
kilometers - the maximum instrumented range of the area surveillance radar sets, and (3) 
all ORC reports will be made in Cartesian coordinates. These assumptions will allow the 
ORC position reports to be defined with a minimum of 11 bits for the X-coordinate and 
11 bits for the Y-coordinate. 
The time flag in the ORC report is the key to the ORC association algorithm. It 
is also desirable to retain , the ability of tracing target activity that may have been 
recorded on a magnetic tape log for later analysis. For these purposes, a time resolution 
of I second in a period of 24 hours is recommended. This resolution can be 
accommodated in a 17 bit binary code. 
2.3.7.7 Interface and Communications  
The netting computer is the principal nodal point of the netted radar-fixed sensor 
security system concept. A great deal of emphasis was placed on the description of the 
data-link and command link interface between the netting computer and the remote 
radar sensor systems. While the operator-display unit might not be operated remotely 
from this unit, a general definition of the interface requirements and the communication 
format is equally important in the design of the netted surveillance system. The design 
concepts used in this section of the netted surveillance system must not limit the use of 
the operator-display unit at a remote location or the use of parallel remote status display 
units. 
The design of the interface to the operator-display unit must accommodate all 
target messages generated in the netting computer including: (1) target-track locations, 
(2) target alarms, (3) IFF location/information, and (4) target assessment information. 
Several other types of messages must also be transmitted to the operator-display unit 
(see Table 6) during the normal operation of the netted surveillance system. A header 
message preceding each transmission from the netting computer will be used to define 
the message category that follows. This procedure will allow a priority interrupt system 
to be used within the operator-display unit to service the interface items of highest 
priority first. The design philosophy assumed in this general interface discussion requires 
that the operator-display unit have a memory capacity sufficient for maintaining the 
short term target track and alarm information required for the situation map display to 
the operator. 
Long term recording equipment used to record target activity (such as digital 
tape) can be located with either the netting computer or the operator-display unit. With 
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TABLE 6. MESSAGES TO OPERATOR-DISPLAY UNIT 
o Five Types of Messages will be Transmitted to the Operator-Display Unit 
o Header Message - This Message is Transmitted for All Communications to the 
Operator-Display Unit - Presents an OK Status or Defines the Failure Message to 
Follow 
o Failure Message - Always Preceded by a Header Message - Gives Basic Target or 
ORC Information from Radars and Fixed Sensors 
o Sensor Report Message - Always Preceded by a Header Message - Gives Basic 
Target or ORC Information from Radars and Fixed Sensors 
o IFF Report Message - Always Preceded by a Header Message - Transmitts IFF 
Transponder Information on Friendly Tracks 
o Tamper Reports - Always Preceded by a Header Message - Transmits Information 
on Tampering With Sensors, Interference or Jamming of Radars, etc. 
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this design approach, the netting computer will pass target and status reports to the 
operator-display unit as they occur and will not maintain a target file for further recall 
by the display facility. 
The netting computer must also respond to communications generated within the 
operator-display unit. These communications must accommodate the basic messages for 
(1) system initialization, (2) control of the operating parameters of the radar units, and 
(3) initiating the self-test functions of the system. Other message formats will be 
allowed, depending upon the options included within the netted security system design. 
One option discussed previously is the ability to remotely control a sampling gate in the 
area surveillance radars for Doppler analysis of the radar return from moving targets. 
The controls for this function will be accommodated in the command message format 
controlling the radar operating parameters. The IFF option described earlier can operate 
automatically and does not require any special commands from the operator. 
The resolution and bit rate required in the interface data-links between the 
netting computer and the remotely operated radar units were defined in considerable 
detail. The interface to the operator-display unit was also defined. A partial list of 
information proposed for the target report is given in Table 7. The position reporting 
information maintains the same 11 bit resolution for each coordinate. The target 
velocity information derived within the netting computer should be reported as one of 
seven velocity classes. 
This information will be a product of the track filters and does not represent 
measurements made on the Doppler return of the individual radar signals. The computer 
derived target speed will be an averaged estimate based primarily on the time-location 
differences between consecutive ORC reports and will be subject to the resolution 
limitations of the radar locating systems. Therefore, the seven velocity classes will 
allow the relative target speed to be conveyed to the surveillance system operator. 
A resolution for target direction of 5 degrees has been proposed for reporting of 
this target analysis algorithm since this is compatiable with the plotting accuracy of the 
display system. This information is intended only to indicate the relative direction of the 
target movement to the operator. The basic time resolution of one second within a 24 
hour day will be preserved in the target message to the operator-display unit. In this 
netted surveillance system scenario study, a capability of reporting up to 320 individual 
fixed location sensors is accommodated. This number is not a hard limit, but represents 
a realistic benchmark for this concept study. 
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TABLE 7. PROPOSED TARGET REPORT DEFINITIONS 
o Target Speed - Proposed that Velocity Classes be Reported as Follows: 
Velocity Clear 	Target Speed  
1 	 0 - 2 km/hr 
2 	 2 - 4 km/hr 
3 	 4 - 8 km/hr 
4 	 8 - 20 km/hr 
5 	 20 - 40 km/hr 
6 	 Over 40 km/hr 
SECTION 3 
PROPOSED SYSTEM CONCEPT 
Many system netting concepts presented in the previous sections of this report 
were previously tested in feasibility demonstrations of the LARIAT netted radar 
system. The extensions of the initial netted radar surveillance system concept to include 
an active interface connection to a large group of fixed-location security sensors is a 
natural development in the design philosophy for centralizing the surveillance 
information available to the system operator. This extension in the netting concept can 
be accomplished with current state-of-the-art hardware and with low development risk. 
The radar system requirements are based on moving target indication (MTI) signal 
processing techniques equivalent to that used in battlefield applications of similar radar 
surveillance equipment. 
This proposed concept design will reference much of the material already 
presented in this report. The concept design discussed here represents a benchmark 
based on the assumed system scenario defined previously in Table 1. The proposed 
system design must accommodate the full scenario system requirements and be adaptable 
to applications where reduced radar surveillance is required. Two design levels to 
accomplish these goals were considered. The goals of this concept design are listed in 
Table 8 based on a two-level system design approach. 
A full capability system is defined as one that is based on the requirement of wide 
area radar surveillance and includes the fully automated target processing capabilities 
presented in the netting concept discussions. Security-surveillance systems having only 
limited radar search requirements are provided for in a reduced capability system. The 
reduced capability system is directed toward applications including one or more radar 
units (primarily of the short-range sector-scanning variety) with a netting configuration 
of fixed location sensors. 
The design concepts and the proposed netted surveillance system configuration 
presented in this report will not limit the use of the netted sensor system in an all radar 
configuration or an all fixed location sensor configuration. The concepts presented here 
are usable in any mix of radars and sensor units, and the maximum number of sensors 
used in this benchmark design is based on the assumed system requirement scenario. 
A major key to the netted surveillance system design is the degree of automation 
for target processing and threat assessment that is included. The reduced capability 
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TABLE 8. DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 
o Two Levels of a Netted Radar/Fixed Sensor Surveillance System Will be Examined to 
Address: 
1. A Full Capability System based on wide area radar surveillance and on the fully 
automated target processing capabilities presented in the concepts discussions. 
This concept design will be capable of netting a maximum of 8 radars (including up 
to two area radars). 
2. A Reduced Capability System providing a minimum of automated target 
processing and depending upon the system operator to perform some of the 
operations of target correlation and assessment on the system display. This 
concept design will be capable of netting a maximum of 8 radars, but is primarily 
intended for use with the short range sector radars with limited overlapping 
coverage. 
o The netting conepts considered here should not limit the use of the netted sensor 
system with an all radar configuration or with an all fixed sensor configuration. 
o The maximum number of radars (8) is an arbitary limit assumed in the senario. 
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system will not be as well developed in the area of automatic processing of sensor data 
and will depend upon the system operator to perform some of the operations of target 
correlation and assessment with the aid of the system scenario map display. The full 
capability system will include algorithms for the automatic detection, tracking, analysis, 
and alarming on intrusion reports from the radars and the fixed sensor units contained in 
the netted system. Table 9 defines the target processing algorithms for the two proposed 
levels of system design. These data processing capabilities have been defined in the 
previous discussions on netted sensor surveillance systems. This table clearly identifies 
the signal processing algorithms that are not automated in the reduced capability 
system. The IFF function was described as an option for the full capability system. 
A more detailed summary of the signal processing algorithms for the radar and 
fixed location sensor data reports is given in Table 10. The separation of the two levels 
of the netted system design is preserved in this listing, but the algorithm functions are 
grouped in a slightly different order to better identify the basic functions of target 
detection and track analysis. The first algorithm group contains six functions that form 
the automatic target detection and track generation algorithms that are contained in the 
netting computer. These target processing functions exist in both the full capability 
system design and the reduced capacity system. The hardware requirements for the two 
applications may differ somewhat in memory requirements and data processing speed. 
This is due primarily to the differing amounts of sensor data that must be 
accommodated. The basic signal processing algorithms and the hardware design for the 
reduced capability system can in principle be expanded to accommodate the full 
capability system design. 
The basic principle for achieving the high degree of automatic signal processing 
for the high data rate encountered with the radar sensor units is through the development 
of efficient signal processing algorithms and the use of a distributed signal processing 
concept. By extending portions of the signal processing facilities to the radar sites, the 
redundancy in the radar signal output can be used to significantly reduce the data rate 
requirements. The algorithms for target detection are also designed to greatly reduce 
target reports generated by spurious radar responses to system noise and natural 
phenomena. The preferred location of the target processing algorithms in the netted 
system is given in Table 11. 
A general block diagram of the netted radar-fixed sensor surveillance system is 
given in Figure 12. This block diagram includes all elements of the full capability system 
concept including an interface to both the FIDS and the SPCDS systems (see Appendix A 
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TABLE 9. NETTED RADAR-FIXED POINT SECURITY SYSTEM CONCEPT CAPABILITIES 
Function 	Full Capability System (FCS) Reduced Capability System (RCS) 
1. Target Detection Yes - Automatic Yes - Automatic 
2. Track Generation Yes - Automatic Yes - Automatic 
3. Radar-to-Radar Target Yes - Automatic Yes - Manual 
Correlation 
4. Radar-to-Fixed Sensor Yes - Automatic Yes - Manual 
Target Correlation 
5. Track Filters Yes - Automatic No 
6. Target Position Yes - Automatic No 
Projection 
7. Alarm Zones Yes - Automatic Yes - Automatic 
8. Threat Assessment Yes - Automatic/Manual No 
9. IFF Capability Yes - Automatic No 
(Correlation between 
IFF and "Skin" returns) 
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TABLE 10. NETTED SECURITY SYSTEM CONCEPT CAPABILITIES 
Algorithm Function 
1. Target Detection/Track Generation 
• ORC Association 
• Track Initiation 
• Track Termination 
• Track Split 
• Track Junction 
• Track Crossing 
2. Correlation of target reports 
Full Capability System (FCS) 	 Reduced Capability System (RCS) 
• Time-Position Association between adjacent 	• Same as FCS 
ORC Reports 
• Based on preset number of associated ORC 	 • Same as FCS 
Reports in fixed time frame 
• Based on number of associated ORC Reports 	• Same as FCS 
within fixed time frame being below threshold 
• Established track continues along one branch 	• Same as FCS 
and new track is generated for remaining branch 
• Only one established track remains with all 	• Same as FCS 
remaining tracks terminated 
• Established tracks remain but may switch 	 • Same as FCS 
targets 
• Radar-to-Radar 	 • Correlation through Time-Position Association 	• Correlation made by operator on 
(for overlapping coverage) 	 of ORC Reports 	 computer generated scenario map 
display 
• Radar-to-Fixed Sensor 	 • Correlation through Time-Position Association 	• Correlation made by operator on 
of Fixed Sensor•Data with ORC Reports 	 computer generated scenario map 
display 
3. Track Filters/Target Position Prediction • Algorithms for estimating direction and speed 	• None 
of target track - necessary for intrusion 
pridiction and track threat assessment 
4. Operator Alarms • • Warning Alarm (Yellow) based on defined track 	• Simple Alarm when declared target occurs 
track properties (properties of speed & direction) 	within predefined boundary 
• Immediate Reaction Alarm (Red) based on 
actual. intrusion of predefined zone or on 
prldicted intrusion of predefined zone 
5. Threat Assessment • Manual or Semiautomatic through operator 	 • Manual monitoring of Doppler radar return 
monitoring of Doppler radar return from • (located at the radar) 
target 	(current capability) 
• Automatic or•Semiautomatic through computer 
assessment of target return (projected capability) 
6. IFF Capability • Automatic correlation between IFF target tracks 	• None 
and tracks of "skin" returns 
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Figure 12. General Configuration of a netted radar-fixed sensor system. 
for summary discussions of these systems). In reality, it is not likely that both of these 
fixed-sensor netted surveillance systems would be used in the same security installations, 
though it can conceptually be accommodated. 
The nodal point of this concept design is the netting computer. This hardware and 
software functional block provides (1) a two-way interface to the radar units and the 
fixed sensor arrays, (2) the system interface to the operator-display system, and (3) the 
basic memory and computer facilities for performing the target detection, tracking and 
alarming functions. Figure 13 gives a more detailed block diagram of the automatic 
target handling algorithms proposed for the full capability surveillance system. 
The proposed netted surveillance system design outlined in this section represents 
a benchmark design based on a realistic set of scenario requirements. The netting 
principles presented in this report are achievable with current state--of-the-art 
equipment and through the use of algorithms that have been demonstrated in previous 
investigations. The combination of these concepts and hardware capabilities can achieve 












































4.1 DISPLAY CONFIGURATION  
The display module is the operator's interface with the netted security system. 
The display module receives processed data from the entire system and displays that 
information in a graphical form that allows the operator to quickly grasp complex 
situations. The display module also enables the operator to communicate with the 
system through several types of man-to-machine interface devices. 
The display module consists of three basic hardware units. The system control 
central processing unit (SCCPU) is basically a computer that receives messages from the 
netted system and generates the data to be displayed. The display unit will display the 
information generated by the SCCPU. The third element is the associated operator input 
devices and the electronics required to support their operation. Given this division of 
system functions, the term 'display module' is used when the entire display system is 
referenced, and the term 'display device' is used in reference to the unit that displays 
data for the operator to monitor. 
4.2 PURPOSE OF THE DISPLAY MODULE  
The purpose of the display module in the netted sensor system is to inform the 
operator of: (1) base or installation security, and (2) netted sensor system operational 
status. The status of total base security is displayed in graphic form using maps and 
symbols. In addition, messages tailored to provide specific information are presented on 
the display. System status in measage format is always displayed. 
A second purpose of the display module is to provide amplifying information to the 
operator after the initial intrusion condition has been communicated. The amplifying 
information may include: (1) precise coordinates of the event, (2) a tailored response 
based on security police, (3) intruder speed, (4) past location, (5) future location, (6) 
security force location, and (7) other parameters. Data such as wind speed, and the 
presence of thunder, lightning, hail or other environmental factors (sources of false 
alarms) that might affect sensor operation can also be displayed using the display module 
concept chosen to support the netted system. 
The display module would be used to record data for event analysis purposes. 
Parameters that would include "time of event" and "intruder track history" could be 
55 
recorded, as could security force response times and associated response track 
histories. Each of these data would be valuable for "post event" analysis that could be 
conducted to improve the response tactics at a future time. 
The display module can be programmed to improve operator "alertness." Human 
factor studies have demonstrated that workers who must be subservient to machines 
usually become bored much quicker than personnel who control various aspects of a 
system. The netted security system concept is highly automated. This is advantageous 
for most security situations where the operator must perform several tasks in addition to 
monitoring the security module display. However, when the operator's sole activity is 
display unit monitoring, boredom can become a negative factor. The automated nature 
of the netted sensor system allows features to be built into the system to test operator 
alertness and to require specific operator responses on a random or scheduled basis. 
4.3 DISPLAY SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE  
The overall netted security system architecture and communication hierarchy was 
discussed in previous sections. The communications scheme used to interface the display 
system with the rest of the netted security system, and the display system hardware and 
software architecture are discussed in the following sub-paragraphs. 
Figure 14 is a block diagram of display module components. The netting computer 
shok,-n at the left margin was described in a previous section. The netting computer 
processes the raw data sent by the sensors to be displayed. The netting computer 
communicates with the display system control CPU through a parallel data, buss. Data 
are transmitted via this buss in a highly structured format. A reverse path is provided to 
allow the system control CPU to transmit device polling request and operator commands 
to the netted system (two-way communications buss in the primary sensor network is 
assumed). 
The operator interface devices referenced in Figure 14 include the various devices 
that might be employed for man-to-machine communications. These devices may include 
a full ASCII keyboard, or a partial keyboard for defined functions. A joy stick, cursor 
ball, light pen, or touch panel may also be employed as operator interface devices. In 
fact, any device that allows the operator to communicate with the system would be 
defined as an operator interface device. 
The system control CPU is a message interpreter and router. A certain amount of 
"scratch pad" memory is used for temporary data storage and certain algorithms are 













Figure 14. Block diagram of display module components. 
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(ROM) would be required for algorithm storage and random access memory (RAM) would 
be included for use as storage buffers. The messages sent from the netting computer to 
the system control CPU would, in some cases, be converted to machine language by the 
system control CPU before being sent to the graphics processor controller (GPC). 
The GPC exercises vector graphic firmware routines. When given X and Y 
coordinates, these routines compute the point on the screen where the pixels that 
represent the target will be displayed. The vector graphics routines also compute 
symbology shapes and the updated coordinates required to move the symbols. The GCP 
also determines how the data will be written to the screen. Symbology would be stored 
by category in a full capability system. 
The displayed screen is written from memory planes if a raster format display is 
used. An expensive, top of the line display system may have up to 16 full screen areas 
that can be dedicated to four types of symbology. 
During the screen refresh cycle, the GCP may cause the data in any of the screen 
refresh memory planes to be written sequentially or in interlaced fashion by the video 
controller. The screen picture assembly process is managed by the video controller. The 
assembled screen picture is then sent as composite video to the monitor. The monitor 
shown in Figure 14 is conceptualized as a standard raster scan cathode ray tube monitor, 
although other types of displays should be considered in the final design. The types of 
displays are discussed in a following subsection. 
The display concept under consideration involves several potential levels of 
display capability based on the number and type of sensors which are included in the 
netted system. These levels are indicated in Figures 15 through 17. In Figure 15, all of 
the sensors are point sensors with the associated low data rates and low resolution 
display requirements. Thus, the three sensor types are netted together through the 
netting computer which is then interfaced to the FIDS display which should be capable of 
handling these additional point sensor inputs. In Figure 16, the FIDS sensor system is 
shown to be netted with at least one radar and a simple netted display is provided on the 
primary display system. The FIDS display unit may be used as an auxiliary display unit. 
In Figure 17, the scenario includes multiple sensor types including some FIDS sensors for 
either fixed-base or mobile deployment applications. For this case, a full capability 
netted display would be required. For the mobile deployment mode, radar sensors make 




































Figure 15. Fixed base system using netting computer as primary sensor 

















Figure 16. Level 1 Fixed Base System Using No Radar but Unique 
Sensor(s) and Netting Computer Tied to Primary FIDS 
System. 
INTERFACE AND LCP 





















































Figure 17. Fixed base or mobile deployment concept includes area radar, gap 
filler, unique sensor, and FIDS sensors, but no FIDS stand alone 
sensor. 
4.4 COMMUNICATION OF DISPLAY DATA  
One purpose of the netting computer is to process data from sensors and format 
the resulting information for transmission to the system control CPU in the display 
system module. Since several levels of display system sophistication may be specified 
(depending on overall security system size), it is desirable to utilize a rigid data format 
for the data transmitted between the netting computer and the display system CPU. The 
use of a rigid format allows certain data fields to be accessed quickly, thus improving 
display response times. In addition, a rigid data format allows certain data fields to be 
ignored by less sophisticated versions of the display system. 
A fixed byte word was chosen as the basic data unit. The bit count in the fixed 
byte word is dictated by the number of bits in the netting computer standard word. 
Table 12 shows the conceptual structure of the data sent between the netting 
computer and the display system control CPU. There are two message preamble 
catagories and four types of messages. Each preamble message is defined as a header. 
The message structure is defined as a data block. 
The status header contains the frame ID number, time of transmission, total 
alarms being reported, total sensors failed, total sensors out of service, total tampers, 
and total 1FF reports. This status header information is used to determine, if any 
additional data in the frame should be read. For example, if there are no data changes 
between updates, the redundant information of the previous transmission can be 
ionored. The status header also provides information that a less sophisticated display 
system or a slave display might use for total system information. 
The pointer header block allows data to be efficiently transmitted and read. The 
data words within the pointer header block specify or point to the word in the variable 
length data stream where data words of interest are found. For example, if there are no 
device failures there will be no failure reports in the data stream during the transmission 
of frame N, however, should three sensors fail before the transmission of frame N+1 the 
failure pointer will specify the location of the three failure messages in the data 
stream. The efficiency gained by using the variable length data frame can be demon-
strated. 
The total byte count in frame N would be 15 bytes less than during frame N+1. 
Only the data blocks that change are transmitted. The change order appears on the data 
buss only after the change has occurred. The system control CPU maintains an updated 
list of system parameters on a local basis and updates these parameters when a change 
occurs. This procedure reduces the time required for the netting computer to service the 
display system CPU by reducing the amount of data exchanged between processors. 
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TABLE 12. THE STRUCTURE A ORDER OF THE DATA BLOCKS 
SENT FROM THE NETTING COMPUTER TO THE DISPLAY 
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I.D. 	CODE NUMBER. X-COORDINATE Y-COORDINATE 
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Table 13 shows how the status header is organized. Table 14 shows the 
organization of the pointer header data block. Table 15 presents the organization of the 
failure or out of sevice data block. Table 16 shows the organization of the sensor target 
data block. Table 17 is a summary of the organization of the tamper data block. Table 
18 shows how the IFF data block is organized. 
4.5 DATA DISPLAY FORMATS ACHIEVABLE WITH A FULL CAPABILITY SYSTEM  
The display serves as the operator's interface with the physical security system. 
The operator will make most of his decisions on the basis of the data presented by the 
display. Thus, the maximum amount of data available should be presented to the 
operator in as highly graphic format as possible. Complex decisions as to message 
formats can be made within the display unit on the basis of very brief "flag" words from 
the sensor. The netted system concept utilizes this capability to advantage. 
Figure. 18 shows a simulated display screen area and the status function options. 
There are three system status conditions: (1) secure and operational, (2) tamper alert, 
and (3) system failure. The status display alerts the operator to specific system 
conditions that the operator should be aware of at all times. Normally, only the secure 
and operational message would be displayed unless a tamper alarm was in progress or a 
system failure occurs. 
Figure 19 shows a full display format during a tamper alert notification. The 
system status indicator shows that a tamper situation is in progress. The billboard area 
to the left of the system status area provides the operator with pertinent data relating to 
the tamper alarm. A map of the base provides visual reference information. The map 
presentation allows the operator to locate and quickly reference the sensor reporting the 
tamper condition. In addition, the location of security units are shown (security units 301 
and 320 are assumed to be transponder equipped). A 1-minute location vector is 
projected from security unit 301 on the basis of the units speed derived from historical 
transponder track file information. The 1-minute location projection line allows the 
operator to determine in which direction the security unit is moving and it's length also 
provides a rough estimate of time of security force arrival. 
Figure 20 shows how an intentional entry might be displayed. The system status 
indicator shows that the system is secure and operational. The billboard area however 
shows no sensors are off line for service, but three sensors out of 183 have been turned 
off to provide personnel access to a specific facility. The map area shows that the 
approved entry is into weapon but three, and that the authorization for entry can be 
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IF EACH CATEGORY IS ZERO, READ NO FURTHER INTO DATA 
BLOCK. IF ANY NOT ZERO, THEN . TOTAL COUNT MUST AGREE 
WITH TOTAL OF REPORTS READ FROM DATA BLOCKS, OR TEST 
CRITERIA NOT MET AND SYSTEM FAILURE INDICATED. 
THIS IS TIME OF DAY KEPT IN SYSTEM TIME. CODE FORMAT. 
ID NUMBER OF FRAME. 	THIS NUMBER INCREMENTS BY THE 
COUNT OF ONE EACH TIME THE NETTING COMPUTER SENDS A 
FRAME TO THE DISPLAY MODULE. FRAME SEQUENCE RESETS 
TO ZERO WHEN ALL TOTALS ARE ZERO. 
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TABLE 14. POINTER HEADER ORGANIZATION 
FAILURE  OR 


















EACH POINTER TELLS THE DISPLAY SYSTEM WHERE TO FIND THE FIRST WORD IN 
THE FIRST DATA BLOCK OF INTEREST. THIS FEATURE ALLOWS A VARIABLE LENGTH 
DATA STREAM TO BE COMPOSED OF ONLY THOSE DATA BLOCKS REQUIRED. 
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TABLE 15, FAILURE OR OUT OF SERVICE MESSAGE DATA BLOCK ORGANIZATION 
DEVICE CODE 
TIME CODE THAT E 
ID FOR THAT 
REPRESENTS FUTURE 0 
NUMBER STATUS 
EVENT TYPE OF EXPANSION B 
OCCURRED MESSAGE _ 
L_  (SYSTEM RESERVE) 
1. POWER FAILURE 
2. SENSOR FAILURE 
3. DATA LINK FAILURE 
4. SELF-TEST RESULTS 
BELOW ALLOWED 
SENSOR PURPOSELY OFF 
6. SENSOR REMOVED FOR 
REPAIRS, TEST, OR 
OTHER REASON 
--TIME OF DAY THAT FAILURE 
OR PURPOSEFUL REMOVAL 
OF SENSOR FIRST OCCURRED 
- CODE THAT INDICATES THAT EITHER A SYSTEM 
FAILURE HAS OCCURRED OR THAT THERE ARE 
CERTAIN SENSORS NOT RESPONDING DUE TO 
PURPOSEFUL REMOVAL FROM THE SYSTEM 
UNIQUE NUMBER ASSIGNED SYSTEM COMPONENT (SENSOR) 
AT TIME OF INSTALLATION 
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SION AND ECM 
DETECTION 
THE TARGET VELOCITY 
AS COMPUTED BY THE 
NETTING COMPUTER IF 
DETECTION MADE BY 
RADAR 
THIS CODE DESIGNATES PRESENT 
CATEGORY OF YELLOW ALERT 
OR RED ALERT. EXPANDABLE 
TO HANDLE THREAT ASSESSMENT 
MESSAGE 
THE Y GRID COORDINATE OF TARGET 
LOCATION. THE Y COORDINATE 
IS SAME AS POINT SENSOR LOCATION 
IF REPORT IS FROM POINT SENSOR 
HE X GRID COORDINATE OF TARGET LOCATION. 
THE X COORDINATE IS SAME AS POINT 
SENSOR LOCATION IF REPORT IS FROM 
POINT SENSOR 
ID NUMBER OF SENSOR REPORTING TARGET 
THE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THE 
TARGET WHEN IT APPEARS THE FIRST TIME. 
THIS NUMBER IS BASIS ON WHICH ASSOCIATED 
TARGET TRACK FILE IS ESTABLISHED 
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(FUTURE NEED) 
TIME  OF DAY WHEN 
SENSOR TAMPER 
MESSAGE WAS FIRST 
SENT. 
NUMBER THAT INCREMENTS EACH 
TIME REPORT SENT. 





















3. OPENING OF ACCESS COMPARTMENTS 
4. SHOCK (GREATER THAN 1 G) 
5. FIRE 
6. JUMPERING OR DISCONTINUITY 
CONDITION 
THE UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF 
SENSOR REPORTING A TAMPER ALARM. 
69 
TABLE 18. IFF DATA BLOCK ORGANIZATION 
TRANSPONDER 
REPORT TRANSPONDER TRANSPONDER FUTURE E 
ID 
CODE NUMBER X-COORD Y-COORD EXPANSION 
0 
B 
FOR FUTURE USE 
THE TRANSPONDER Y COORDINATE 
DERIVED BY THE POLAR 
TO RECTANGULAR CONVERSION 
ROUTINE. 
THE TRANSPONDER X COORDINATE 
DERIVED BY THE POLAR TO REC-
TANGULAR CONVERSION ROUTINE 
THIS IS A COUNT THAT INCREMENTS BY ONE 
ANY TIME ANY IFF DATA BLOCK APPEARS 
AS A MESSAGE. RESET AT INCREMENT TO 
BE DECIDED. 
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Figure 19. Simulated display for TAMPER condition. 
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Figute 20. Simulated display for intentional entry. 
verified by Colonel Walker (when an entry occurs, procedures would be followed to verify 
and authenticate the process). A timer would be started to show elapsed time since first 
entry, and the type of activity would be shown. The sensors that were taken off line to 
allow entry would also be shown. All of this information could be preserved as an 
historical record of entries if a mass storage device was associated with the display 
driver computer. 
Figure 21 shows the display when sensor failure has occurred. The system status 
indicator shows that system failure has occured. The billboard shows that no sensor 
associated processors are out of service; three sensor units have failed; the identification 
numbers of the failed sensors are 120, 122, and 125; the elapsed time since failure is 12 
minutes 34 seconds; and system maintenance personnel were called at 0128:45 hours 
Zulu. The time that the maintenance personnel were called would be entered by the 
operator via the keyboard. The map area displays the failed sensor locations 
automatically because the failed sensors can not reply to the system status interrogation 
message. 
Figure 22 shows a simulated display at the time of an intrusion detection. The 
system status monitor informs the operator that the system is secure and operational; 
thus all alarm data should be accepted as valid. The billboard shows a simple but easily 
readable message fomat. The ALERT ALERT ALERT message would flash on and off. 
The sensor type and •number would also be displayed. The alarm type would be shown; in 
this case INTRUDER. The time of first intrusion detection is shown as ALARM TIME, 
which is 1545:23 hours Zulu. 
The map would display major landmarks and the location of the transponder 
equipped security force (units S320 and 5310). 
Since radar was the detector of the intruder's presence, the intruder's location can 
be determined with precision. The intruder's location is marked by a circle. The symbol 
within the circle in the example case is an I for intruder. The data produced by the radar 
allow target velocity and location to be computed on a scan-to-scan basis. Thus, targets 
may be identified within the general catagory of low velocity (speed < 3 kts) and high 
velocity (speed >3 kts) targets. 
If coherent (Doppler) radar data are used, other target recognition techniques 
might be employed to identify targets by Doppler signature. Given this capability, an I 
might be assigned to low speed targets to symbolically represent an intruder on foot, 
based on the detection of arm and leg motion. A V might be assigned to symbolically 
represent the presence of an intruder in a vehicle, based on the strong Doppler associated 
with a vehicular size target. 
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Figure 22. Display unit presentation when intruder has been detected by radar in net. 
The dots behind the intruder would represent a smoothed track history (in this 
case, the last 8 computed intruder locations). The line ahead of the target would 
represent the time track line. The direction of movement would be indicated by the 
pointing angle of the time track line, while the intruder's location at a point 60 seconds 
in time would be indicated by line length (the end of the time line represents location in 
60 seconds). The number above the target symbol would be a numeric presentation of 
computed target speed. 
Four dots are shown; one in each corner of the screen. These are light pen or 
touch panel activation points. The display parameters could be changed quickly by 
activation of these points. This rapid response feature is necessary to allow the operator 
to devote maximum attention to the displayed information while requiring minimum 
display manipulation. 
Figure 23 shows the results of activating one of these touch panel or light pen 
points. A blow-up of the intrusion scene is shown. Additional data are provided in the 
billboard display area. The operational mode is shown; the elapsed time since intrusion 
detection is also shown. The security unit responding to the intrusion is shown along with 
that units estimated time of arrival (based on track history). The sensor detecting the 
intruder is also shown; in this case, a wide area radar. Two additional light pen or touch 
panel activation points are provided in the billboard area. The activation point labeled 
main map returns the system to display the information presented in Figure 22. The 
activation point labeled Billboard 2 will display a security grid reference system or other 
desirable map presentation. Figure 24 shows the grid mode presentation. The grid mode 
representation would be a useful tool to vector security forces to a particular sector. 
The only difference between a normal map presentation is that grid coordinates are 
substituted for map coordinates, in the example display, the intruder symbol has been 
changed to M to represent man. Assuming that a coherent area radar is used as the 
sensor and the radar has an associated Doppler processor, then actual target type can be 
inferred from the Doppler signature. 
Each of the display concepts depicted in Figures 17 through 24 can be 
implemented using currently available technology. The level at which any of the display 
concepts could be implemented is limited only by cost. The intruder type, approximate 
location, and speed would only be available to the display when an area radar is used with 
the system. A transponder system would be necessary to track the security force and 
project security time lines. 
77 
MODE QUAD 4 BLOW-UP ELAPSED TIME 0 0 01 2 2 
	
SYSTEM STATUS 
TI ME 15 4529 SECURE AND OPR. 
UNIT RESPONDING S 320 
	
ETA  0 0 0120  
SENSOR RADAR 1 
	
TAMPER ALERT 
AD BILLBOARD 2 	• MAIN MAP 
	
SYSTEM FAILURE 
Figure 23. Display unit simulation showing results of activating the blow-up mode on the display. 
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Figure 24. The display unit presentation in the grid mode. 
4.6 DISPLAY TECHNOLOGY  
4.6.1 OVERVIEW 
Five state-of-the-art display technologies are candidates for use as the display 
unit in the netted security system display module. Each technology has associated 
advantages and disadvantages which are application and requirement dependent. One of 
these display technologies will ultimately be selected for use in the final netted security 
system module after final system requirements are established. 
The technology utilized to display information from the netted security system (in 
formats proposed earlier) is available on an off-the-shelf basis. This availability forecast 
is supported by a survey of state-of-the-art display systems that is included as Appendix 
C of this report. This survey was developed as a task supported by this research project. 
Five display device technology categories were surveyed. Over 75 candidate 
display devices were included in the survey as shown in Appendix C. In addition, 
literature on most of these display devices was obtained from the manufacturer of record 
and this information was consolidated into a display device compendium which resides at 
Georgia Tech. The specifications that were surveyed and shown in Appendix C, include 
the following: (1) manufacturer, (2) model, (3) date that the system was introduced, 
(4) resolution (pixel array size), (5) number of displayable colors, (6) total associated 
memory, (7) supporting software options, (8) operator/system interface devices 
(input/output), (9) associated mass storage devices, and (10) price. 
The display systems listed in Appendix C, are organized by technology type. Five 
basic types of technology are used as the display device in the display module. They 
are: (1) storage tube, (2) stroke writer, (3) plasma panel, (4) light emitting diode panel, 
and (5) the raster scan display. Each technology has advantages and disadvantages which 
depend on final application. The following paragraphs discuss the principles on which 
each of the five technologies operate, and their advantages and disadvantages. 
4.6.2 STORAGE TUBE 
The storage tube display was first introduced as the display device for the digital 
computer. Basically an electron beam, controlled in the X and Y direction by magnetic 
deflection techniques, writes a point on the surface of a storage cathode-ray tube 
(CRT). When the electron beam strikes the phosphor coating on the screen, the phosphor 
is excited and photons are emitted by the phosphor. The phosphor remains in an excited 
state, emitting photons, until an excitation voltage is removed from the screen. Thus, 
the excited screen area serves as a memory and it emits light at each point where the 
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electron beam has excited the phosphor. Memory and photon emission are maintained 
until the screen memory control voltage is removed from the screen surface area. The 
maximum resolution that can be achieved is determined by beam spot size and total 
screen area. 
There are advantages to using a storage tube display. There is no need to 
periodically update or refresh the screen. Once excited, the pixel appears as a luminous 
point until the screen maintenance voltage is removed. High resolution can be obtained 
as pixel size is only a function of magnetic focus capability. A third advantage is that 
there is no specific scan pattern required during the writing to the screen. Any pixel 
area may be illuminated at any point on the screen upon command from the associated 
electron gun driver electronics. 
Storage tube displays also have disadvantages. The storage tube display is 
primarily a low light output device. High ambient light levels will wash out the display. 
The entire screen must be erased to erase any pixel already written on the screen; for 
certain applications, this can be a major problem. The display is limited to a single color 
(green), which eliminates the possibility of color coding of display features. Most storage 
tubes are short lived devices when compared to other types of displays. When a storage 
tube fails, the replacement cost is high. 
4.6.3 STROKE WRITER 
The stroke writer is another CRT display device. The display of conventional CRT 
with high brightness phosphor is written by an electron beam steered in X and Y 
coordinates. The phosphor may be medium or long persistence. Just as with the storage 
tube, the electron beam is steered to any location where a pixel is to be written. The 
beam steering instructions are controlled by software computed vector graphics routines. 
There are advantages to using stroke writer technology. The combination of high 
energy electron beam and high intensity phosphors allow operation in high ambient light 
level environments. There is a low refresh memory overhead if all beam steering vectors 
are computed from X-Y coordinates during each screen refresh cycle. The stroke writer 
is also capable of high resolution. 
There are disadvantages to using stroke writer technology for certain 
applications. At present, there are only three color phosphors available. The refresh 
rate slows as the number of pixels to be displayed increases. When the refresh time 
exceeds phosphor persistence times, a flicker of the screen is noticeable. 
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4.6.4 PLASMA PANEL 
The plasma panel display does not use CRT technology. The plasma panel is 
composed of a front and a rear optically clear panel mounted in a vacuum seal 
structure. An ionizable gas occupies the small area between the front and rear panels. 
A matrix of very small conductors run parallel to the screen surface in an X and Y 
plane. When a voltage is applied to an X and Y pair, the gas at the intersection of the 
conductors becomes excited and the gas glows. 
There are advantages to using the plasma panel for certain applications. The 
plasma panel is a flat screen and does not require a recessed cabinet for installation. 
The panel can be used as a rear or front projection screen. Maps, facility outlines, or 
other graphics can be optically projected onto the screen surface. Plasma panel data can 
then be displayed using the projected map graphics data as visual reference points. The 
plasma panel is rugged and well suited for military application. The rugged design also 
makes it well suited for mobile or portable applications. 
The plasma panel does not require continuous update. The logic that drives the X, 
Y screen locations can be selectively latched and unlatched (erased) when the status of 
individuals pixels change. 
The plasma panel has disadvantages for certain applications. The current 
generation of plasma panels display only a single color. There is no grey scale; a pixel is 
either on or off. 
The plasma panel is a low light output device and must be operated under subdued 
ambient light conditions. This limitation suggests that, if the display application requires 
operation in direct sunlight, a plasma panel may not be the best choice of display 
mediums. 
4.6.5 LIGHT EMITTING DIODE (LED) PANEL 
A recent addition to the family of display mediums is the light emitting diode 
(LED) display panel. The LED panel is composed of individual chips of Gallium Arsenide 
(GAs) that will emit photons (light) when excited by a low voltage. The color emitted by 
Gallium Arsenide is in the red region of the visible spectrum. However, if the GAs is 
doped with other semiconductor materials, different colors can be obtained. 
The LED panel is composed of an array of light emitting diode chips that can be 
addressed in X and Y matrix fashion. It is a rugged display device and can be configured 
in a flat package. 
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The latest generation panels provide three colors simultaneously. The matrix 
encoding scheme allows single LED array elements to be addressed on an individual basis, 
and each element can be latched in an on condition. The resolution is limited by the 
density of the number of chips in the array. Total array chip counts are limited by chip 
size, heat dissipation, and chip connector arrangements. The latest generation LED 
panel display allow transparent color coded maps and other graphic devices to be put in 
front of the screen area to further enhance their display capability. 
There are disadvantages associated with the LED panel display. The panel is 
composed of many LED chips that form the array. The current drain is 10 to 20 
milliamperes per LED chip (per pixel). Thus, when the screen is filled with data, the 
panel will draw relatively high current.. This factor would be a disadvantage in a portable 
system or a system where heat dissipation might be a problem. The LED has a relatively 
low light output. This factor limits the use of the LED to low ambient light level 
environments. 
There is a possiblity that certain LEDs in the array may fail before the active life 
of the total screen has been exceeded. The pattern in which the LEDs fail would 
determine if this problem would be a serious limitation. 
4.6.6 RASTER SCAN DISPLAY 
The raster scan display uses the same display technology that is used in the home 
television set. Figure 25 shows the pattern scanned by the electron gun in a raster scan 
display. The electron gun starts at the top of the left hand corner of the CRT, traces a 
horizontal path to the top right hand corner, and during the flyback period moves back to 
the far left hand side of the CRT screen and begins to write on the next line down. The 
entire screen is scanned in this manner from top to bottom 30 or 60 times per second 
depending on whether retrace is used. 
The persistence of the phosphor used with raster scan CRTs is sufficiently long to 
ensure that the photon emission of a single pixel area will continue until the electron 
beam returns on the next write cycle to refresh the frame. 
Black and white raster scan displays utilize a single hue phosphor that emits 
monochromatic light. Various hues of color can be displayed using simultaneous 
excitation of three closely grouped phosphors that emit either red, blue or green. 
A combination of the colors red, blue, and green can be mixed in various 
proportions to produce any color in the visible spectrum. The color or hue that will be 
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Figure 25. Operational principle of raster scan color display. 
The red, blue, and green electron guns track the raster scan line, but each is slightly 
offset to ensure that only the color pixel controlled by each is scanned by the electron 
beam on the screen. The hue is controlled by the intensity of each color in the pixel 
group. The color intensity is controlled by modulating each of the electron beams in 
proportion to the color intensity required to generate a specific hue. 
The raster scan display technique has advantages and disadvantages that relate 
directly to the physics of the color generation and screen write process. The advantages 
of raster scan displays include: (1) multi-color capability, (2) standard television format 
capability, (3) modulated brightness (blinking and other effects), and (4) low price versus 
display capability. 
When the raster scan display technique is used for data display purposes, the 
information to be displayed is stored in screen refresh memory. The memory overhead 
required to refresh the screen can be large. Recall that the electron beam in a black and 
white raster scan display sweeps from top left to right, line after line, until the bottom 
right hand corner of the screen is reached, and the cycle begins again. When data are 
being displayed using a raster scan format, one bit of memory must be assigned to each 
individual pixel to be displayed for the most simple display where a logic 1 represents a 
full white and a logic 0 represents black. Thus, a display capable of displaying a 512 by 
512 pixel field will require 262,144 bits of memory. If this memory is packaged in 8 bit 
bytes, 32,768 bytes will be required to represent a binary pixel state (or or off). 
If three basic colors are to be displayed, the memory overhead is 786,432 bits 
(98,304 bytes) because the memory requirement is three times greater than the simple 
black and white case. In practice, a moderately priced display may utilize a 512 x 512 
bit memory plane associated with each basic color. Unfortunately, this screen refresh 
scheme allows a limited number of hues to be assigned to any pixel on the screen. 
A true color display is capable of providing a variety of hues, and this requires 
that the intensity of each of the three basic colors be controlled. Sixteen levels of hue 
control capability, for example, will require four bits of memory per pixel. Thus, a 
display capable of providing 512 x 512 lines of resolution and 16 levels of hue control for 
each color electron gun will require 3,145,728 bits of memory, or 393,216 bytes if the 
memory is organized around an 8 byte memory architecture. 
The current drawn by the display to maintain this memory overhead is dependent 
on the type of logic used in the display memory. Both low and high current memories are 
available. The trade-off is the speed at which the memory operates. Low current 
memory is slower than higher current memory. Heat dissipation associated with high 
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current memory may also be a limiting factor and a disadvantage depending on user 
application. 
The physics relating to writing any image on a cathode ray tube (CRT) can be a 
disadvantage depending on display application. For example, if a flat screen is required, 
the CRT display would not meet the requirements due to depth of the CRT. The CRT 
may not be optimum in high light level situations. A high ambient light condition could 
wash the screen. 
4.6.7 SUMMARY 
Five display technologies have been reviewed. Each is a potential candidate 
technology for inclusion in the final version netted radar system. The advantages and 
disadvantages of each technology have been presented. Final system requirements will 
drive the selection of a display technology and the actual hardware system that 
incorporates the selected technology. 
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SECTION 5 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 SUMMARY  
The study reported herein has attempted to determine methods for combining 
physical security sensors currently under development into a single command, 
communication, and display system to greatly enhance the usefulness of each 
independent sensor, provide improved intruder detection, and reduce nuisance alarms. 
Experience gained during previous programs involving the netting of sensors and the 
development of automatic detection systems was drawn on to formulate concepts for 
netting several of the sensor systems currently under development into a single 
communications and display system. A workable system configuration has been 
identified; previous netting work provides assurance of low technical risks. In addition, 
interface concepts for the primary sensors currently under development have been 
formulated and are presented in Appendix B. A specific interface design for the 
AN/PPS-15(B) radar is presented in Appendix D. Note that these interface concepts are 
certainly not the only schemes that could be developed for netting these sensors to a 
central system, but they do represent a workable scheme which incorporates a great deal 
of flexibility for the addition of future more capable sensors. 
The proposed system which is discussed here is merely the framework for the 
needed system; more of the details must be filled in prior to implementation of such a 
system in hardware. Such details should include specific requirements for the 
performance of the hardware and the specific algorithms to be utilized for processing. 
(A brief overview of the digital processor requirement is presented in Appendix E.) 
Previous experience has indicated that nuisance alarms are the primary performance 
problem area for most automatic sensor systems. Algorithms which take advantage of 
data available from multiple sensors to reduce nuisance alarms must be developed and 
evaluated. This study has shown that multiple sensors can be netted into a central 
display system in a logical manner, but the usefulness of such a netted system to solve 
the major physical security problems remains to be demonstrated completely. 
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5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS  
A demonstration of a netted system study should be conducted to answer questions 
concerning the utility of netted systems. This demonstration should be conducted using 
existing sensors, digital processing equipment, and display hardware in order to save time 
and money. Such equipment is available from the WIDS, LARIAT, and FIDS programs. 
This prototype system should be installed at an operational base such as Eglin AFB and 
used as a research tool to develop better intrusion detection algorithms and ascertain the 
usefulness of the netted system concept in solving realistic physical security problems. 
Once the usefulness of the concept is proven, development of an Advanced Development 
Model using state-of-the-art technology would be the logical next step. In addition, 
suitable interface design should be factored into sensors currently under development so 
that they can be utilized as a part of a future netted system. 
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SENSOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 
A.1 FOLPEN RADAR  
A.1.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
This summary description of the FOLPEN (Foliage Penetration) radar system was 
prepared in support of the Georgia Tech netted surveillance concept investigation. At 
the time of this research, a written description of the FOLPEN was not available. This 
system description was assembled after a visit to the Program Manager's Office at the 
Naval Weapons Center in December 1981. Appreciation is expressed for the help of Mr. 
John Campell (Program Manager) and Mr. Don Quist (engineer in charge of design). This 
system description was constructed as accurately as possible from notes made during this 
visit. 
An Advanced Design Model (ADM) of the FOLPEN system was in the design and 
construction phase at the time of the Georgia Tech visit to the Naval Weapons Center. 
This ADM was aimed at meeting the USAF requirements. Another ADM was to 
specifically address the USMC requirements and should have smaller volume, less weight, 
and longer battery life. The first ADM was scheduled to begin field tests in February 
1982. 
The FOLPEN radar is a 435 MHz system with a designed maximum operating range 
of 1500 meters. It is intended to detect a walking man obscured by as much as 300 
meters of dense foliage. The Experimental Demonstration Model achieved penetration 
depths of 245 meters in heavy foliage. The transmitter, receiver, and signal processor 
are located with the antenna system. The transmitter antenna consists of an array of 
two dipole corner reflector elements located one above the other. This gives a vertical 
beamwidth of approximately 20 degrees and a horizontal beamwidth of approximately 
120 degrees. The receiving antenna consists of three arrays identical to the transmitter 
antenna arrays; the center array is directed along the transmitter array axis. The two 
remaining receiving antenna arrays are aimed 60 degrees to either side of the 
transmitter array center-line. Monopulse processing between the independent receiver 
channels allows an azimuth resolution of about 10 degrees to be achieved. 
The FOLPEN radar concept has been under development for several years. Figure 
A-1 outlines the development of this concept and the design goals associated with each 





















* COMPLETE SYSTEM 
* 7 FT 3 
* 125 LBS 
* 24V/LINE POWER 
* 60 WATTS 
* 20 MIN SET-UP 
* 20 MIN TAKE-DOWN 
* 120 ° SECTOR 
* SINGLE ANTENNA 
* SPCDS INTERFACE 
* DEDICATED HARDWARE 
1 FT 3 
30 LBS 
30 WATTS 
12 MIN SET-UP/TAKE-DOWN 
24 HR BATTERY 






FY-1972 	 FY-1979 
* PARTIAL SYSTEM 
* 30 FT 3 
* 300 LBS 
* LINE POWER 
* 200+ WATTS 
* 45+ MIN SET-UP 
* 30 MIN TAKE-DOWN 
* 60 ° SECTOR 
* DUAL ANTENNAS 
* LAB HARDWARE 
FY-1983 FY-1986 
* 5 FT 3 
* 125 LBS 
* 100 WATTS 
* 12 HR BATTERY 
* BUILT-IN-TEST 
* NETTING 
* RF LINK 
* HIGH INTERFACE 
* LINE SUPERVISION 
Figure A-1. Development goals for the FOLPEN radar. 
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The unit is physically divided into two units to allow the operator to use the control 
display unit (CDU) from a remote, protected location. The radar receiver/transmitter 
and the signal processor are located with the antenna system. The antenna units are 
currently a bistatic assembly that mount on tripod fixtures. 
The CDU is the operator interface to the radar system. It provides the operator 
with a B-scope display and is connected to the radar via a 50 meter cable. The 
surveillance coverage of the radar is from a minimum detection range of 60 to 90 meters 
to a maximum instrumented detection range of 1500 meters. Detection of targets having 
a radar cross section (RCS) of 0.1 to 0.5 square meters can be accomplished at the 
maximum range for clear terrain. The operator can control three range gates that are 30 
meters wide. The inner, middle, and outer range gates may be positioned independently 
in 30 meter increments (see Figure A-3). Each range gate acts as an electronic fence to 
detect and alarm on intruders within the gate area. The signal processing system is 
expandable in concept to accommodate a total of 10 range gates. 
The transmitter operates at a nominal frequency of 435 MHz. The radar is a CW 
Doppler system that operates with a 50 percent duty cycle on the transmitted waveform 
with a transmitter power of 20 watts peak (10 watts average). The radar transmits a 
single beam covering the 120 degree surveillance sector. 
The radar receiver contains three separate receiver channels that operate 
independently from three receiving antennas that are positioned with individual 
boresights separated by 60 degrees to cover the 120 degree field of surveillance. A 
general block diagram of the receiver is shown in Figure A-4. Each receiver consists of a 
tuned amplifier having a 50 MHz bandwidth around the 435 MHz center frequency. The 
tuned amplifier receiver is followed by a correlation processor that decodes the reflected 
returns and generates a separate in-phase (I) and quadrature (Q) channel for each range 
gate position (three in the current ADM design). Each I and Q processor has a net gain of 
approximately 100 dB. The I and Q signals are processed by a baseband and IF section 
with a half-power bandwidth of 60 Hz. This functional block has a variable gain 
capability and processes a total of 18 separate channels of data (three range bins from 
each of the three receivers). 
The I and Q signals are time-division multiplexed into a 12-bit analog-to-digital 
converter. Moving target indicator (MTI) signal processing of the radar targets is 
accomplished by performing a spectrum analysis on each range bin of each receiver 
channel using a digital Fourier transform. The spectral results are used to detect targets 
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logarithmically spaced between 0.58 Hertz and 58 Hertz. The target Doppler frequency 
bins correspond to a minimum radial velocity of 0.2 meters per second and a maximum 
radial velocity of 20 meters per second. The spectrum processing time requires 6.5 to 10 
seconds, depending upon the velocity of the filters being analyzed. 
The FOLPEN radar apparently does not include any form of CFAR as commonly 
used in radar systems. A variable threshold is set by the ratio of the I and Q signals for 
each range bin. This threshold is applied to each of the 12 velocity bins of each range 
gate. The signal processor may specify multiple targets per range bin, giving a target 
reporting rate of 12 targets per gate (for all three receiver channels). 
Each detection report from the signal processor includes information for range, 
velocity, direction of radial movement (in/out), and receiver beam number. A simple 
monopulse algorithm is used to determine the azimuth position of the target. 
A.1.2 COMMUNICATION FORMAT 
The present FOLPEN radar ADM design does not have provisions for external 
communications or control. The cable interface between the radar and the CDU is a 
possible access point since the data is formatted into a digital message for the display 
unit. A maximum target rate of 90 target reports per second  is accommodated in the 
current design. The targets sent to the CDU contain the information shown in Table A-
1. This target message is transmitted in serial format consisting of 9 bits of target 
information and 2 stop bits. The digital target report is transmitted to the CDU by pulse 
width modulation with a 1 millisecond bit rate. 
TABLE A-1. FOLPEN TARGET MESSAGE 
1. Range gate number - 2 bit resolution 
2. Target speed - 1 bit resolution 
3. Target direction (In/Out) -2 bit resolution 
4. Azimuth - 4 bit resolution 
Control messages are sent to the radar from the CDU only when there is a 
command to change a range gate position. The command word is a 24 bit serial format 
plus 2 stop bits that is clocked to the radar at a bit rate of 1 kilohertz. Each range bin 
position may be specified in any of 50 possible positions (0 through 49) requiring 8 bits of 
the command word. The total of 24 bits in the command word is to allow the position 
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code for the three separate range bins to be simultaneously transmitted to the radar 
receiver/transmitter. 
A.1.3 NETTING INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 
The FOLPEN radar system concept appears to be an ideal surveillance/ sensor unit 
for inclusion in a netted sensor system. It provides a surveillance capability in heavy 
foliage that cannot be met with radar systems operating at significantly higher 
frequencies. 
The ADM radar design appears to be accessible at the interconnection point 
between the radar and the CDU. The communication rates and data formats described 
above will be considered in the netting study and definition. In reality, a different 
communication format and a dedicated interface (input-output port) may be required for 
operating the ADM in a netted surveillance system. 
A.2 EPSD SECTOR SURVEILLANCE RADAR SYSTEM (AN/PPS-15)  
This summary description of the AN/PPS-15(B) radar and the proposed product 
improvement program for the Exterior Perimeter Surveillance Device (EPSD) was 
prepared in support of the Georgia Tech netted radar-fixed sensor surveillance system 
concept study. The AN/PPS-15(B) does not currently exist in a form that is directly 
applicable to the netted radar surveillance system. The proposed EPSD is scheduled to 
include a capability for interfacing with other systems. Since the EPSD is proposed as a 
product improvement to the AN/PPS-1.5(B) radar, the two summary descriptions were 
combined into this single description. 
The AN/PPS-15(B) radar is a solid-state very short range ground surveillance 
radar. It operates at X-band frequencies and is limited to line-of-sight operation. The 
radar can detect, locate, and recognize fast and slowly moving vehicles and personnel 
under varying conditions of terrain visibility and weather. The radar set provides both 
audible and visual alarm indications of targets, and provides a digital readout of range 
and azimuth to the target. 
The radar system produces a phase modulated waveform out of the transmitter, and 
the radar receiver uses the reflected waveform to generate the characteristic Doppler 
frequencies of moving targets within the audio range (between 1.5 and 1350 Hertz) for 
targets moving at radial speeds between 0.5 and 45 miles per hour. These Doppler 
frequencies are amplified and used for audible detection of targets in the operator's 
headset and a tone of the alarm speaker. Target detection is also visually provided as a 
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blinking alarm indication. A summary of the general operating parameters is presented 
in Table A-2. 
The AN/PPS-15 radar will provide surveillance of moving ground targets within the 
illuminating beamwidth of the antenna (approximately 5.6 degrees). The radar is 
provided with a tripod base assembly that allows either manual or electrical rotation of 
the radar set. Increased sector coverage is obtained by electrically rotating the 
radar/antenna system in a sector scan mode by means of an electrical motor in the tripod 
mount. The scan sector is variable between sector widths of 22.5 degrees and 180 
degrees. The scan rate is approximately 90 mils (5.1 degrees) per second. 
Target detection occurs when a moving object produces an audible sound in the 
operator's headset and an audible and visual alarm from the automatic alarm circuits 
within the radar set. A block diagram of the AN/PPS-15(B) control unit is given in 
Figure A-5. Once a target has been detected by the operator, the radar set typically is 
used to track the target. Target tracking is accomplished by changing the antenna 
azimuth and elevation and the RANGE (i.e., the position of a range-gate) control to 
maintain maximum volume tone in the headset and a maximum number of dots on the 
PEAKING indicator. While tracking individual targets can provide information about the 
direction, location, and speed of the target, it requires a one-on-one situation between an 
operator and the target. This is different from the approach taken in the netted radar-
fixed sensor surveillance system. In this application, the approach is to maximize the 
data available to a single operator and to automate as many of the detection-tracking 
functions as practical. 
The process of target detection in the AN/PPS-15(B) is assisted through the use of 
7 range gates that are prepositioned by the radar operator. A block diagram of this 
signal processing and range gating circuit is illustrated in Figure A-6. These range gates 
can be set to trigger the alarm modes available to the operator for an intrusion into any 
one of the gates, or the output from all of the range gates can be combined to respond to 
a target in any one of them. The range bins can be positioned to provide continuous 
coverage, or they can be separated with equal spaces between adjacent range bins. This 
radar has a location accuracy of approximately plus or minus 40 meters in range and plus 
or minus 20 mils in azimuth. 
The AN/PPS-15 radar currently does not have a capability for interfacing to a 
remote netting facility. A suitable interface must be developed to allow remote 
operation of the radar via a command link for setting the operating parameters of the 
radar and a data link for receiving the target data from the radar receiver. To be most 
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TABLE A-2. TYPICAL OPERATING PARAMETERS OF AN/PPS - 15 RADAR 
General. 
Range: 
Personnel: Walling or running (0.5 
square meter target) 	  50 to 1.500 meters (55 to 1.640 yards). 
Crawlime (0.05 square meter target) 	  50 to 500 meters (55 to 547 yards). 
Vehicle (10 square meter target), 	  50 to 3.000 meters (55 to 3281 yards). 
Determination 
	
Numeric electronic readout indicators coincident with 
aural indication and visual presentation on the range PEAK-
ING indicator on the control indicator. 
Accuracy 	  =20 meters (=22 yards). 
Target velocity 	  0.805 to 56.326 kilometers per hr (radial) (0.5 to 45 mph (radial)). 




+ 4800 mils (+270 °) manual 
Determination 	
 
Numeric electronic readout on control indicator 
	  400 to 3200 mils (221/2° to 180° ) continuously variable. 
Can be set to any desired azimuth 3200 mils left or 
–10 mils (=.0.6°). 	 right of center 
90 mils/sec 1:9 mils. 
100 mils (5.651. 
Automatic sector scan width 
Scan Center 
Accuracy 	  
Scan rate  
Resolution 	  
Elevation: 
Coverage (manual tilt) 	  
Determination 	  
Assembly time 	  
Not less than +400 to -600 mils (22.5° to -33.751 manual. 
Calibrated elevation scale on antenna drive. 
One person in less than 10 minutes from transport case to 
tripod configuration 
b. Transmitting System. 
Frequency 	  	  10.3 GHz Nominal. 
Tuning range (Electronic). 	 
Tuning range (Mechanical) — 	  
Radiated power 	  
Stability, frequency 	  
Modulation 	  
Source of rf power 	  
+ 20 MHz about 10.217 to 10.383 GHz 
10.197 GHz to 10.403 GHz. 
30 to 94 milliwatts; 45 milliwatts nominal average power. 
1 part in 1000 parts from set point. 
Fm/cw. 
Gunn oscillator. 
c. Antenna System. 
Radiating element 	  Vertically polarized slot array. 
Antenna gain 	 °7.5 db. 
Horizontal beainvridth 	  100 tails (5.6 ° ) nominal 
Vertical beamwidth 	  177.7 mils (10.0 ° 	) maximum. 
Side lobe level. relative to main lobe: 
Azimuth plane 	  -14 db. 
Elevation plane  -13 db. 
d. Receiving System. 
Type 	  
Mixer  
Sensitivity 	  
Noise azure: 
Search mode 	 
Ranve !node 	 
Aural presentation 
   
Not more than 12 db. 
   
Not more than 10 db. 
Headset provides audio doppler tones for target detection location 
and identification. 
   
   
	  Homodyne. 
Hot-carrier diode, type HP5082-2751. 
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Figure A-5. Block diagram of AN/PPS- 15(B) control unit. 
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Figure A-6. Block diagram of signal processing section of AN/PPS -15(B). 
effective, the radar system must be used in a track-while-scan mode. This will require 
additional algorithms for detecting and reporting targets when the radar set is connected 
into a netted surveillance system. 
A product improvement program has been proposed for the AN/PPS-15(B) by 
General Dynamics. The improved system design is designated the EPSD and is intended 
to affect the Operator Control Indicator Unit only. It is currently proposed that an 
input/output (I/O) interface will be part of the improved system. The improved system 
will also include a capability for automatic range/azimuth target tracking, an extension 
of the non-ambiguous range to 6 kilometers, and a capability for random scan width and 
scan speed. A comparison of the AN/PPS-15 and the EPSD improvements is given in 
Table A-3. 
This short range sector surveillance radar will be a very valuable sensor to the 
netted radar-fixed sensor surveillance system. However, it can not be used efficiently in 
its current form or in the EPSD form proposed for the product improvement program. 
The addition of an interface data link to the surveillance radar must include several 
functions outlined in other sections of this report if an efficient interface with the 
netting system is to be achieved. The radar system must also operate in a true track-
while-scan mode to allow the netting computer to automatically detect and track on a 
number of targets simultaneously within the sector of coverage. 
A.3 LARIAT SYSTEM  
A.3.1 OVERVIEW 
This system summary describes a netted ground surveillance radar system that was 
designed and field tested at the Yuma Proving Ground in 1978. The system known as the 
Long Range Area Radar for Intrusion detection And Tracking (LARIAT) System was 
developed in support of the MX-missile base security program and was supported by the 
US Air Force Space and Missile Systems Office (SAMSO) - now the Ballistic Missile 
Office (BMO). This system concept is very relevant to the current netting study since it 
was used to prove the effectiveness of many of the radar tracking algorithms discussed in 
this final technical report. The area surveillance radars used in the LARIAT system are 
also considered to have many of the performance requirements necessary for a wide area 
radar surveillance system. Therefore, this summary description has been prepared as 
reference material for the Georgia Tech concept investigations of netted radar-fixed 
sensor surveillance systems. 
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TABLE A-3. EPSD SUMMARY OF SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
AN/PPS-15(B) VERSUS AN/PPS-15( ) PIP-1 
o Weights 
AN/PPS-15(B) AN/PPS-15( ) PIP-1 
Operational 35 25 
o 
System 
Range (Detection 80% 
150 140 
PD, Single Scan) 2 
Man - Walking (0.5 m 2 ) 1500 Meters Same 
Vehicle - Jeep 3000 Meters Same 
o 
Armor - Van (20.0 m 2) 
Target Tracking 
N/A 4000 Meters 
Range/Azimuth Manual Automatic 






Battery NI-CAD (External) NI-CAD (Internal) 
External Power AC 115/220 VAC Same 
External Power DC 24 VDC Vehicle Same +12 VDC Vehicle 
o Scan Driver Brush-Type DC PM Motor Brushless DC PM Motor 
Preset Scan Times Random Scan Times 
o Netting Compatibility No Yes 
The increasing importance of security for nuclear materials and weapons demands a 
reliable and cost effective solution for the security surveillance of the very large base 
areas needed for the missile (MX) system. Such a surveillance system must possess a 
very high probability of detection with a low false alarm or false dispatch rate. The MX 
basing scenario requires the surveillance and tracking of threat and non-threat intruders 
over large base areas located in undeveloped regions of the continental United States, 
such as the desert regions of the southwest. 
Personnel detection radar technology could be a cost effective surveillance 
approach for monitoring and protecting these large base areas. The sizes of these 
proposed bases are sufficiently large to require surveillance by several such radar sensors 
to accomplish the desired detection probability and reduce the effects of terrain 
masking. The use of multiple radars for detecting, tracking, and identifying threat 
targets requires a large number of operators or a sophisticated data processing/handling 
system. This weapon system will have an expected operational life of several years, and 
the cost of personnel for security protection becomes a significant cost driver in the 
overall system design. For this reason, the automatic control of the radar systems and 
the functions of detection, tracking, and operator alarm were approached through a 
central computer/signal processing system to net the radar surveillance sensors into a 
common operator machine interface. This interface provides the operator with track 
information for the entire base area in the form of a situation map that can be used to 
vector security forces to intercept threat target tracks or identify targets of unknown 
origin. 
The MX deployment scenario requires routine deployment of security patrols and 
maintenance personnel within the protected base area. These friendly personnel must be 
easily recognizable by the surveillance system to reduce the workload on the data 
processor and the monitoring operator. This requires a parallel capability in the intrusion 
detection system that can detect and track Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder 
units carried by these friendly forces. This transponder tracking system parallels the 
signal processing of skin returns from the moving personnel and allows the operator 
Alarm functions to be bypassed for defined non-threat tracks. 
This appendix summarizes the development and field testing of a netted radar 
surveillance system concept for protecting a large base area such as described above. 
This feasibility demonstration program was designated the LARIAT security system. The 
surveillance concept was developed for the MX program office of the U.S. Air Force 
Space And Missile System Organization (SAMSO). LARIAT was designed to provide a 
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dependable surveillance system for the MX basing scenario that required minimal 
operator attention until threats or potential threats within a defined base area were 
automatically detected according to prescribed threat algorithms. The system approach 
also met the requirement for identifying friendly forces via a transponder IFF system. 
The ,surveillance devices were modified AN/PPS-5 personnel detection radar sets 
manufactured and supplied by the AIL Division of Cutler-Hammer Group, Eaton 
Corporation. The associated remote command/microwave data link system and the radar 
system interface were also supplied by AIL. The Georgia Institute of Technology 
Engineering Experiment Station (GIT/EES) developed the data processing/display portion 
of this feasibility demonstration system, along with all computer/signal processing 
algorithms, under contract with the CS&TA Laboratory of the U.S. Army Electronics 
Research and Development Command (ERADCOM), Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey 
(Contract DAAB07-77-C-2147), who provided technical advice and administration. The 
radar system and data link system were supplied and supported by AIL under a separate 
ERADCOM contract (Contract DAAB07-77-C-2138). 
A.3.2 BACKGROUND 
Radars operating in a netted configuration were chosen as the surveillance sensors 
for the LARIAT system since the technology of personnel detection is well-proven and 
suitable radar designs that required only moderate modifications were available. This 
surveillance approach can potentially provide multiple coverage of both ground targets 
and low flying aircraft in an economic manner. It can meet the design goals for an 
automatic tracking system for both unknown (or threat) intruders, as well as friendly 
personnel and maintenance forces. The research effort addressed three separate problem 
areas related to this surveillance system concept. 
The first area involved the design, development, and testing of a feasibility 
demonstration of the LARIAT computer netted radar surveillance system concept. This 
concept is illustrated pictorially in Figure A-7. The tower mounted radar sensors provide 
overlapping coverage of both friendly and unfriendly targets within the base area. 
Friendly targets give both a skin return and an IFF transponder return that are processed 
separately to inhibit the operator alarm functions for these non-threat targets. This 
feasibility demonstration was made using two radars, but all other software and hardware 
parameters were conceptually expandable to ten such sensors. 
The design philosophy for the LARIAT system was to provide an automatic 
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Figure A-7. Illustration of LARIAT concept for feasibility demonstration. 
LARIAT system was designed to automatically detect and track ground targets (such as a 
walking man, a man riding a horse or a motorcycle, vehicles) and low-flying aircraft, and 
to alert the operator only when prescribed threat conditions were met. The system has 
the capability of simultaneously interrogating and tracking several IFF beacon 
transponders to aid the operator in identifying friendly target tracks. All radar 
information and recent track histories are presented to the operator in a situation map 
format on a computer graphics display system. The central computer facility controls 
the radar systems, processes target data from all radars, performs track analysis, and 
controls the operator display system. 
The goals for the LARIAT system feasibility demonstration may be summarized as: 
1. Provide wide area surveillance with high probability of detection with low 
system false alarms or false dispatch rate, 
2. Correlate the outputs of several radars into a common data processor and 
display, 
3. Provide automatic detection and track, 
4. Provide automatic track assessment, 
5. Integrate IFF capabilities, 
6. Provide effective man/machine interface enabling rapid reaction time by: 
Combining radar information with computer graphics on a common status 
map display, 
b. Providing a time compressed display of the radar data to enhance the 
visual recognition of movement patterns, 
c. Integrating the IFF responses (position and identity) into the map display, 
d. Storing recent target files for system recall, and 
e. Providing an interactive control/display interface between the operator 
and the computer/display systems, 
7. Operate the LARIAT system in desert terrain typical of an MX installation and 
evaluate performance, and 
8. Define the system parameters of an operational system. 
The field tests of this system were performed at the Yuma Proving Ground during 
the summer and fall of 1978. Operation of the system in its design configuration was 
demonstrated. Its performance against a test matrix of threat targets was demonstrated 
during this test period. The data base established during these tests is valuable in 
specifying the requirements for an operational system. 
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The threat targets for this system were considered to be a single man or a group of 
men walking or riding (horseback, motorcycle, dune buggy, or jeep). Non-threat targets 
in the desert environment were considered to be animals (such as the coyote, burro, 
mustang, deer, goat, and birds) and weather phenomena such as dust devils and 
thunderstorms. The range of velocities for the threat targets considered here varied 
from less than one-half meter per second to more than 50 meters per second. 
A second area of this research involved an investigation into radar concepts to 
evaluate various system characteristics that would be recommended for an operational 
surveillance radar system for an extended MX base installation. Another area of this 
research was directed toward the development of suitable target discrimination 
algorithms potentially useful for automatic target identification and verification. This 
work consisted primarily of the measurement of the calibrated radar characteristics of 
fixed geometrical targets of conductors and non-conductors, and of the dynamic RCS of 
walking human subjects. The primary goal of these measurement tasks was to supply Dr. 
Robert Harrison of TRW with information suitable for the verification of his computer 
modeling of radar targets. These measurements included controlled experiments at UHF, 
S-band, and X-band on radar measurement ranges located at the GIT/EES campus 
facilities. The measurement program also included the recording of selected target 
returns from the AN/PPS-5 radar system during the Yuma Field Test. Selected samples 
of the data at all four frequencies were provided in a digital computer tape format to Dr. 
Harrison for his studies. A limited scope analysis was also performed in an attempt to 
identify target signature features which could be exploited for target discrimination and 
classification or otherwise influence system design. 
A.3.3 LARIAT SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
The LARIAT system design presented unique challenges in the development of 
signal processing equipment and algorithms for the automatic detection, tracking, and 
alarming of suspected intruders in the protected area. The unique problems common to 
this system included: irregular track sampling intervals, extremely low data rates, and 
wide variations in the expected velocities and radar cross section of the threat targets. 
Netting together two to ten scanning radars with various degrees of overlapping coverage 
increases the data processing requirements by introducing a random period between 
target detections. The characteristics of the netted radar system used in LARIAT made 
it difficult to use conventional tracking methods to project a search sector ahead in time 
to match target detections with known tracks. This was due to the almost random time 
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interval between detections of a given target as it proceeded along its track. This 
random pattern in the sample interval was related to the overlapping radar coverage of 
the track and to the options in speed and direction that were applied independently to 
each radar scan. 
The computer analysis of radar signals in real time dictated extremely high 
performance processing to handle the very high data rate. There was, redundant 
information in the radar returns as seen at the output of the remote data link. Some of 
this redundancy was introduced by the integration process at the radar receiver-
transmitter used to provide bandwidth compression of the signals before transmission 
over the data link. The data rate at the output of the radar receiver was calculated by 
observing that each transmitted pulse from the radar was followed by a return signal that 
was divided in time to correspond to 200 independent range bins (each having 50 meters 
resolution). These transmitted pulses occurred at a frequency of 2 kHz, providing an 
information rate of 400,000 range bin samples per second per radar at the input to the 
MTI processor. These signals were processed independently to detect moving targets for 
each range bin. The bipolar MTI output signal which indicated the presence of a moving 
target in a given range bin was rectified and integrated independently for each range 
bin. The integrator summed the current return with the weighted sum of past returns. 
The integrator time constant was approximately equal to the interrogation period of the 
multiplexed data link system. The output of the integrator was then transmitted to the 
CPU van in data word groups at a 50 Hz multiplexing frame rate to reduce the data rate 
to only 10,000 range bins per second per radar. 
The 200 sequential digital data outputs of the MTI processor/integrator were 
converted to a pulse amplitude modulated analog signal and transmitted over the data 
link to the CPU van. At the receiver end of the data link, the signal was converted back 
to a digital format and organized into a data word package for interfacing to the 
computer system. The contents of each range bin were represented at this point by an 8-
bit binary word. This provided sufficient resolution to cover the received signal dynamic 
range expected. 
The LARIAT surveillance system (as field tested at the Yuma Proving Ground) 
combined the outputs of two ground surveillance radars (mounted on towers) within a 
single data processor and display system. The hardware and software design conceptually 
allows for the expansion of the system to ten such surveillance radars under the control 
of the central computer facility. The feasibility demonstration used two modified 
AN/PPS-5 radar sets mounted on 100 foot towers. The towers were located 
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approximately 6.5 kilometers apart allowing overlapping radar coverage on the test area 
to ensure maximum surveillance by minimizing the effects of terrain masking. The 
AN/PPS-5 radars were modified by reducing the horizontal beamwidth of the antenna 
from 1.2 to 0.7 degrees, providing continuous processing of all range bins out to an 
instrumented range of 10 kilometers, and providing an increased range bin resolution of 
50 meters (a total of 200 range bins). The PRF of the transmitter was reduced to 2 
kilohertz to eliminate the problems of second time around targets, and the receiver was 
modified to provide a coherent-on-receive capability. The radar signal preprocessing 
functions were accomplished using hardwired digital designs. 
The hardware and software algorithms for processing and displaying the radar 
information at the central processing van were developed at GIT/EES. This portion of 
the system was installed in an air conditioned step van that was interconnected to the 
remote radar towers by two-way microwave data links. A parallel microwave data link 
was used for the remote control of the co-boresighted TV cameras mounted on each 
radar pedestal. The LARIAT system design presented several unique challenges in the 
development of the signal processing equipment and the development of suitable 
software algorithms to provide the functions of automatic detection, tracking, and 
alarming of suspected intruders into the protected base area. Several problems unique to 
this system include irregular track sampling intervals and extremely low data rate of 
track information (related to the slow scanning rates for the radar), wide variations in 
the expected target velocities, and wide variations in the radar cross section of the 
threat targets. 
Slow scan speeds were required for the AN/PPS-5 (modified) radar system to detect 
slow moving, small targets such as a walking or crawling man. Scan speeds of the 
LARIAT system fielded in Yuma were remotely controlled through the digital 
computer. Selectable scan speeds of 18 degrees per second to 2.25 degrees per second 
corresponded to time periods of 20 seconds through 160 seconds required to cover a 360 
degree scan sector. The modified radar antenna employed a 3 dB horizontal beamwidth 
of 0.7 degrees (approximately 12.4 mils). This beamwidth was interpreted as an 
independent azimuth sector; thus, there were 514 such individual sectors over each 360 
degree scan. The 20 millisecond (or 50 Hz) interrogation period (established by the 
telemetry system) of each range bin of each radar provided multiple readouts of the 
return from a target within a given range bin as the antenna pattern swept across the 
target azimuth position. The number of responses through the multiplexed data link 
depended on the scan speed. This redundant information was used to great advantage in 
the data processing algorithms for target detection and verification. 
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A distributed (both parallel and serial) computing system concept was adopted to 
handle the large computing load demanded of the central processing system. A block 
diagram of the basic LARIAT data processing system used for the Yuma feasibility 
demonstration is illustrated in Figure A-8. 
The central computer system used to analyze the combined radar information and 
to interface with the operator display and other peripherals was a NOVA-3 computer. 
Preprocessing of the remaining large volume of received radar data prior to the NOVA-3 
computer occurred in two levels of high-speed microprocessors specifically designed for 
this application. The data flow chart in Figure A-9 illustrates the basic data processing 
operations performed between the radar/computer interface and the operator/display 
interface of the LARIAT system. The Data Distribution Preprocessor (DDP) unpacked 
the time division multiplexed data signal from the data link equipment. The microcode 
program in this preprocessor was completed within the four millisecond period allocated 
to each radar by the data link system. This included the transmission of the common 
word package and the receipt of the radar data word package. The complete computer 
program was repeated for each radar interrogation. The high operating speed of these 
microprocessors can accommodate a much higher multiplexing rate from the data link 
with no hardware changes. The important data processing algorithms accommodated in 
this distributed data processing system included a range only CFAR algorithm for the 
process of target detection  and an M-out-of-N integration algorithm for the function of 
target verification.  These two processes (contained in the microprocessor software) 
initiated target reports to the NOVA-3 system. The data processing algorithms within 
this main computer associated the target reports  stored on tape and disk files to 
establish target tracks according to prescribed software requirements. Threat analysis 
and alarm conditions to the operator were made only on established target tracks. 
The principle objective of the LARIAT program was to demonstrate the feasibility 
of the netted wide area surveillance radar concept in providing physical security for a 
MX missile installation scenario. The goals supporting this system objective included the 
development of the necessary hardware and software techriology for netting radars of 
this type. These goals also included the integration of an IFF capability and the 
demonstration of automatic detection, tracking, and alarming on threat targets. This 
system was designed to provide an effective man/machine interface for controlling the 
radars, interpreting track information, and directing friendly or security forces to 
intercept target tracks of unknown origins. This system concept was field tested in the 
desert environment of Yuma Proving Ground to answer specific questions on performance 
and to generate the necessary data base for designing operational systems. 
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Figure A-8. LARIAT distributed data processing system. 
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Figure A-9. Data processing order in the Georgia Tech LARIAT system. 
A.4 THE FACILITY INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (FIDS) SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
A.4.1 BACKGROUND 
The FIDS netted surveillance system is being developed at Ft. Belvoir for the U.S. 
Army. A comprehensive description of the FIDS system was not available and this 
summary description was assembled for the Georgia Tech concept study of netted radar-
fixed sensor surveillance systems after discussions with Mr. Al Zushin and Mr. Dale 
Rehak (of Ft. Belvoir) in December of 1981. Copies of briefing material on the FIDS 
concept and a description of the Interface Specification for the Control Unit/Line 
Control Processor were obtained during the Georgia Tech visit. 
The original FIDS concept (FIDS I) was started in 1974. This system had a single 
console rack connected to 32 control units. The operator interface to the FIDS I 
consisted of a printer and a series of light bulbs. 
The original unit was superceded by the FIDS II system in 1976. FIDS. II had a 
console connected to 96 control units (each addressing 6 point sensors). The original 
system was built by Labarage Electronics of Tulsa and included the line control processor 
architecture that will be used in the upcoming FIDS III system. It also upgraded the 
operator interface with a random access slide projector that could be used for maps or 
instructions. This element was later removed by the Ft. Belvoir personnel due to poor 
reliability. The resulting in-house changes introduced the two CRTs that are used for the 
status amd map displays. These operator-display interfaces have been retained in the 
FIDS III design. 
The FIDS III prototype system is currently being built by Sylvania at Mountain 
View. This contract was awarded in December 1978 for 6 complete units. The first 
prototype model of the FIDS III (scheduled for delivery in the near future) will include 
the console and a complete complement of 16 line control processors (LCP) and control 
units. The system will have only 2 sensors per control unit (CU). Development tests are 
currently scheduled for September 1982. The U.S. Army proponent for the system is the 
Military Police School. The main point of interest in the U. S. Air Force is the Office of 
Security Police at Kirkland. 
A.4.2 SUMMARY DESCRIPTION  
The FIDS system is a fixed installation security and alarm system that allows the 
operator to interface with a large number of fixed sensors of several different types. 

























































Figure A-10. Block diagram of Facility Intrusion Detection System (FIDS). 
common display/alarm system. The console contains the central master control (CMC), 
the audio monitor for selected acoustical monitoring by the operator, map and status 
displays, printer, and the command keyboard. The system provides secure and reliable 
communication between the sensors located in remote secure areas and the display unit. 
The communication link operates on an interrogate-respond principle which reports 
configuration and status information from each secure area interconnected to the 
control/display unit. 
A number of different types of sensors may be used with the FIDS system. Table 
A-4 describes the generic types of sensors and the common application area. 
TABLE A-4. SENSORS CURRENTLY COMPATIBLE WITH FIDS 
Sensor Type 	 Area of Application  
Ballanced Magnetic 	Detects penetration through 
switch door or window 
Passive Ultrasonic 	Detects ultrasonic energy 
generated through forced entry 
Vibration 	 Detects vibrational acceleration 
forces on wall or fence 
Ultrasonic motion 	Detects intruder motion 
in protected volume (12 x 20 x 30 ft)• 
Passive Infrared 	 Detects intruder motion 
Motion 	 Sensor at rates of 0.1 to 15 ft/sec 
RF motion sensors 	Bistatic area surveillance 
(approx. 930 m°) for low velocity 
targets 
Capacitance 	 Proximity/contact sensor 
(10 to 40 decks) 
The operator console communicates with the sensor in a tree configuration through 
the line control processor (LCP). Up to 16 of these LCPs may be used in the full scale 
FIDS system. Each of these LCPs may be connected to a total of 16 control units as 
illustrated in Figure A-11. This gives a full system capacity of 256 control units. 




I C U I I CU 	I I_ CU  
	I C0 1  
	I C U I 
	1 C U  I 
CU  
111 113 







CU CU CU 
CU U 
Each Control Unit 
Addresses 48 Sensors 
I_ CU I 
CMC 
LEGEND 
CMC - CENTRAL MASTER CONTROLLER 
OCP - DISPLAY CONTROL PROCESSOR 
LCP - LINE CONTROL PROCESSOR 
MODEM - MODULATORIOEMODULATOR 
SCA - SATELLITE CONTROL PROCESSOR 
CU - CONTROL UNIT 
	 CU I 
	
 	CU I 





	[ CU 	I 
CU 
MAXIMUM SYSTEM CAPACITY 
UP TO 16 LCPIMOOEN1S IN CMC TIMES 
UP TO 16 CU'S PER LCPIMOOEM EQUALS 
256 CONTROL UNITS IMAX1 
I CU I CU CU 







	I CU  
	I_ CU  
r CU 
	1_ CU 
Figure A-11. Sensor architecture of FIDS. 
The control unit contains a microprocessor for interfacing with up to 48 individual 
sensors within a data link distance of 500 feet from the CU. A block diagram of the CU 
system is given in Figure A-12. Each CU also provides 2 special function channels, 2 
deterrent channels (control of lights etc.), a channel for an entry control device 
(electrically controlled lock etc.), and 10 audio channels for operator monitoring of 
selected areas. 
The FIDS operating philosophy provides a status or operational check on all sensors 
that is activated by the control equipment. A tamper detection mode is also provided for 
all of the major system elements (such as the control unit and the CU power supply). 
A.4.3 COMMUNICATION FORMAT 
This description of the communication format of the FIDS system applies to the 
interconnection between the line control processors located at the central operator 
display facility and the control units located at the remote security areas. This 
multipoint data transmission system (MDTS) enables secure communications between the 
monitor console and the control units. The data transmission protocol operates in an 
interrogate-response mode to report alarm and status conditions at control units to the 
monitor console. The system operates in a half duplex mode over a hard-wire link of up 
to 10 miles of proprietary No. 22 AWG twisted pair wire having noise characteristics no 
worse than a 3002 unconditioned channel. The data rate is 1200 bits per second and 
operation is asynchronous. 
The communication system is implemented with a universal asynchronous 
receiver/transmitter (UART) technique for flexibility and commonality. The word 
format is an 11-bit word that is defined as follows: 1 start bit, 8 data bits, 1 parity bit 
(odd), and I stop bit. 
A method of authenticating the transmitted data is used to provide data security. 
The communication technique utilizes the capability of the microprocessors in the line 
control processor and the control unit to perform the processing necessasry for data 
authentication and implementation of the data transmission protocols. 
The hardware provided for data authentication is a single integrated circuit which 
implements the data standard chosen by the National Bureau of Standards as a federal 
information processing standard (FIPS46). The integrated circuit is a Western Digital 
DE2001 which is compatible with the 8085 microprocessor used in FIDS. In addition to 
the hardware, a software algorithm is implemented along with a protocol to increase the 
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Figure A-12. Block diagram of FIDS Control Unit. 
The control unit monitors the output from 48 sensors and acts as the computing 
mode from these sensors to the central facility. FIDS uses a communication concept to 
provide comprehensive sensor communictions by providing: 
1. Addressability to an individual sensor or remote device. 
2. Sufficient generality for use with a variety of sensors, function devices, 
deterrents, entry control and surveillance devices. 
3. Reporting to the control unit sensor configuration information, such as sensor 
type and presence of a sensor stimulus. 
4. Maintenance of line security via an interrogate/response system. 
5. Provision for control of sensor stimulus as well as other functions. 
6. Provision for reporting of status conditions in addition to internal tamper 
alarms. 
A.4.4 NETTING INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 
The FIDS security system appears to be a well designed concept for the netting of 
fixed point sensors. The basic communication rate is considered to be too low for use  
with radar sensors, (even with a high degree of preprocessing. The display is not suitable  
for displaying the large amounts of data that can be introduced from a netted radar 
security system. The system does not have spare capacity or expansion capability to 
accommodate the computing requirements of a netted radar system for the functions of 
target correlation, track processing, and threat analysis. 
The FIDS system does appear to be a good match for combining a netted fixed 
sensor security system with a netted radar system. The communication format is well 
engineered and the alarm information can be accessed in the central operator/display 
facility..  
One place to consider accessing the information in the FIDS system is at the line 
control processor. An interface board could be introduced into the central operator 
console (16 maximum - one for each LCP) to monitor the normal communications 
between the FIDS console and the remote area control units. This interface would not 
alter the operation of the FIDS system, but could provide the overall netted radar-fixed 
sensor surveillance system with all of the fixed sensor data from FIDS. Correlation of 
the fixed sensor data with the radar sensor data would be made in the overall netted 
surveillance system. 
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A.5 THE BISS SPCDS NETTED SENSOR SECURITY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION  
A.5.1 SUMMARY DESCRIPTION 
This summary description of a netted fixed sensor security system was prepared for 
the Georgia Tech concept investigation of netted radar-fixed sensor surveillance 
systems. This netted fixed sensor system is designed around the BISS Small Permanent 
Communications and Display Segment (SPCDS) that monitors a number of fixed sensors 
through nodal interface units. The nodal interface to the sensor array is provided by the 
Coder-Multiplexer, Sensor, Data (CMSD). This security/surveillance system is designated 
as the Alarm System, Anti-Intrusion, Restricted Area, AN/GSS-29(V). 
The SPCDS is a netted physical security system that connects a number of fixed 
point sensors to a central operator/display console. The system is connected in a tree 
configuration through the CMSD interface unit. Intruder detections are indicated on a 
display with 160 LEDs on a facility map at the operator display. 
A block diagram of the system is given in Figure A-13. Each CMSD is capable of 
monitoring up to 80 sensors of a variety of types. The display system supports up to 4 
CMSD units giving the net command of up to 320 sensors units. 
The CMSD is a data gathering, storing, processing, and transmitting device for 
sensor data received from 1 to 80 remote sensor units. It has the facilities for initiating 
sensor test functions, either on command from remote equipment or automatically at 
seven hour intervals. The sensor test feature provides an indication of the operational 
status of the remote sensor units. The CMSD unit is capable of handling up to 80 sensor 
input signals simultaneously over 3.2 kilometers of AWG No. 19 copper wire, in four 
groups of 20 inputs per connector. 
The CMSD is an impedance sensing device. It recognizes an intrusion alarm signal 
when the impedance of any of the sensor lines drops belows 400 ohms for a period of 80 
milliseconds or longer. A line fault is recognized whenever the impedance of a given 
sensor line rises above 7.5 kilohms for a period of 200 milliseconds or longer. These 
conditions are automatically transmitted to the central operator display console. 
A.5.2 COMMUNICATION FORMAT 
The CMSD unit transmits 5 communication message types to a Local Display Area 
(LDA) and/or to a Remote Display Area. These message types are 
1. Sensor Alarm Messages. 
2. Line Fault Messages. 
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Figure A-13. 	SPCDS functional block diagram. 
3. Failed-Self-Test Messages. 
4. Data Link Monitor Messages. 
5. Battery Good Link Good Messages. 
Messages from the CMSD are sent in serial digital format consisting of 29 bits that are 
clocked out at a 1200 Hertz rate. These bits are assigned as follows: 
1. Bits 29 through 22 is a preamble that specifies the formatting of a message. 
2. Bits 21 through 17 is the sync word code that allows routing of the message to 
appropriate remote equipment for further display and processing. 
3. Bits 16 through 13 is the area ID that is manually set by switches on the CMSD 
to represent the assigned area in which the CMSD is placed. 
4. Bits 12 through 7 gives the transmitter ID; the first two bit identify the 
CMSD. The remaining four bits identify the sensor. 
5. Bit 6 identifies the source. 
6. Bits 5 through 2 contains the data message. 
7. Bit 1 is the parity bit for the serial message. 
These message formats are shown in more detail in Figure A-14 and in Table A-5. 
A.5.3 NETTING INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 
The SPCDS unit does not have the display capability for handling intrusion data 
from a net of radar sensors. The CMSD unit appears to be a good design for the netted 
radar-fixed sensor surveillance system being studied. The data rate and formats of the 
CMSD is adequate for the point sensors, but will not support the higher data rates needed 
for radar data. This SPCDS concept could be used in the netted radar-point sensor 
security concept if the output of the CMSD units are interfaced via a suitable interface 
box. This would allow the sensor information to be accessed without affecting the normal 
display functions of the SPCDS unit. 
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Figure A-14. SPCDS message format. 
TABLE A-5, SPCDS MESSAGE FORMAT. 
BIT 
SOURCE 	PARITY 
PREAMBLE 	 SYNC WORD 	AREA ID 	TRANSMITTER ID 	DATA 
 1 29 28 27 26 25 24 	23 22 	21 	20 	19 18 	17 . 16 	15 	la 	13 	12 	11 	10 9 8 7 	6 	5432
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DATA MESSAGE 	1 	1 	0 	1 	0 LINE SUPERVISION MESSAGE 	1 	1 	1 	0 0 
DATA 
BIT 6 	5432 	MESSAGE 	 BIT 6 	5432 	MESSAGE 
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APPENDIX B 
PROPOSED INTERFACE DESCRIPTIONS 
FOR SELECTED SENSORS 
B.1 NETTED INTERFACE DESCRIPTION FOR SHORT RANGE SECTOR RADARS  
B.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This appendix contains the proposed interface requirements for currently available 
sensors that are to be connected into a netted radar-fixed sensor surveillance system. 
This requirement description was prepared in support of the Georgia Tech netted radar-
fixed sensor concept study and was developed around the netting concepts described in 
this final technical report. 
This section describes the considerations for interfacing short range ground 
surveillance sector radars into a netted security system with a number of fixed sensors. 
The background rationale is briefly discussed, and the data format and resolution 
required for such an interface is presented. When options are possible, the recommended 
priority for choices is listed. The interface description defined here will accommodate a 
maximum of eight radars in the net, but will also function well with any number of radars 
less than the maximum. 
B.1.2 BACKGROUND 
A netted security system study was performed for the U.S. Air Force Physical 
Security Systems Directorate (PSSD) by the Georgia Institute of Technology Engineering 
Experiment Station (GIT/EES) to define concepts for integrating ground surveillance 
radars into a netted security system along with fixed sensors currently under 
development such as SPCDS, FIDS, and REMBASS. This study defined the radar unit as a 
large area sensor system capable of detecting intrusions from a large number of 
individual resolution cells contained within the radar field of view. Each radar resolution 
cell can be considered to be equivalent to a fixed sensor unit in terms of a netted system 
and can best be referenced by its location. Since more than one radar may be used in a 
surveillance application, provisions must be made for overlapping coverage of given 
terrain areas. A reference method such as the map grid system is ideal for this target 
location identification problem. 
Automatic detection, tracking, and threat assessment is a major goal of a netted 
sensor system which involves the integration of radar technology with point sensors. This 
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is necessary to eliminate or supplement the requirement for individual radar operators 
wherever possible to reduce manpower requirements and increase the effectiveness of 
the operating security personnel. Personnel and vehicle targets which may be detected 
by a radar sensor have a wide range of velocities, and the human intruder can rapidly 
change the velocity and direction of movement. For these reasons, near real time 
tracking of intruders is a necessity. For real time tracking, the target association and 
tracking algorithms must be designed to operate primarily on the location and time that 
a given radar range cell shows the indication of an intrusion. This establishes the 
requirements for the location and time to be included in a report of a potential target in 
an occupied resolution cell (ORC).
* 
The resolution requirements for such reports will be 
developed in the following discussions. 
The netted radar-fixed sensor concept is based on automatic association and 
tracking algorithms for intruders within a defined base area to provide improved 
rejection of false and nuisance alarms and assist in the interception of potential threats 
by security forces. Multiple radar coverage of protected areas may be required to 
maximize the probability of detection and allow for natural overlapping of surveillance 
zones. This concept requires correlation target data reported from different radars and 
correlation of data from radars and fixed point sensors. This correlation is accomplished 
through the use of position location and time-of-occurrence. 
Two communication formats must be defined for the radar interface to such a 
netted system. The first will be concerned with the reporting of data from the radar to 
the netted sensor system. This message information will be defined as the data word. 
Secondly, since the radar may have adjustments that can be changed by a local operator, 
it may be desirable for the netted sensor system operator to also have control access to 
these adjustments. This communication function will be defined as the command word. 
B.1.3 REQUIRED INFORMATION 
The position of an occupied resolution cell within a given radar coverage area can 
be expressed uniquely in Cartesian coordinates such as the UTM map-grid system. While 
this reference system is in a form that can be easily used in a netting system, it does not 
represent the form common to most personnel detecting sector radars. The category of 
*
Occupied Resolution Cell is defined as a resolution cell within the radar field of view 
defined by the antenna azimuth beamwidth and the range cell length in which the 
detected signal has exceeded a threshold indicating the presence of a potential target. 
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radars discussed here (such as the FOLPEN radar and the Exterior Perimeter Sensor 
Device (EPSD) a product improvement of the AN/PPS-15(B) are oriented to a detection 
scenario using a limited number of range rings as shown in Figure B-1. The intrusion 
report is typically referenced to the range ring location where the intrusion occurred or 
to the location of the first range ring if they are continuous. The location description of 
the ORC is fixed with the addition of an azimuth position that is referenced to the radar 
antenna position. 
The definition study of netted radar-fixed sensor security systems has defined 
association/location algorithms for analyzing the radar ORC reports that are based on 
the position location and the time of occurrence of the event. This study indicates that 
the nominal location resolution of the radars available for this function is between 10 and 
50 meters. If a worst case design is assumed, a resolution of 10 meters can be selected 
for an assumed operating area of 10 kilometers radius (the operating area includes all of 
the netted surveillance area). This would require a maximum resolution of 11 bits binary 
for both the X and the Y coordinates of the ORC report. In a similar manner, the 
resolution of the time of occurrence of the report can be defined to be a one second 
resolution over a 24 hour period (17 bits). This defines basic location and time resolution 
needed in a netting central processor to correlate ORC data from radars with 
overlapping coverage and from radars and fixed sensors. 
B.1.4 DESIRED INFORMATION 
B.1.4.1 Data Word  
There are several types of information in the data word and in the command word 
that are desirable from the netted radar-fixed sensor standpoint. The ORC position may 
be uniquely referenced by X-Y grid coordinates in the UTM map system as discussed 
above or by a range and azimuth reading relative to the location of the radar. If the 
ORC locations are described in polar coordinates, then the location and pointing 
direction of the radar must be known at the central netting processor with a resolution 
nominally equivalent to 10 meters. Azimuth reference for the radar pointing direction or 
for the ORC report should be referenced to grid-north of the map system. 
The resolution requirements for the position and time of an ORC report given 
above are the maximum values defined for a netted surveillance system containing a 
large number of fixed sensors and a number of radars. This is the resolution required 
within the netting computer. The minimum resolution for the ORC reports can be 
examined by considering the capabilities of the specific radar units. The basic location 
reporting scenarios are illustrated in Figure B-2. 
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Figure B-2. Two basic ORC location reporting scenarios. 
The minimum resolution requirements for a short range sector scanning radar can 
be defined in terms of its maximum detection range. If a range resolution of 30 meters 
is assumed for a 4 kilometer maximum detection range (typical for the EPSD version of 
the AN/PPS-15(B), a binary resolution of 8 bits is required. A nominal azimuth resolution 
of 6 degrees over a sector coverage of 180 degrees would require a binary resolution of 5 
bits. This minimum value of location word resolution would require 13 bits total and 
would require that the position and pointing direction of each radar be known accurately 
at the netting computer. This value is coarser than the 10 meter maximum location 
resolution reporting capability defined for the automatic associating/tracking algorithms 
Used in the netted radar-fixed sensor system study and, thus, would not use the least 
significant bits in reporting. 
Two ORC reporting methods may thus be defined for describing the position in an 
ORC location report. A position report using the UTM map coordinates is preferred, but 
this requires that the conversion from polar coordinates to Cartesian coordinates be 
made at the radar. The information required in the data word is defined in Table B-1 for 
both position descriptions presented above. The radar units are to be capable of operation 
via remote RF data transmission links to facilitate fast set-up for the security system. 
For this reason, the radar interface will follow the Physical Security Systems Directorate 
Specification Number SEIWIG-005 on "Interface Specification RF Data Transmission 
Interfaces For DOD Physical Security Systems." This document defines the data message 
inputted to the RF transmitter as a binary signal coded at an information bit rate of 1200 
+ or - 36 bits per second. Each transmitted message will have a common preamble 
(message bits 1 - 9) consisting of a sequence of eight "zeros" followed by a "one." The 
preamble is followed by a message code field (bits 10 - 13) containing a preassigned 
code. The message data field starts with bit 14. The BISS and the REMBASS systems 
have traditionally used a 29 bit digital message which is too small to accommodate the 
data defined in Table B-1. The FIDS message is made up of varying numbers of 11 bit 
bytes following eight or more zeros. The first byte of a FIDS message incorporates the 
start bit (bit 9) and the message code field (bits 10 - 13). The referenced specification 
does not limit the message length, but it is desirable for the radar interface description 
to follow a defined format if a suitable one exists. The FIDS format varies from three 
bytes to nine bytes, corresponding to a range of 41 bits to 107 bits per message. This 
FIDS format is sufficient to accommodate either of the data requirements listed in 
Table B-1. 
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TABLE B-1. DATA WORD INFORMATION 
Item 
	 Desired 	 Minimum 










Preamble 	 9 bits 
Message Code 	 4 bits 
Sensor Type 	 2 bits 
Radar ID 	 3 bits 
Report Type 	 2 bits 
Report Subclass 	 5 bits 
Time 	 17 bits 
ORC Location 	 22 bits 
Parity 	 1 bit 
Total Bit Requirements 	 65 bits 56 bits 
1 
The message data field of the ORC report contains a number of data items relating 
the radar system and the location of the occupied resolution cell. The definition of these 
items are given in Table B-2. 
B.1.4.2 Command Word 
The command word controls the position of the radar and the signal processor 
located with the radar set. The command word serves two basic functions and has been 
divided into an initialization format and an operational format.  The initialization format 
of the command word is used to define (or redefine - in the case of fast-set up security 
systems) the initial conditions of location coordinates, time, and operating mode of the 
radar and signal processor. The operational format of the command word is used as the 
routine communication form with the remote radar/signal processor systems. This 
command word is used to: (I) change the direction of the sector scan center, (2) control 
the width of the sector scan, (3) change the position of the range bins, (4) control the 
distance between adjacent range bins, (5) provide a routine synchronization of the 
reference clock contained in the radar signal processor, (6) define the operating mode of 
the radar system, (7) initiate self test algorithms within the radar and signal processor, 
and (8) adjust the clutter filter cutoff frequency of the signal processor. 
The command word is defined for remote RF operation in a manner similar to that 
selected for the data transmission links. The command word will follow the referenced 
SEIWG-005 specification described above. The message contents and bit requirements of 
the two formats of the command word are listed in Table B-3 and Table B-4. The 
definitions of the various message items are given in Table B-5. 
B.1.5 RECOMMENDED COMMUNICATION WORD FORMATS 
The communication requirements defined for the data words and the command 
words are intended to accommodate several generic types of short-range radar sets. The 
definitions of the message items recognize that the actual capabilities of a given radar 
design will differ from the desired capabilities allowed for in the communication 
interface definition. In this sense, the definitions made in this specification are intended 
to be universal enough to accommodate future security system requirements and 
available equipment designs. 
The recommended communication word formats follow the FIDS format using 
groups of 11-bit bytes. The data word has been defined with a requirements of at least 
65 bits. Two formats of the command word have been defined with requirements of at 
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TABLE B-2. DEFINITION OF DATA WORD 
	





2. 	Radar ID - 3 bits -- identifies one of 8 possible radars in net 
3. Report Category - 2 bits -- defines 4 radar report categories 
a. Occupied Resolution Cell (ORC) Report 
b. Built In Test (BIT) Failure Report 
c. Tamper Report 
d. Self Test Report 
4. 	Report Subclass - 5 bits -- identifies report type under above categories or velocity 
information for ORC Report 
a. 	ORC Report 
(1) Speed - 4 bits defines ORC velocity category or velocity bin number 
(2) ORC Direction - 1 bit - defines in/out direction of ORC modem 
b. 	BIT Report 
(1) Equipment Failure 
(2) Degraded Performance 
c. 	Tamper Report 
(1) Physical Tampering/Equipment Entry 
(2) Electromagnetic Countermeasures (Jamming) 
(3) Proximity Detectors (Personnel nearby) 
(4) Sensor Moved (detects possible change in pointing direction) 
d. 	Self Test 
(1) Acknowledge Self Test Request 
(2) Self Test Completed - System OK 
(3) Equipment Failure 
(4) Degraded Performance 
TABLE B-2. DEFINITION OF DATA WORD (Continued) 
e. 	Communication 
(1) Link Check 
5. Time - 17 bits -- time of occurrence of report (one second resolution in 24 hour day) 
6. ORC Location  
a. First Priority: Cartesian Coordinates - 22 bits 
b. Second Priority: Polar Coordinates - 13 bits 
7. Parity  - 1 bit -- An even or odd parity check on data word 
TABLE B-3. COMMAND WORD INFORMATION 
(Initialization Format) 
Item 	 Resolution Desired 
Preamble 	 9 bits 
Message . Code 	 4 bits 
Radar ID 	 3 bits 
Command Subclass 	 2 bits 
Radar Location 	 22 bits 
(X - position -- 11 bits) 
(Y - position -- 11 bits) 
Time 	 17 bits 
Operating Mode 	 4 bits 
Self Test Initiate 	 2 bits 
Parity Check 	 1 bit 
Total Bit Requirements 	 64 bits 
TABLE B-4. COMMAND WORD INFORMATION 
(Operational Format) 
Item 	 Resolution Desired 
Preamble 
	 9 bits 
Message Code 
	 4 bits 
3 bits Radar ID 
Command Subclass 
Direction of Scan Center 
Width of Scan Sector 
Range Bin Position 










Self Test Initiate 	 2 bits 
Clutter Filter Cutoff Frequency 	 3 bits 
Parity Check 	 1 bit  
Total Bit Requirements 	 75 bits 
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TABLE B-5. DEFINITION OF COMMAND WORD 
1. Radar ID - 3 bits -- Identifies one of 8 possible radars in net. 
2. Command Subclass - 2 bits -- Defines type of Command Message. 
3. Direction of Scan Center - 11 bits -- Defines pointing direction of sector center with 
a resolution of 0.2 degrees over a range of 360 degrees. 
4. Width of Scan Sector - 6 bits -- Defines sector width with a resolution of 5 degrees 
over a maximum sector width of 180 degrees. 
5. Range Bin Position - 10 bits -- Defines position of reference bin (for example: inner 
range bin) from radar with a resolution of 5 meters over a maximum range of 4 
kilometers. 
6. Distance Between Range Bins - 3 bits -- Defines separation of adjacent range bins 
(For example: the EPSD has two range bin separation distances - 50 meters and 
500 meters). 
7. Time - 17 bits -- Time synchronization for reference clock in radar. 
8. Operating Mode - 4 bits -- Defines the operating mode of the radar. This quantity is 
specific to each radar system design (For example: the EPSD may operate in the 
Search or Track Mode). First Mode Bit defines Manual/Computer Control of 
radar. 
9. Radar Location - 22 bits -- Initializes the radar signal processor with the coordinates 
of the radar set. 
10. Self Test Initiate - 2 bits -- Initiates Self Test routines designed into the surveillance 
radars. (Includes a Communication/Data Link Test.) 
11. Clutter Filter Cutoff Frequency - 3 bits -- Controls possible settings of the clutter 
rejection filter. 
12. Parity Check - 1 bit -- An even or odd parity check on the data word. 
least 64 and 75 bits. A grouping of seven 11-bit bytes will accommodate all three word 
formats and is the recommended word format  for the netted radar interface. The 
suggested bit assignments for the three 7-byte words are given in Figures B-3, B-4, and 
B-5. The definitions of the message items used in these figures are given in the data 
word definitions (Table B-2) and the command word definitions (Table B-5). 
B.1.6 COMMUNICATION RATES 
The maximum bit rates are defined by the referenced SEIWIG-005 specification at 
1200 baud. The 7-byte (11 bits per byte) word format limits the communication rate for 
both the data words and the command words to a maximum of 15.6 words per second at 
each radar interface. While this is more than adequate for the limited number of 
command words expected, it will pose a limitation on the maximum number of . ORC 
reports that can be accommodated from a given radar set. This reporting rate will 
handle two reports per range bin for an 8-range bin signal processor which accommodates 
the EPSD and the current capabilities of the FOLPEN radar systems. 
The proposed communication word formats will accommodate the netting of up to 
eight short range sector scan personnel detecting radars with a security system using 
fixed sensors. The interface definition will allow a bidirectional RF communication/ 
data link to be used for fast set-up situations and will also function over other 
communication mediums such as hard wires. The word formats are similar to the 
formats used in the FIDS sensor netting system and contain some unassigned bits to allow 
for future expansion. 
B.2 RADAR SENSOR INTERFACE DESCRIPTION FOR WIDE AREA SURVEILLANCE  
RADARS  
This section discusses requirements for the data and command links for a wide area 
surveillance radar operating within a netted radar-fixed sensor surveillance system. 
While this interface description parallels the proposed interface requirements for the 
short range sector scan radars, it has not been developed as a stand-alone document since 
no specific production radar has currently been identified with this application. The 
modified AN/PPS-5 radar used in the LARIAT feasibility demonstration has been used in 
this report as a benchmark system since it meets many of the operating parameters 
desired in an area surveillance radar for a netted surveillance applications. 
The netting requirements for an area surveillance radar differ from the short range 
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Figure B-4. Suggested command word format. (Initialization Format) 
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Figure B-5. Suggested command word format. (Operational Format) 
possible for the area surveillance case. The interface description for the area radar will 
follow the Physical Security Systems Directorate Specification Number SEIWIG-005 on 
"Interface Specification RF Data Transmission Interfaces For DOD Physical Security 
Systems" using a format similar to that specified for the sector coverage radar. 
The display return from isolated radar targets is useful in identifying the class or 
type of target. While this information can be very useful to the radar operator or to the 
netted surveillance surveillance system, it carries some additional bandwidth 
requirements over that accommodated within the interface to the short range sector 
scan radar systems. The data link to this radar will be used for the ORC reports to the 
netting computer and for any position reports from the optional IFF system described in 
this report. An additional option for monitoring the radar target Doppler from the area 
surveillance radar will be handled as a parallel interface. 
The bandwidth requirements of the Doppler signal is controlled by the Nyquist 
sampling rate. In a pulse Doppler system, this will be approximately one-half of the 
pulse repetition frequency (PRF). The benchmark AN/PPS-5 radar had a PRF of 2 
kilohertz, giving a bandwidth of the Doppler audio channel in excess of 2 kilohertz. The 
serial digital channel specified in the SEIWIG-005 requires that the Doppler signal be 
digitized before encoding on the data link. If a 9-bit resolution is assumed (8 bits plus 
sign bit) to give a 40 dB peak dynamic range, then a minimum bit rate requirement of 
9000 bits per second would be needed for the above example. This clearly illustrates that 
the use of the remote Doppler monitoring option must be supported by a wide-band data 
link. Since this option may not be used for all applications of the area surveillance radar, 
the ORC reporting data link will be specified as the primary interface to the netting 
computer, and the Doppler return channel will be specified as an optional auxiliary 
communication channel. 
The ORC reporting data link to the area radar is proposed to contain one additional 
ORC position report per data word over that used in the sector scan radar interface 
format. This will expand the basic 7 byte word of the short range sector scan radar 
interface to a total of 9 bytes (11 bits per byte). The data word bit requirements are 
given in Table B-6. The definition of the items used in the data word are found in Table 
B-7. This increased bit count of 9 bytes per words will reduce the data word rate to 12.1 
words per second at each area radar interface, but it will increase the ORC reporting 
rate to an average of 24.2 reports per second per radar. The proposed data word 
communication format is illustrated in Figure B-6; in this figure, 5 bits are provided for 
each ORC report for an RCS estimate as a future expansion to the netted system 
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TABLE B-6. DATA WORD INFORMATION FOR AREA SURVEILLANCE RADAR 
Item 	 Resolution Desired 
Preamble 	 9 bits 
Message Code 	 4 bits 
Sensor Type 	 2 bits 
Radar ID 	 3 bits 
Report Type 	 2 bits 
Report Subclass 	 5 bits 
Time 	 17 bits 
ORC Location 
Number 1 	 22 bits 
Number 2 22 bits 
RCS Estimate 
ORC 1 	 5 bits 
ORC 2 5 bits 
Parity 	 1 bit 
Total Bit Requirements 	 97 bits 
TABLE B-7. DEFINITION OF DATA WORD FOR AREA SURVEILLANCE RADAR 
	





2. 	Radar ID -.3 bits -- identifies one of 8 possible radars in net 
3. 	Report Category - 2 bits -- defines 4 radar report categories 
a. Occupied Resolution Cell (ORC) Report 
b. Built In Test (BIT) Failure Report 
c. Tamper Report 
d. Self Test Report 
4. 	Report Subclass - 5 bits -- identifies report type under above categories or velocity 
information for ORC Report 
a. 	ORC Report 
(1) Speed - 4 bits defines ORC velocity category or velocity bin number 
(2) ORC Direction - 1 bit - defines in/out direction of ORC modem 
b. 	BIT Report 
(1) Equipment Failure 
(2) Degraded Performance 
c. 	Tamper Report 
(1) Physical Tampering/Equipment Entry 
(2) Electromagnetic Countermeasures (Jamming) 
(3) Proximity Detectors (Personnel nearby) 
(4) Sensor Moved (detects possible change in pointing direction) 
d. 	Self Test 
(1) Acknowledge Self Test Request 
(2) Self Test Completed - System OK 
(3) Equipment Failure 
(4) Degraded Performance 
e. 	Communication 
(1) 	Link Check 
5. 	Time - 17 bits -- time of occurrence of report (one second resolution in 24 hour day) 
6. 	ORC Location - 44 bits -- defines the X-Y position of two ORC'S with a resolution 
of 11 bits per coordinate 
7. 	ORC RCS Estimate - 10 bits -- a reporting capability for RCS estimate of two ORC 
targets with a resolution of 5 bits per report. 
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Figure B-6. Data word format for area surveillance radar. 
capability. This format parallels that used for the FIDS message and the general format 
selected for the proposed short range radar sector scan radar interface requirements. 
This information would be used for adjusting the search area in the ORC association 
algorithms. 
The command link to the area surveillance radars will be similar to that used in the 
sector radar interface (described in Section B.1). The command link will use separate 
word formats for the initialization mode and operational mode. The bit requirements for 
these two command word formats are given in Tables B-8 and B-9. The definitions of the 
terms used in the command words are given in Table B-10. The proposed word formats 
for these two functions are illustrated in Figures B-7 and B-8. 
The maximum bit rates for the ORC reporting channel and the command link 
channel are defined by the referenced SEIWIG-005 specification at 1200 baud. The 
proposed communication word formats will accommodate the netting of two or more 
area surveillance radars into a netting computer as defined in the study scenario. These 
interface definitions will allow a bidirectional RF communication/data link to be used for 
fast set-up requirements and will also function over other communication mediums such 
as hard wires. The separate communication channel for the Doppler target return can 
also be handled over a dedicated wideband RF link or over a quality hardwire system. 
These proposed word formats are similar to the formats used in the FIDS sensor netting 
system and are considered general enough to allow the use of different area surveillance 
radars. This proposed command/data link format will accommodate several area radars 
into the netting computer if required. 
B.3 NETTED INTERFACE FOR BISS SPCDS SYSTEM  
This section describes an interface concept which will allow connection of the BISS 
SPCDS system to the proposed netted system. The interface for the SPCDS should be 
similar in format to those proposed for the sector scan and area radars in order to 
simplify the communications problem. However, since the radar interface is much more 
complex than the SPCDS interface the interface, format will be much simpler for the 
case of the SPCDS system. 
One of the goals of the netted system concept is to provide for netting of various 
sensor systems without interfering with the stand alone capabilities of the system. 
Ideally, the interface to the SPCDS system should not involve major modifications to the 
system and must not prevent the system being used in its normal operational mode. 
Fortunately, this is achievable for the SPCDS system if the interface to the net is made 
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TABLE 13-8. COMMAND WORD INFORMATION 
(Initialization Format) 
Item 	 Resolution Desired 
Preamble 	 9 bits 
Message Code 	 4 bits 
Radar ID 	 3 bits 
Command Subclass 	 2 bits 
Radar Location 	 22 bits 
(X - position -- 11 bits) 
(Y - position -- 11 bits) 
Time 	 17 bits 
Operating Mode 	 4 bits 
Self Test Initiate 	 2 bits 
Parity Check 	 1 bit 
Total Bit Requirements 	 64 bits 
TABLE B-9. COMMAND WORD INFORMATION 
(Operational Format) 
Item 	 Resolution Desired 
Preamble 	 9 bits 
Message Code 	 4 bits 
Radar ID 	 3 bits 
Command Subclass 	 2 bits 
Scan Mode 	 1 bit 
Scan Diretion 	 1 bit 
Scan Speed 	 2 bits 
Sector Scan Center Azimuth 	 11 bits 
Width of Scan Sector 	 6 bits.  
Range Bin Position 	 10 bits 
Time 	 17 bits 
Operating Mode 	 4 bits 
Self Test Initiate 	 2 bits 
Clutter Filter Cutoff Frequency 	 3 bits 
Parity Chck 	 1 bit  
Total Bit Requirements 	 76 bits 
I 
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TABLE B-10. DEFINITION OF COMMAND WORD FOR AREA SURVEILLANCE RADAR 
1. Radar ID - 3 bits -- Identifies one of 8 possible radars in net. 
2. Command Subclass - 2 bits -- Defines type of Command Message. 
3. Scan Mode - 1 bit — Defines Continuous or Sector Scan Mode. 
4. Scan Direction - 1 bit -- Defines direction of Continuous Scan Mode. 
5. Scan Speed - 2 bits -- Defines scan speed (4 possible). 
6. Sector Scan Center Azimuth  - 11 bits -- Defines pointing direction of sector center 
with a resolution of 0.2 degrees over a range of 360 degrees. 
7. Width of Scan Sector  - 6 bits -- Defines sector width with a resolution of 5 degrees 
over a maximum sector width of 180 degrees. 
8. Range Bin Position - 10 bits -- Defines position of reference bin (for example, inner 
range bin) from radar with a resolution of .5 meters over a maximum range of 4 
kilometers. 
9. Time - 17 bits -- Time synchronization for reference clock in radar. 
10. Operating Mode - 4 bits -- Defines the operating mode of the radar. This quantity is 
specific to each radar system design. First Mode Bit defines Manual/Computer 
Control of radar. 
11. Radar Location - 22 bits -- Initializes the radar signal processor with the coordinates 
of the radar set. 
12. Self Test Initiate - 2 bits -- Initiates Self Test routines designed into the surveillance 
radars. (Includes a Communication/Data Link Test). 
13. Clutter Filter Cutoff Frequency  - 3 bits -- Controls possible settings of the clutter 
rejection filter. 
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Figure B-7. Command word format for area surveillance radar. (Initialization Mode) 
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Figure B-8. Command word format for area surveillance radar. (Operational Mode) 
at the so-called "Coder, Multiplexer, Sensor, Data" (CMSD) unit as is shown in Figure B-
9. The CMSD scans up to 79 remote point sensors in a periodic manner and generates a 
serial digital message which reports the status of the sensors (see Appendix A). 
Normally, this serial message is sent over a distance of up to 8 km to the so-called 
"Receiver, . Digital Data" (RDD) which processes the data for display. Fortunately, the 
CMSD is designed to drive up to two RDD units, although the normal mode involves only 
one. Thus, the extra RDD output is available to interface to the netted system as shown 
in Figure B-9. The interface circuitry consists of an RDD emulator, a code translator, 
and an RF link driver. As far as the CMSD is concerned, the interface looks like a 
second RDD, and , the interface unit can be located up to 8 km away from the CMSD. 
Since the data format is already a serial digital word, all the code translator has to do is 
to transform the code format to that appropriate for the RF data link. 
As in the case of the radar interfaces, both a data word and a command word are 
needed for communication (two way communication). Table B-11 defines the desired 
data word for the SPCDS interface. The format follows as closely as possible the format 
used for the radar interfaces and includes all of the information available from the 
CMSD unit. The data word includes sensor type (SPCDS), area ID (one of four possible 
CMSD units), report category (alarm, self test, tamper, or line fault), report subclass 
(two speed catagories, failed self test, tamper report, or line fault), time (one second per 
day resolution), location of sensor, and parity check. Figure B-10 gives the data word 
format and indicates the various message reports. The SPCDS system has a two way 
communication capability. Thus, a command word from the netted system to the the 
CMSD is needed. Table B-12 gives the message definition for the command word. The 
format for the command word includes sensor type, sensor ID, command subclass (either 
initiate self test or set time), time reference, and parity check. Thus, the CMSD sees 
the two way interface that it expects and the RF link sees the format it expects. The 
specific format for the command word is given in Figure B-11. 
B.4 NETTED INTERFACE FOR FIDS SYSTEM  
The desired goals for the FIDS system interface are similar to those for the SPCDS 
system. That is the FIDS system should operate in the stand-alone mode without 
interference from the netted interface, and all of the data available from the system 
should be transmitted to the netted system. This can be accomplished for the FIDS in a 
manner similar to that used for the SPCDS system. Figure B-12 gives a block diagram of 
the netted interface of the FIDS system. For this case, one of the 16 possible line 
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Figure B-9. Block diagram of SPCDS to netted system interface. 
TABLE B-11. DEFINITION OF DATA WORD FOR SPCDS 





2. Area ID - 2 Bits - Identifies One of Four CMSD Units 
3. Report Catagory  - 2 bits - Defines Four. Report Catagories 
a. Sensor Alarm 
b. Failed Self Test 
c. Tamper Report 
d. Line Fault 
4. Report Subclass - 7 Bits 
a. 	Speed - 1 Bit Defines Two . Speed Classes as Allowed Under SPCDS 
Specification 
Failed Self Test - 7 Bits 
a. Acknowledge Self Test Initiate - 1 Bit 
b. Failed Sensor Numbers - 7 Bits 
Tamper Report 
a. Tampered Sensor Number - 7 Bits 
b. Transmission Line Tamper (CMSD to RDD) - 1 Bit 
Line Fault 
a. 	Number of Failed Sensor - 7 Bits 
5. Time - 17 Bits - Time of Occurrence of Report (One Second Resolution in 24 Hour 
Day ) 
6. ORC Location - 22 Bits 
a. First Priority: Location of Sensor in Cartesian Coordinates - 22 Bits (10 m 
Accuracy) 
b. Second Priority: Area ID, Transmitter ID 
7. Parity Check - 1 Bit - Even or Odd Word Test 
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Figure B-10. SPCDS data word. 
TABLE B-12. DEFINITION OF COMMAND WORD FOR SPCDS 





2. CMSD ID - 2 Bits Identifies One of Four CMSD Units 
3. Command Subclass - 1 Bit 
a. Initiate Self Test 
b. Set Time 
4. Time Ref rence - 17 Bits Time Synchronization for Reference Clock in Interface 
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Figure B-11. SPCDS command word. 
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Figure B-12. Block diagram of netted interface to FIDS System. 
control processors (LCPs) is replaced by an LCP emulator. Thus, the rest of the FIDS 
system operates normally, and all of the incoming data are available to the interface 
from the LCP buss. A code translator (probably a microprocessor) then translates the 
FIDS codes to the netted interface code. 
Table B-13 gives the format for the FIDS data word. The word can be broken down 
into the sensor type, the line control processor ID, report category, report subclass 
(sensor alarm, built-in-test, tamper report, or self test response), time, sensor location, 
and parity bit. Figure B-13 shows the format for the data word; the format is very 
similar to that of the SPCDS system data word. Table B-14 gives the makeup of the 
FIDS command word. The FIDS system is capable of responding to several commands 
including deterrent initiate, self test initiate, entry allowance, and set time. The format 
for the command word is illustrated by Figure B-14; the structure is very similar to that 
for the SPCDS interface. 
TABLE B-13. DEFINITION OF DATA WORD FOR FIDS 





2. Line Control Processor ID - 4 Bits - (Identifies One of 16 LCPs) 
3. Report Catagory - 2 Bits 
a. Sensor Alarm 
b. Tamper Report Built in Test (BITE) Report 
c. Self Test Report 
4. Report Subclass - 3 Bits 
a. 
	
	Sensor Alarm - 3 Bits 
(1) Sensor Type 
b. 	Built ih Test - 2 Bits 
(1) Type of Failure 
c. 	Tamper Report - 2 Bits 
(1) Physical Tampering 
(2) Proximity Detector 
(3) Link Check Failure 
d. 	Self Test - 2 Bits 
(1) Acknowledge Self Test Command 
(2) Self Test Complete 
(3) Component Failure 
(4) Degraded Performance 
5. Time - 17 Bits - Time of Occurrence of Report (One Second Resolution in 24 Flours 
Day) 
6. Sensor Location - 22 Bits 
a. First Priority: Cartesian Coordinates of Sensor Location (+10 meters) 
b. Second Priority: Control. Unit and Sensor Number (10 BitsY 
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Figure B-13. Data Word for FIDS. 
TABLE B-14. DEFINITION OF COMMAND WORD FOR FIDS 
1. Line Control Processor ID - 4 Bits - Identifies One of 16 LCPs. 
2. Command Class - Identifies Type of Command Message (2 Bits) 
a. Deterrent Command 
b. Initiate Self Test 
c. Entry Command 
d. Set Time 
3. Command Subclass 
a. 	Deterrent Command - 2 Bits 
b. Initiate Self Test - 1 Bit 
c. 	Entry Command - 4 Bits 
(1) Shut Down Sensors - 2 Bits 
(2) Unlock Doors - 2 Bits 
d. 	Time - 17 Bits - Time to Nearest Second 
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Figure B-14. Command. word for FIDS. 
APPENDIX C 
DISPLAY TECHNOLOGY SURVEY 
TABLE C-1. CANDIDATE DISPLAY SYSTEMS THAT USE STORAGE TUBE TECHNOLOGY 
4006 	11/75 	11-in. storage 	1 
tube; 1024 x 780 
4014-1, 4015-1 1974 	19-in. storage 	1 
tube; 1024 x 780 
4016-1 	6/78 	25-in. storage 	1 
tube; 4096 x 3120 
K-BYTES 
TOTAL 




STORAGE PRICE REMARKS 
to 64K Plot 10, 	TCS and IGL: 
graphics primitives, 








$6,295 Faster 	than 4010; 	4052 
is 	$9,900 
to 64K Plot 10, TCS and IGL: 
graphics primitives, 








$20,100 Continuous write-through 
optional 
No Plot 10, 	TCS and IGL: 
graphics primitives, 








$3,600 Thumbwheel cursor control 
No Plot 10, TCS and IGL: 
graphics primitives, 








$5,900 Thumbwheel cursor con-
trols; 	4012 adds lower- 
case characters; 	4013 
adds APL characters 
to 32 Plot 10, 	TCS and IGL: 
graphics primitives, 








$1,475 Both units feature write- 
through; 	4015 has APL 
characters for 	$16,900 
to 32 Plot 	10, •TCS and IGL: 
graphics primitives, 








$18,000 Includes write-through 
to 800 Plot 10, 	TCS and IGL: 
graphics primitives, 








$17,500 Includes write-through 
DATE 	 NO. OF 
MANUFACTURER MODEL INTRODUCED 	RESOLUTION 	COLORS 
Tektronix 	4051, 4052 	1973 	11-in. storage 	1 
tube; 1024 x 780 
4054 	4/79 	19-in, storage 
	
1 
tube; 4096 x 3125 





tube; 1024 x 780 
4114 	1980 	19-in. storage 
	
1 
tube; 4096 x 3120 
TABLE C-2. CANDIDATE DISPLAY SYSTEMS THAT USE STROKE REFRESH TECHNOLOGY 
DATE 
MANUFACTURER MODEL INTRODUCED 	RESOLUTION 
K-BYTES 
NO. OF 	TOTAL 
COLORS MEMORY SUPPLIED SOFTWARE  
AVAILABLE 	OFF-LINE 
1/0 DEVICES STORAGE PRICE 
 
REMARKS 
               






Graphics primitives, 	KDB, light pen 	No 	$25,000 	Includes light pen for use 
Digigraphic 	refresh; 	 dynamic functions with CDC computers 
1024 x 1024 
KBD, light pen, 	No 	$15,750 	Storage-tube emulation is 
tablet, video available 
copier 
KBD, joystick, 	No 	$25,000 	Includes joystick; 5-color, 
tablet, matrix 16-grey-shade beam-penetration 










64 	Graphics primitives, 
refresh; 	 dynamic functions 







1-5 	64-192 Wand 7200, graphics 
7210 
	
refresh; 	 primitives, dynamic 









1-5 	64-192 Wand 7200, graphics 	KBD, joystick, 	No 	$40,000 	Includes 1 stroke, 1 raster 
7290 
	
refresh; 4096 x primitives, dynamic tablet, matrix display, 2 KBDs, 2 joysticks 
4096; and 21-in. 	 functions 	 printer, screen 









2/80 	21-in. stroke 
refresh; 




1 	32-256 Graphics primitives, 
dynamic functions 









1. Dynamic functions: zoom, pan, etc. 
2. Virtually all have printer interfaces. 
3. All prices include keyboard (KBD), standard display, graphics generator, BASIC software, interface, standard memory. 
AVAILABLE 










$16,100 Includes 128K-byte RAM, 
joystick, firmware 
KBD, light pen, 	Disk, 
Xerox 6500 screen diskette 
camera 
$16,670 Includes I5-in. display, 
132K-byte RAM, diskette 
drive 
No 	 $7,400 Emulates Dasher D200 KBD, matrix 
printer 
TABLE C-3. CANDIDATE DISPLAY SYSTEM THAT USE RASTER. SCAN TECHNOLOGY 
DATE NO. OF 
K-BYTES 
TOTAL 
MANUFACTURER MODEL INTRODUCED RESOLUTION 	COLORS MEMORY SUPPLIED SOFTWARE 
Advanced 
Electronic 
AED512 1980 13/19-in. 	raster; 
512 x 512 





5216 6/79 19-in. 	raster; 
1024 	x 1024 
32-1000 Aygraf 2D, 	3D 
graphics 
functions 
5217 1/79 13-in. 	raster; 8 4-32 Graphics characters 
720 	x 480 
BMC USA IF-800/20 
4013 
1981 12-in. 	raster; 
720 x 	240 
8 Charting functions, 
graphics characters 
Calcomp IGT-100 6/77 15-in. 	raster; 1 Graphics primitives 
1024 x 680 
Chromatics CG Series 6/79 13-, 	15-, 	19 	in. 
raster; 	512 	x 	512 
8 96-132 Graphics primitives, 
dynamic functions 
CGC-7900 11/80 19-in. 	raster; 
1024 	x 768 
8 128 Graphics primitives, 
dynamic functions 
Colorgraphic MVI-7 8/81 13-, 	15-in. 




Data Dasher 8/81 13-in. 	raster; 8 Graphics primitives 
General D280C 560 x 240 
Dasher 
G300 
3/81 12-in. 	raster; 
640 x 	240 







KBD, light pen 




Cartridge- 	$19,975 Includes 32K-byte RAM 
disk 
No 	 $2,995 For process control 
Diskette 	$6,950 Includes diskette drive, 
cartridge ROM 	matrix printer 
$13,500 
KBD, light pen, 
joystick 





$14,995 Includes 128K-byte memory 
$3,805 
No 	 $3,500 Extra memory needed for 





$13,600 Includes joystick for use 
with DEC systems 
$2,988 












KBD, light pen, 
matrix printer 




KBD, pen, matrix 
plotters 




STORAGE 	PRICE 	REMARKS  
No 	 $3,795 A DEC VT-106/VT-52 
emulator 
No 	 $30,000 Includes tablet instead'of 
KBD STD for use with 
Datapoint ARC Systems 
No 	 $5,000 User must provide display 
monitor 
$9,995 Emulates Tektronix 4010 
with selective erase 
$14,550 
No 	 $3,750 Integral thermal printer 
optional 
Cartridge 	$8,950 Functions as a stand-alone 





NO. OF 	TOTAL 
COLORS MEMORY SUPPLIED SOFTWARE 
DATE 


















8/80 	19-in. raster; 
1024 x 792 
Raster; 
1280 x 1024 
1981 	Raster; 
512 x 390 
5/78 	12-in. raster; 
720 x 360 
7/77 	11-in. raster; . 
720 x 360 
4/78 	19-in. ratter 
16 	Plot 10 - compatible 
Business graphics 
32 	Business graphics, 
graphics primitives 
Refresh Business graphics, 
only 	graphics primitives 
7 	256 graphics symbols 
Datamedia 	Colorscan 	1981 	12-in. raster; 
10 	 640 x 240 
9680 	11/81. 	13-in. raster; 
512 x 480 
VS11 Series 5/80 	19—in. raster; 
512 x 512 
	
VGT-100 in pro- 	15-in. raster; 
duction 640 x 240 
8 	 Charting functions, 
graphics primitives 
16 	128-156 Business functions, 
graphics primitives 
8 	 Graphics primitives 
16 	Refresh Graphics primitives 
only 
Plot 10 - compatible 
1 
1 
TABLE C-3.. CANDIDATE DISPLAY SYSTEMS THAT USE RASTER SCAN TECHNOLOGY (CONTINUED) 
DATE NO. OF 
K -BYTES 
TOTAL AVAILABLE OFF-LINE 






1/81 14-in. 	raster; 
480 x 240 
27 Graphics characters KBD, 	light pen Diskette 
BMW 9001-IGT 7/79 13-in. 	raster; 8 8 Graphics primitives KBD, 	light pen, Disk $10,000 OEM (quantity 100) price 







1978 12-in. 	raster; 
264 x 72 
1 Refresh 
only 
Graphics characters KBD No $1,575 APL KDB optional 
IBM 3279 10/79 14-in, 	raster; 
760 x 384 
7 Graphics primitives KBD, 	matrix 
printer 
No $3,805 
Industrial IDT-1800 9/80 19-in. 	raster; 8 Refresh Graphics primitives, KBD, 	light pen, No $7,490 
Data Terminals 512 x 256 only macrographics matrix printer 	' 
IDT-2000 3/80 19-in. 	raster; 





KBD, 	light pen, 
matrix printer 
No $10,600 
IDT-2200 7/81 19-in. 	raster; 














7/81 13-, 	19-in. 
raster 
16 2 Graphics characters KBD No $2,090 OEM 	(quantity 25) 	price; 
19-in. 	version, 	$3,075 
ID-212 7/81 12-in. 	raster 16 2 Graphics characters KBD No $1,695 OEM (quantity 25) 	price 
ID-1200 1/82 13-, 	19-in. 
raster 
16 4-128 Graphics characters 
CP/M, BASIC 
KBD No $2,485 OEM (quantity 25) 	price, 
19-in. 	version, 	$3,395; 




CANDIDATE DISPLAY SYSTEMS THAT USE RASTER SCAN TECHNOLOGY (CONTINUED) 
K-BYTES 
NO. OF 	TOTAL 	 AVAILABLE 	 OFF-LINE 
MANUFACTURER MODEL INTRODUCED RESOLUTION COLORS MEMORY SUPPLIED SOFTWARE 1/0 DEVICES STORAGE PRICE REMARKS 
Integrated 801 8/81 12-in, 	raster; 6-10 Graphics characters KBD, light pen No $3,000 
Terminals 160 x 96 
Intelligent 
Systems Corp. 
3600 10/80 13-in raster; 
128 x 128 





8001G 1973 19-in. 	raster; 
192 x 160 




Diskette $2,745 $2,120 cash in advance 
8001L 11/80 19-in. 	raster; 
480 x 384 




Diskette $4,460 $3,695 cash in advance 
8300 10/80 13-in. 	raster; 
192 x 160 







1981 Raster; 	560 x 500 1 DG, HP commands KOD No $3,240 Includes light pen; de-




CTM-300 6/81 12-in. 	raster 2 Graphics characters, 
graphics primitives 
KBD No $2,940 
Megatek Whizzard 
6240 
1979 	. 19-in. 	raster; 
512 x 512 











1980 19-in. 	raster; 
1024 x 1024 







No $17,900 Includes joystick, 
64K-byte RAM 












STORAGE PRICE REMARKS 
Whizzard 
6250 
1979 13-in, 	raster; 
512 x 480 











1980 19-in, 	raster; 
1024 	x 1024 











1980 19-in. 	raster; 
1024 x 1024 







No Includes joystick 
Whizzard 
7250 
5/80 19-in. 	raster; 
512 x 512 











5/80 19-in. 	raster; 
1024 x 1024 







No $60,300 Includes joystick, 
128K-byte RAM 
MQI Autograph 12-in. 	raster; 1 Graphics primitives KBD No $2,590 




Advantage 12-in. 	raster; 
640 x 240 












MANUFACTURER 	MODEL 	INTRODUCED 
CANDIDATE DISPLAY SYSTEMS THAT USE RASTER SCAN TECHNOLOGY (CONTINUED) 
K-BYTES 
NO. OF 	TOTAL 	 AVAILABLE 	 OFF-LINE 
RESOLUTION 	COLORS MEMORY SUPPLIED SOFTWARE 	1/0 DEVICES STORAGE 	PRICE REMARKS 
Ramtek 	6211 6/81 13-in. 	raster; 
640 x 512 
16 46-58 CGL: 	graphics 
primtives, dynamic 
functions 




No $5,995 Desk-top terminal 
6212 1980 13-in, 	raster; 
640 x 512 
16 46-58 CGL: 	graphics, 
primitives, dynamic 
functions 




No $10,000 Expandable modular 
terminal 
SCION Microangelo 15-in. 	raster; 256 Graphics $2,495 
512 x 480 
SRA Com- 
munications 
SEMIGRAF 240 6/78 13-in. 	raster; 
512 x 256 
8 Graphics characters, 
curve generator 
KBD Diskette 
Tektronix 4025A 11/77 12-in. 	raster; 
640 x 462 
1 to 64 Plot 10, TCS and IGL: 
graphics primitives, 










4027A 6/78 13-in. 	raster; 
640 x 462 
8 to 224 Plot 10, TCS and IGL: 
graphics primitives, 










4112 1980 15-in. 	raster; 
640 x 480 
1 to 672 Plot 10, TCS and IGL: 
graphics primitives, 











1/0 DEVICES SUPPLIED SOFTWARE 
OFF-LINE 
STORAGE 	PRICE 	REMARKS 







Plot 10, TCS and IGL: 
graphics primitives, 




No 	 $6,600 Extended graphics 
optional 
KED 
$7,500 Extended graphics 
option, $5,000 
KED, joystick, 	Diskette 





$8,350 Includes diskette Graphics primitives, 
dynamic functions 
KBD Diskette 






K- BY TES 
TOTAL 
MEMORY 
4113 1981 19-in. 	raster 8-16 
Tele- 
crafters 
CDT-7001 6/80 13-in. 	raster; 
512 x 256 
8 8 
MCD 1979 13-in. 	raster; 8 4 
40018 512 x 256 
Terak 8510/A 1981 12-in. 	raster; 1 64 
320 x 240 
8600 1981 13-in. 	raster; 64 
40 x 480 
TRW - Facom 9/81 14-in. 	raster; 1-8 128 





KBD, joystick, 	No 
DEC-compatible 
printers 
KBD, light pen, 	Diskette 
thermal printer 
$16,500 
$7,490 Includes light pen; 
optional color display 
is 512 x 400 
TABLE C-4%. CANDIDATE DISPLAY SYSTEMS THAT USE PLASMA DISPLAY PANEL OR LIGHT EMITTING DIODE TECHNOLOGY 
K-BYTES 
DATE 	 NO. OF 	TOTAL 
MANUFACTURER MODEL INTRODUCED 	RESOLUTION 	COLORS  MEMORY SUPPLIED SOFTWARE  
Interstate 	PD 	1980 	12-in. plasma; 	1 	64 	Graphics primitives 





















1980 	LED panel 	 1 	384 
4.5"H x 12'W 
(144 x 384 diodes) 
1981 	3 sizes available. 	3 
Advertised screen 
size 28.8"H x 22.4"W 
20 lines per inch 
3 color LED 
Graphics capability 




Digitizer, type- 	Magnetic 
writer keyboard, tape or 






Z-800 - 16 bit central 
processor with 256K-bytes 
for high speed processing. 
(4) NSC 800S, for display 
maintenance, graphics, 
etc. 9 and 24 volt D.C. 
operation. 
Display stand alone capa-
bilities not described in 
literature 
APPENDIX D 
AN/PPS-15(B) INTERFACE DESIGN 
D.1 OVERVIEW  
General descriptions of currently available radar and non-radar physical security 
sensors are given in Appendix A, and generalized interface requirements to a netted 
system for each sensor class are described in Appendix B. In this Appendix, a more 
detailed description will be given of two methods of implementing the AN/PPS-15(B) into 
a netted system: one method involves utilization of most of the current AN/PPS-15(B) 
signal processing and timing circuits, but yielding lower performance; the other method 
involves replacing most of the AN/PPS-15(B) with automated computer hardware which 
yields much higher performance (at higher cost). 
Security systems using large numbers of fixed location sensors connected to a 
central monitoring console have demonstrated the efficient and effective manner that 
security guards may monitor and evaluate intrusion threats to secure areas. Two fixed-
location netted sensor systems achieving this function are discussed in this report. The 
advantages and feasibility of combining the intrusion data from one or more surveillance 
radar sensors into a common display have also been proven through field tests against 
simulated targets (as described in the discussion of the LARIAT netted radar system in 
this report). The potential advantages of extending this netting concept to include inputs 
from both fixed-location sensors systems and radars have been identified, and concepts 
have been defined for specifying the hardware and software algorithms to accomplish 
these designs. A communication format capable of supporting the proposed netting 
concept is described in Appendix B of this report. This interface description is 
compatible with established data-line system requirements as outlined in SEIWIG-005. 
The addition of a radar sensor unit (or units) to a net of fixed-location sensors 
allows intruding targets to be monitored via multiple sensor technologies potentially 
providing advanced verification techniques that may improve the overall detection and 
false alarm characteristics of the netted surveillance system. Three candidate radar 
systems were included in the netting study described in this report. These three radar 
systems (the AN/PPS-5, the AN/PPS-15 or 15(8), and the FOLPEN) represent current 
state-of-the-art surveillance systems that have operating characteristics addressing the 
problems for (1) large area surveillance requirements, (2) moderate range sector 
coverage or "gap-filler" applications, and (3) base areas requiring moderate amounts of 
foliage penetration. The AN/PPS-5 Modified radar set was used in the LARIAT netted 
D-1 
radar feasibility demonstration for the MX missile system. While this modified radar has 
many desirable characteristics of a moderate-to-long range ground surveillance radar, it 
is not currently available in the military inventory and no future development of this 
capability is anticipated. 
The FOLPEN radar is being designed to meet the special requirements involved in 
surveillance of base areas containing heavy foliage where conventional radar sets will not 
penetrate. However, this system is still experimental and in a developmental state. The 
definition of a data-link interface for this radar is not complete at this time due to the 
developmental state of this system. Furthermore, this unit may have only limited use in 
the netting security/surveillance field since it is primarily intended for searching foliated 
areas. Due to the low operating frequency required for this application, only a limited 
number of FOLPEN radars can be used in a given area without expecting interference 
problems between radar units and with nearby communication and television services. 
The most promising radar examined for the near-term solution to the radar 
surveillance problem is the AN/PPS-15(B) or its proposed predecessor the (EPSD). While 
the AN/PPS-15(B) radar set operates as a sector-scan device with a detection range 
limited to about 3 kilometers (for a 10 square meter radar cross-section target i.e., a 
vehicle size target), it possesses many capabilities that are desirable in a radar sensor for 
a netted surveillance system. Unfortunately, neither the model "B" or the proposed 
EPSD follow-on has an adequate data-link interface to effectively meet the present and 
future requirements for the proposed netting concept with fixed-location sensor systems 
and/or with other radar systems. 
The AN/PPS-15(B) radar set will be used in this section as an example of the 
techniques required to adequately interface a complex sensor unit into the proposed 
netting configuration defined in this report. Two proposed interface descriptions are 
included for this purpose that will modify the AN/PPS-15(B) radar to provide (1) a 
partially implemented radar surveillance system using the seven range bins currently 
instrumented or (2) a fully implemented radar system instrumenting all available range 
bin positions. These proposed system modifications are a suitable departure point for 
obtaining an effective ground surveillance radar sensor in the reasonably near future that 
is truly usable in a netted configuration with other sensor technologies and/or other 
radars. A hardware demonstration of the feasibility of the proposed modifications could 
potentially shorten the development time required to field the combined capability 
surveillance system described in this report. 
D-2 
D.2 DESIGN PHILOSOPHY  
Many design aspects for applying radar sensors to netted surveillance systems 
have been outlined in previous sections of this report. A block diagram of this netted 
surveillance system concept is given in Figure D-1. Three sector-scan radar sets are 
indicated in this illustrative example to scan areas adjacent to protected high-risk assets 
within a defended base area that also contains a network of fixed-location sensors. 
Target information from these surveillance radars is processed within the netting 
computer facility to combine all target information into a common display for the 
monitoring operator. The design philosophy for the netted surveillance system should 
allow intruding targets to be monitored via multiple sensor technologies in order to 
utilize advanced verification techniques to improve the overall detection and false alarm 
characteristics of the netted system. The netted system should be designed to provide 
operator assistance in the form of: 
1. Automatic operation of the equipment, 
2. Automatic status checking of the system components and this operation, 
3. Automatic target detection and tracking, 
4. Threat evaluation of detected targets 
(either automatically or as designated by the operator), and 
5. Combine multiple sensor information (radar and fixed location sensors) into a 
common scenario-map presentation. 
These netted surveillance system guidelines drive the design of the radar interface 
and the sensor unit. Basic to the system netting philosophy is the demonstrated concept 
of reporting detected targets (or suspected targets) with the minimum information of 
position and time of detection. This minimizes the bandwidth requirements for the data 
link, but assumes a preprocessing capability at the sensor unit. The simplified 
information of location and detection time proved adequate for the automatic detection, 
tracking, and threat evaluation algorithms used in the feasibility demonstration of the 
LARIAT netted radar system. Additional information obtained from the radar or sensor 
preprocessor (such as target speed, direction, classification, etc.) can be used to enhance 
the basic sensor netting algorithms with little modification. The data link interface 
should accommodate a reasonable expansion of the data to include foreseeable 
requirements in this area. The radar interface description in Appendix B of this report 
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Figure D -1 • Netted radar/fixed location sensor surveillance scenario. 
D.2.1 RADAR TARGET DETECTION/TRACKING ALGORITHMS 
There are three basic algorithm concepts for radar target processing. The most 
simple of these is the Area Alarm Mode. This detects and reports targets within a single 
radar resolution surveillance sector. While having a minimum of instrumentation and 
preprocessing requirements, this algorithm concept represents a fairly inefficient use of 
the surveillance of the radar system. This concept is not adaptable to the netting 
concept defined in this report since the location information is not available for the 
proposed tracking algorithms. 
A second basic concept detects and tracks single targets in a Sector  
Search/Azimuth Track Mode. This provides position information on detected targets, but 
can not handle multiple simultaneous targets. This basic operating mode is very helpful 
to the radar system that is continuously monitored by a dedicated radar operator, but is 
considered too restricted to be effective in a netted surveillance system. 
A Track-While-Scan Mode provides both range and azimuth information on 
multiple targets and offers a more efficient use of the capabilities of the radar set. This 
approach can provide positional information on several targets simultaneously within the 
surveillance sector of the radar. This processing is desirable for netting applications 
using the small sector radar as well as for applications requiring an area radar system. 
The proposed detection/tracking algorithms are equally usable for (1) automatic 
monitoring of a single radar, (2) combining the surveillance capabilities of a single radar 
with a conventional fixed location sensor system, or (3) combining the surveillance 
capability of a number of radars into a single security system with or without a fixed 
location sensor capability. The concepts proposed here are intended to allow maximum 
flexibility in the surveillance sensor mix to match the actual base and threat scenario 
requirements. 
D.2.2 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
The initial analysis of the radar sensors indicates that a track-while-scan radar 
surveillance concept offers the most efficient use of the radar's surveillance 
capabilities. The AN/PPS-15(B) is the most promising near-term solution for a nettable 
radar surveillance system. However, this unit does not have the required interface for 
netting in the current production model or in any known follow-on configuration. One 
improvement included in the "B" model is a signal processing system that can 
simultaneously monitor radar returns from seven range bins. While this can represent a 
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significant surveillance area with a reasonable scan sector, it does not utilize the full 
surveillance capability of the radar. 
D.2.3 SURVEILLANCE RADAR OPTIONS 
As a direct result of these preliminary conclusions, two options were defined for 
accomplishing the goals of the design philosophy of interfacing the AN/PPS-15(B) radar 
in a netted surveillace system. Either of these two proposed modifications should 
produce a nettable ground surveillance radar in a cost effective manner. A block 
diagram showing the basic system components of the AN/PPS-15(B) radar is shown in 
Figure D-2. The "B" model includes the Multiple Range Gate (MRG) Unit that contains 
the signal processor for the seven range bins. 
The first modification option makes maximum use of the current signal processing 
system in the AN/PPS-15(B) radar set. This approach can lead to a partial 
implementation of a track-while-scan surveillance system by interfacing the netted 
system data-link with the MRG unit to utilize the seven range bins included with this 
model design. The second modification option defines an alternate signal processor 
design for the AN/PPS-15(B) radar that allows the full surveillance capability of the 
radar set to be utilized when this unit is connected in a netted surveillance/security 
system. The first option is considered a candidate for retrofit modification of existing 
radar units while the second option is considered to be a large enough change to be 
considered as a future model design. 
D.2.3.1 Partial Implementation/Track-While-Scan Option  
The first modification option to the AN/PPS-15(B) radar is a partial 
implementation of the track-while-scan concept. This modification to the radar system 
is outlined in the block diagram in Figure D-3. The driving element in this design is the 
Data Link Interface Unit that performs the task of providing a two-way interface 
between the radar system and the remote netting computer. The requirements for this 
Input-Output (I/O) interface can be met by a serial format that allows transmission of 
the digital information over conventional radio or hardwired data-links. The formatting 
of the data from the radar set before transmission can be accomplished by a simple 
microprocessor located at the radar set. 
The proposed modifications to the radar set are indicated in the block diagram as 
being separated from the radar elements by the dashed line. While the elements 
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Figure D-3. Block diagram of proposed partially implemented netting interface (seven 
range bins) for AN/PPS-15(B) radar. 
will be located at or in the radar set to provide the required signal preprocessing. The 
signal flow in Figure D-3 shows three types of signals going from the radar unit to the 
Netting Preprocessor/I-0 Interface. These signals include (1) the system timing 
functions, (2) the Multiple Range Gate "video" (or the detected outputs), and (3) the 
azimuth position or pointing angle of the radar antenna. One important point in this 
block diagram is the signal flow between the radar set and the Netting Preprocessor/I-0 
Interface is only in one direction. It is not proposed to change the normal operation of 
the radar. 
The key to understanding the signal preprocessing in this system modification lies 
in understanding the proposed communication interface to the central netting 
computer. A detail description of this interface is given in Appendix B of this report. 
The discussion of the Netted Interface For Short Range Sector Radars in this appendix 
applies to this modification description. The two-way communication with the data-link 
is in the form of a 7-byte word 01 bits per byte). Digital communication over the data-
link is made at a bit rate of 1200 baud as specified in the referenced SEIWIG-005. 
Definitions of the Command Word format (containing instructions and synchronization 
signals to the radar set) and the Data Word format (containing the target and status 
reports from the radar sensor) are given in the referenced appendix. Tables D-1, D-2, 
and D-3 are repeated here to summarize the definitions of the Data Word and the 
Command Words as described in Appendix B. The Command Word is divided into two 
formats allowing an Initiatization Format to be used at system start up to initialize any 
parameters needed at the Netting Preprocessor/I-0 Interface. Justification of the 
contents and resolution of these communication word formats are presented in the 
referenced appendix. The above discussion of the data-link interface is equally 
applicable to the second proposed modification to the radar (the fully implemented 
track-while-scan concept). Some of the capabilities specified in the communication word 
formats allows for future system expansion and are not fully utilized in this proposed 
radar modification. 
Pedestal Interface Requirements.  The pedestal operating requirements for both 
of the proposed modifications are identical. The basic conclusion included in both 
designs is that a track-while-scan radar makes the most efficient use of the surveillance 
capabilities of the radar. This requires that the antenna pointing system be restricted to 
operate only in the sector scan mode when the radar is part of a netted sensor 
surveillance system. The AUTO/MANUAL switch in the model B radar provides an 
automatic sector scan capability when placed in the AUTO position. This model provides 
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TABLE D-1. DEFINITION OF DATA WORD 
	





2. 	Radar ID - 3 bits -- identifies one of 8 possible radars in net 
3. 	Report Category - 2 bits -- defines 4 radar report categories 
a. Occupied Resolution Cell (ORC) Report 
b. Built In Test (BIT) Failure Report 
c. Tamper Report 
d. Self Test Report 
4. 	Report Subclass - 5 bits -- identifies report type under above categories or velocity 
'nformation for ORC Report 
a. 	ORC Report 
(1) Speed- 4 bits defines ORC velocity category or velocity bin number 
(2) ORC Direction - 1 bit - defines in/out direction of ORC modem 
b. 	BIT Report 
(1) Equipment Failure 
(2) Degraded Performance 
c. 	Tamper Report 
(1) Physical Tampering/Equipment Entry 
(2) Electromagnetic Countermeasures (Jamming) 
(3) Proximity Detectors (Personnel nearby) 
(4) Sensor Moved (detects possible change in pointing direction) 
d. 	Self Test 
(1) Acknowledge Self Test Request 
(2) Self Test Completed - System OK 
(3) Equipment Failure 
(4) Degraded Performance 
TABLE D-1. DEFINITION OF DATA WORD (Continued) 
e. 	Communication 
(1) 	Link Check 
	
5. 	Time  - 17 bits -- time of occurrence of report (one second resolution in 24 hour day) 
6. ORC Location  
a. First Priority: Cartesian Coordinates - 22 bits 
b. Second Priority: Polar Coordinates - 13 bits 
7. 	Parity - 1 bit -- An even or odd parity check on data word 
TABLE D-2. DEFINITION OF COMMAND WORD 
1. Radar ID - 3 bits -- Identifies one of 8 possible radars in net. 
2. Command Subclass - 2 bits -- Defines type of Command Message. 
3. Direction of Scan Center - 11 bits -- Defines pointing direction of sector center 
with a resolution of 0.2 degrees over a range of 360 degrees. 
4. Width of Scan Sector - 6 bits -- Defines sector width with a resolution of 5 degrees 
over a maximum sector width of 180 degrees. 
5. Range Bin Position - 10 bits -- Defines position of reference bin (for example: 
inner range bin) from radar with a resolution of 5 meters over a maximum 
range of 4 kilometers. 
6. Distance Between Range Bins - 3 bits -- Defines separation of adjacent range bins 
(For example: the EPSD has two range bin separation distances - 50 meters and 
500 meters). 
7. Time - 17 bits -- Time synchronization for reference clock in radar. 
8. Operating Mode - 4 bits -- Defines the operating mode of the radar. This quantity 
is specific to each radar system design (For example: the EPSD may operate in 
the Search or Track Mode). First Mode Bit defines Manual/Computer Control 
of radar. 
9. Radar Location - 22 bits -- Initializes the radar signal processor with the 
coordinates of the radar set. 
10. Self Test Initiate - 2 bits -- Initiates Self Test routines designed into the 
surveillance radars. (Includes a Communication/Data Link Test). 
11. Clutter Filter Cutoff Frequency - 3 bits -- Controls possible settings of the clutter 
rejection filter. 
12. Parity Check - 1 bit -- An even or odd parity check on the data word. 
TABLE D-3. AN/PPS-15(B) SIGNAL PROCESSING. HIERARCHY 
A. 	Radar preamplifier output processed in delay-line processor to form discrete range 
video. 
B. 	Gain controlled amplifier used as Sensitivity Time Control (STC). 
C. Range gate hold-off waveform used to blank ranges not being processed. 
D. CMOS analog sampling switches gate return radar signal into 7 separate processing 
channels. 
E. 	Storage capacitor holding-circuits used in each channel to: 
1. "Stretch" or "hold" analog sample for duration of time between samples. 
2. Form part of high-pass/low-pass filter for each range-bin channel. 
F. 	Range gated signals synchronously detected using all-ran e Doppler as the coherent 
reference to detect high-speed and low-speed targets parallel channels). 
G. 	Integrated output of each range bin threshold-detected for target activity in that 
resolution cell. 
a continuously variable sector scan width between 400 and 3200 mils (22.5 to 180 
degrees) that is set by the SCAN WIDTH control on the radar. The azimuth position of 
the antenna is monitored by a potentiometer within the pedestal assembly. The center of 
the search sector can be changed electrically from the radar controls or by rotating the 
tripod-pedestal assembly. Electrical limits on the antenna scan angles exist within the 
pedestal control at 1400 and 5000 mils. The antenna positioning motor automatically 
reverses when these limits are reached. Mechanical stops are also included in this design 
to limit rotation at 1200 and 5200 mils should the electrical controls fail. 
Attention must be taken during initial set up of the radar system to insure that 
the desired surveillance sector is within the allowable scanning angle of the antenna 
positioning system. Care should also be used in defining the sector width to be monitored 
since undesirably long scan times can be introduced by large surveillance sector widths. 
With a scan speed of 5 degrees per second, a 90 degree sector will have an average 
revisit time of approximately 18 seconds. If a dismounted intruder is walking at a 
nominal speed of 3 miles per hour, he would travel a distance of 24 meters during this 
average revisit time. This is the largest scan width that is recommended to insure that 
at least one detection is made while a walking target is passing through a given range 
bin. The problem of tracking moving vehicles is increasingly difficult as the target speed 
increases. The upper detection velocity (radial component) is limited to 45 miles per 
hour by the upper cut-off frequency in the signal processor of the radar set. Where 
tracking of vehicles is of primary importance, the sector scan width may be reduced (if 
practical) to decrease the revisit time of the radar beam. The target detection rate is 
also increased when overlapping coverage occurs from two or more radar sensors that are 
connected to a central netting computer. 
The azimuth position of the antenna must be known in the preprocessing 
microcomputer at the radar unit. This requires two pieces of information: (1) an 
instantaneous measurement of the pointing direction of the antenna and (2) knowledge of 
the reference direction used in set-up and initialization of the radar sensor. The 
reference direction can be obtained by boresighting against a magnetic compass 
reference. The instantaneous pointing angle can be obtained by measuring the reference 
voltage on the potentiometer contained within the pedestal asembly. The azimuth 
position potentiometer is seen in the schematic diagram of the Antenna Drive Unit 
(Figure D-4) where pin F gives a voltage analog of the pointing position. The reference 
voltage across this potentiometer must also be known to make a meaningful 
determination of the pointing direction. These signals also appear on pins E, F, and H of 
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Figure D-5. Antenna Assembly Unit Interconnection Diagram. 
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Figure D-6. MRG Unit Connection Diagram. 
connector 31 as shown in the Antenna Assembly Interconnection Diagram in Figure D-5. 
The same signals also are available at pins X, W, and R on the connector to the MRG unit 
as shown in the schematic in Figure D-6. 
The positional information from the pedestal potentiometer exists in digital form 
on the digital readout panel of the radar. This is the desired form needed by the signal 
conditioning unit in the Netting Preprocessor/I-0 Interface unit. However, the 
difficulties encountered in trying to connect to this digital signal may be greater than 
simply converting the analog voltage through a simple analog-to-digital converter 
contained in the Netting Preprocessor. 
Since both of the proposed system modifications are based on a track-while-scan 
radar surveillance principle, the above discussions of interface requirements, sector scan 
widths, etc., apply equally to both configurations. The provisions in the communication 
word formats for remote control of such functions as pointing direction are not addressed 
in this system option, but exist as a possible future design option. 
Signal Processor Interface Requirement. The driving design consideration in the 
first modification option is to make maximum use of the seven range bin signal processor 
contained in the model B radar set. A functional block diagram of the Multiple Range 
Gate Processor is given in Figures D-7 and D-8. CMOS switches in the MRG unit 
perform the range gating process of switching the amplified radar video into a separate 
storage capacitor for each range gate in sequence. Each of these storage capacitors, in 
conjunction with the gated source, forms a simple low-pass Doppler filter for each range 
bin channel. In a similar manner, an additional capacitor per channel and the common 
gated resistor are used to provide high-pass filtering. Each range-gated Doppler signal is 
applied in sequence to one input of each of two wideband analog multipliers. The second 
multiplier inputs are always all-range high-speed and low-speed target Doppler signals. 
Since these reference all-range Doppler signals have a relatively high signal-to-noise 
ratio, the multipliers synchronously detect the relatively noisy range-gated Doppler 
signals using the all-range Doppler signal as a coherent reference. The multiplier outputs 
are sequentially switched to an individual low-pass filter for each range gate that 
integrates the synchronously detected Doppler for a period corresponding to the duration 
of the look on each radar scan. These filter outputs are applied to a threshold comparator 
whose threshold is controlled by the sensitivity (SENS) control to set the probability of 
false alarm to the required level. 
This point (indicated on the block diagram in Figure D-8) is an ideal point to 
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interface before thresholding in the radar set makes the output to the Netting 
Preprocessor/I-0 Interface insensitive to adjustments in the manual SENS control. The 
filtered range-gated signals will then be converted to a digital form in the Signal 
Conditioning section of the Netting Preprocessor. Each range bin channel is monitored 
by the microprocessor to determine the average "target" activity. This information can 
then be used to automatically set the reference threshold level to maintain a prescribed 
false alarm rate. This Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR) algorithm can be accom-
modated entirely within the software of the microprocessor and is a very desirable 
feature for the nettable radar sensor. 
One additional requirement must be met in order to operate the modified 
AN/PPS-15(B) in a netted configuration. The radial distance to the center of the 
occupied range bin must be determined to specify the position of detected targets. This 
condition may be easily fulfilled if the distance to the range bin can be determined in the 
Netting. Preprocessor/ I-0 Interface unit. The MRG unit provides seven range bins (each 
with a nominal 50 meter resolution) that may be positioned to provide a 350 meter 
surveillance zone where intruding targets can be detected and tracked via computer 
hardware/software algorithms. The range to the center or edge of this surveillance zone 
can be changed by means of a mechanical adjustment on the radar set control panel. The 
distance to the intruding target can easily be computed by entering the manually 
adjusted distance to the first range bin into the microprocessor. Alternately, the 
distance to the first range bin may be determined from the timing pulses contained in the 
radar set. An alternate method of operating the MRG exists, in which the seven range 
bins are positioned with large blank areas between each range bin. While this is very 
useful to a dedicated radar operator monitoring a scenario of troups or infiltrators 
moving across a battlefield, the large spacing between the range bins in this operating 
mode precludes any automatic tracking of invidual targets. 
The range bins are located to the nearest range gate position corresponding to the 
basic AN/PPS-15 range gate. Subsequent gate or bin positions follow at contiguous 50 
meter increments. All timing in the radar signal processor is referenced to a crystal 
controlled oscillator within the radar set. This unit sets the PRF of the radar to 
correspond to a range of 4000 meters per cycle and the range gate clock to 50 meters per 
cycle. A typical timing diagram is given in Figure D-9. Synchronization with the radar 
set is desirable in meeting two requirements. The distance to the first range bin can be 
automatically computed by measuring the time difference between the modulation pulse 
(waveform 7 in Figure D-9) and the range gate pulse (waveform 8 in Figure D-9). This 
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Figure D-9. Timing Waveforms 
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measurement can be accomplished to the resolution of a range bin by simply counting the 
600 kilohertz clock periods shown in waveform I of Figure D-9. 
Timing information is also required to flag the detection time on the target report 
from the Netting Preprocessor/I-0 Interface. This may be accomplished by further 
division of the timing reference obtained from the radar set or from an independent real-
time clock contained in the microprocessor assembly of the Netting Preprocessor Unit. 
A resolution in this time reference of at least one second is recommended in Appendix 
B. Provision must be made to routinely synchronize this clock with the central netting 
computer. This can be accomplished from the time reference contained in the command 
words used for initialization and routine status checking. 
Radar Sensor Status Reporting. One basic requirement placed on the remote 
operation of the radar set as a sensor for a netted surveillance system is the built in 
status check and tamper report. Provisions for three messages are included in the 
communication words defined in Appendix B. Several operational checks can be 
programmed into the radar set to give a measure of confidence in its surveillance 
capability. The Command Word routinely initiates the self test function by a two-bit 
message contained within the word format. The Data Word contains one of four possible 
responses to the self test initiate command. These responses acknowledge the request, 
signify that the system is "OK," and indicate equipment failure or degraded 
performance. To accommodate this function, the radar should also be instrumented to 
allow the Netting Preprocessor/I-0 Interface to monitor the battery voltage within the 
radar set (if the system is not operated from a central power system) and the transmitter 
power monitor. This information should be sufficient to determine that the transmitter 
portion of the system is functioning. The operation of the receiver (and a general 
measure of the overall system performance will be indicated in the detection activity 
count being made within the microprocessor software in support of the CFAR 
algorithm. Correct receiver performance will be indicated by a nominal level of 
threshold crossings assuming that the transmitter/antenna system is functioning 
properly. The detection rate considered here will be higher than the false alarm rate 
experienced at the output of the central netting computer due to the filtering action of 
the target detection and tracking algorithms. The details of these algorithms are 
presented elsewhere in this report. The information on battery voltage, transmitter 
power output, and detection activity should be sufficient to define the status message 
responses outlined in Appendix B. This function should be accomplished in the software 
of the Netting Preprocessor/I-0 Interface unit. 
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The tamper report of the Data Word is used to indicate deliberate interference 
with the remotely operated radar set. As a minimum requirement, equipment entry 
switches and a movement sensor should be included within the set for this function. The 
equipment entry switches should include cover doors over the operating controls of 
radar to prevent undetected changes in the settings. A tilt or movement sensor should be 
installed to detect a possible change in the pointing direction if the unitis to be operated 
on a small portable tripod. Additional tampering detection algorithms can be installed to 
monitor electromagnetic countermeasures (jamming) and the aproach of personnel 
(proximity detectors) if so desired. The proposed Data Word as defined in Appendix B 
accommodates these tamper report catagories. 
Future Expansion Capabilities. Several functions have been included within the 
netting interface description presented in Appendix B that are not addressed in this 
modification option. Such options as remote monitoring of the Doppler audio by e 
system operator is desirable, but is not considered necessary as a minimal operating 
capability for remote netted operation of the radar. Other desirable features that are 
not considered essential are further remote controls on the radar set. These options have 
been provided for in the communication word formats and can be included in future 
system designs as required. 
D.2.3.2 Fully Implemented/Track While Scan Option 
The second proposed modification for the AN/PPS-15(13) radar set is an alternate 
signal processor that can simultaneously monitor target activity in contiguous range bins 
over the usable portion of the radar beam. This coverage will account for approximately 
30 of the the 50-meter resolution range bins similar to those used in the current radar 
design. The difference in the first and second proposed modification options is in the 
development and interfacing of the 30-range-bin signal processor. The data-link 
interface to the central netting computer will be identical to that defined in Appendix B 
and discussed above. 
A block diagram of the proposed fully implemented track-while-scan modification 
to the AN/PPS-15(B) radar set is shown in Figure D-10. One additional function (the 
Signal Processor Unit) has been introduced into this system to handle the increased signal 
processing load. All of the basic interconnections to the radar set are identical with 
those previously proposed with the exception of the receiver video or MRG output. In 
this modification option, the required interface may be performed before the sampling or 











































Figure D-10. Block diagram of proposed fully implemented netting interface (all thirty 
range bins) for AN/PPS- 15(B) radar. 
Alternately, the interfacing may be performed at the output of the MRG unit if this 
hardwired processor is expanded to include the required number of range bins. These 
interface requirements will be developed further in the following discussions. 
The proposed Data Word format is capable of supporting the expected target load 
from the expanded surveillance area of each radar. The Data Word defined in Appendix 
B for the short range sector scan radar allows only one ORC report per data word, and 
the 1200 baud rate established by the SEIWIG-005 requirements gives a maximum 
communication rate of 15.6 words per second. While some Data Words may be responses 
to a status check request from the central netting computer, this rate establishes the 
maximum target reporting rate at approximately 15 reports per radar per second. The 5 
degree per second scan speed and the 5.6 degree beamwidth of the AN/PPS-15(B) radar 
will allow target or ORC reports to be made from at least one-half of the proposed 30 
range bins during one pass or look of the radar antenna. Target activity of this level 
would typically be considered a near overload condition for this clutter referenced 
coherent radar system. This means that the proposed netting algorithms and data link 
system should be more than adequate for processing the maximum expected load of this 
fully instrumented radar set. 
The same operating scenario for the radar sensors will be used in the fully 
implemented track-while-scan modification. The pedestal interface requirements for 
this modification option are identical to the first option, and the discussions above 
applies here also. This includes the requirement for reporting the absolute pointing angle 
of the antenna to determine the azimuth position of the occupied range cells with the 
resolution defined in Appendix B. 
The noticable effect of this modification to the radar will be an increase of 
approximately four in the surveillance region available at any instant from each radar 
set. This results in a capability for following intruding target tracks for longer distances 
on the scenario-map operator display. When a single radar system is used, the proposed 
detection/tracking algorithms must have a preset number of associated detections to 
initiate a track. This extended coverage of the full range signal processor will improve 
the performance and usefulness of these algorithms. Overlapping coverage of two or 
more radar sets will also increase the coverage for systems using both the fully or 
partially implemented signal processor. 
Fully Implemented Option - Version I. The expansion of the signal processor to 
instrument the full detection range of the radar set is a very desirable capability and at 
least two versions may be considered. One obvious approach is to duplicate sections of 
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the Multiple Range Gate processing unit to gain the required additional channels of 
processing. Since the MRG processor design may currently be adjusted to position the 
seven contiguous range bins at essentially any point between the minimum detection 
range and the maximum operating range of the radar, this approach offers a low risk 
processor expansion to the full range capability at only a slight increase in system 
complexity, size, cost, and power consumption. The parallel functions of four MRG units 
can provide 28 range bins, essentially instrumenting all of the usable detection range of 
the radar. The first MRG unit would be triggered by the range pulse from the discrete 
range module. The range to the first sampling gate should be locked at its minimum 
value. An additional circuit modification would also be required to trigger each 
successive MRG unit so that the first range gate in the second, third, and forth MRG 
units follow contiguously upon the last range gate of the previous unit. This concept is 
illustrated in the block diagram in Figure D-11. 
The interface between the Signal Conditioner Unit and the four MRG units must 
have a multiplexer capacity sufficient to handle the 28 range bin channels. The analog-
to-digital converter must be able to convert these samples at a real time rate equal to 
the product of the number of range bins and the PRF of the radar. Twenty eight range 
bins and a 3 kilohertz PRF require a conversion rate of 84,000 per second. Current 
technology in analog-to-digitial converters is capable of megasample conversion rates 
with an eight-bit resolution. Higher resolution (10 to 12 bits) can be obtained at slightly 
lower conversion rates). Therefore , the interface with the four MRG units is not 
considered to be a technical limitation to this system modification. 
In this version, performing the primary signal processing in the four MRG units, 
the Signal Processor Unit will be used to perform the dynamic CFAR thresholding 
functions for each range bin. This algorithm is discussed in the previous radar 
modification description and must be performed on a real time basis for each of the 28 
range bins. The Microprocessor-Signal Formatting Unit acts as the buffer and 
communication message center to the data-link and the central netting computer. The 
computation of the location of occupied range cells is also performed in this unit. All of 
the modifications described in this version of the fully instrumented radar signal procesor 
appear to be well within the state-of-the-art of the required hardware and software. 
Fully Implemented Option - Version II.  The second approach to providing the full 
range signal processor capability is to completely replace the signal processor in the 
AN/PPS-15(B) radar. The initial task for this approach would be a study of the current 
signal processing chain or hierachy to prevent an unnecessary reinvention of the wheel. 
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Multiple Range Gate 
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(Range Gates 1 - 7) 
Multiple Range Gate 
Unit 3 




Multiple Range Gate 
Unit 2 




Multiple Range Gate 
Unit 4 
(Range Gates 22 - 28) 
Analog Inputs (28) to 
Multiplexer and A-to-D 
Converter in Signal 
Conditioning Unit 
Figure D-11. Block diagram of four multiple range gate unit modifications 
for a fully instrumented processor. 
Table D-3 lists the basic signal processing steps as they appear in the radar signal 
processing chain. Some of the functions in the current model B design are not applicable 
to the all-range modifications (such as the range-gate hold-off waveform that is used to 
blank range bins not being processed). Other functions not included in this list are 
recognized as being very desirable for the all-range radar processor for netting 
applicatons (such as the CFAR algorithm). 
The sensitivity time control (STC) gain controlled amplifier is used to reduce the 
radar receiver sensitivity inversely as a function of range to reduce problems of receiver 
saturation for close-in targets. This process is a necessary function that is considered 
most suitable to be performed in the analog circuitry of the present radar signal 
processor. This means that the "radar video" interface to the radar set should be made 
following this circuit, but the function of the range-gate hold-off waveform applied to 
the gain controlled amplifier must be eliminated or inhibited. Figure D-12 shows the 
first portion of the Multiple Range Gate Unit in block diagram form. The proposed 
interconnection to the radar video is shown here at the input of the analog multiplexer. 
This interface should include the restrictions that (1) suitable buffering of the signal is 
provided and (2) the effects of the range-gate hold-off waveform have been eliminated 
from the video signal. 
The function of the range gate sampling of the radar video is replaced by 
converting to a digital value the samples of this analog taken at intervals corresponding 
to the two-way propagation time from the center of each range bin. The multiplexing 
and demultiplexing of these digital samples will be accomplished in the 
hardware/software of the Signal Processor Unit. The normal sequence of processing 
operations in the MRG unit (see Figure D-12 and D-13) is to synchronously demodulate 
the Multiple Range. Gate Doppler (signal Y of Figure D-13) with the All-Range Doppler 
(signal Z of Figure D-13) by means of the two analog multiplier circuits. This process 
simply makes use of the strong radar return from the ground clutter as the coherent 
reference for this moving target signal processor. The multiplying operation can easily 
be performed in the proposed digital system, but the conversion of the All-Range Doppler 
signals must be made in proper time sequence to correspond to each range bin sample. 
This must be done for both the high pass filtered signal (high-speed) and the low pass 
filtered signal (low-speed). The suggested interface to these two signals is illustrated in 
Figure D-13 at the respective outputs of the two AGC (automatic gain control) circuits. 
The functional block diagram in Figure D-13 shows the output of the two analog 
multipliers being sorted in the analog multiplexer to the seven individual low pass 
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Figure D-12. Multiple range gate processing block diagram (Part 1) showing 
proposed interconnection to radar video. 
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filters. The time constant or averaging integration time of these filters is approximately 
equal to the time for the radar beam to scan over a target. Target activity in each range 
bin is monitored by threshold detecting the output of each range bin with a threshold 
controlled by the manual setting from the radar control panel and the target and clutter 
activity in the adjacent range bins. This provides a "detector" with a threshold setting 
that decreases the sensitivity of the system when the number of responses from wind-
blown clutter, etc., increased the false alarm rate above a desired level. This is the 
basic range - only CFAR algorithm discussed in a previous section. These basic functions 
can be accomplished in the software of the Signal Processor Unit. 
The CFAR algorithm is an adjustable threshold detector for moving target 
activity in each of the range bins. This function can be implemented digitally as outlined 
above in the hardware and software of the Signal Processor Unit. A simplified flow chart 
of this processing concept is shown in Figure D-14. This processing is applied to each 
range bin in real time. The digital signal processing functions and their sequence in this 
flow chart parallels the operation of the AN/PPS-15(B) radar processor shown in Figure 
D-12 and D13. 
The CFAR threshold must be computed from the radar return activity detected in 
the adjacent range bins. In a digital system, it is practical to make this computation on a 
dynamic basis for each range bin. Experience has shown that somewhere between 4 and 
10 independent range-bin samples can provide an effective sample of the alarm rate to 
be expected in the candidate range cell being considered. Figure D-15 indicates the 
concept of monitoring the activity in the 3 range bins immediately above and below the 
candidate range bin. This process must be performed for the output of both coherent 
target detectors. The averaging of six adjacent range bins approximates the summing 
function used in the current MRG signal processor. A modification of this averaging 
algorithm must be made for operating at the first three and at the last three range bins. 
When the candidate range bin being calculated is in position 1, 2, or 3, a total of 3 range 
bins does not exist to the left (see Figure D-16). One solution is to pick up the lost range 
bin on the other side of the candidate range bin in order to keep a total of six bins as 
inputs to the CFAR threshold estimate. This concept is shown in Figure D-16). A 
complementary argument is used for operation of this CFAR threshold averaging 
algorithm at the far range cells. 
Alternate Modifications. This version of the fully implemented/track-while-scan 
radar system is basically a parallel implementation of the moving target detection 
algorithms used in the current AN/PPS-15(B) radar design. Alternate modification 
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Figure D-16. CFAR algorithm for end of range calibration. 
schemes for this radar are possible that affect the radar as well as the signal processor. 
More flexibility in the approach would be possible if the radar were a truly coherent 
radar design. This would significantly alter the signal processing approach used and the 
software and hardware techniques used to implement the moving target processor. 
Modern integrated circuitry can provide MTI processing and analysis using discrete 
or fast fourier transforms. This analysis approach will not only provide an alternate 
method of separating the moving targets from the stationary and slow moving ground 
clutter, but will allow target radial velocity to be determined. If the frequency domain 
processing has sufficient resolution, two targets having different radial velocities may be 
separated when in the same resolution cell. Advanced analysis algorithms may also use 
the high resolution FFT outputs for classification of the target or target type. 
One additional concept that may be desirable in future modifications of the signal 
processor is the inclusion of an azimuth bin splitting algorithm. This would use predictor 
algorithms to estimate the location of a target in azimuth position with a pointing 
resolution that is better than the radar beamwidth. The accurate operation of this 
algorithm depends upon only one target being within a given range-azimuth cell; 
otherwise it predicts the centroid of the multiple targets. 
Mechanical Configuration. The circuit modifications proposed in this section may 
easily be configured in a box that may be located adjacent to the existing MRG/Remote 
Control Indicator and connected to the AN/PPS-15(B) radar by electrical cables. This 
concept is pictured in . Figure D-17 where the additional circuit box is placed on the 
ground when the radar unit is operated on the portable tripod. The tamper-proof 
modifications would require that the radar unit be modified to prevent undetected 
movement or adjustment of the operating controls. 
D.3 SUMMARY  
The basic concept for adapting the AN/PPS-15(B) radar to operate effectively in a 
netted surveillance application with other radars and/or fixed location sensor systems has 
been presented. This approach has identified the minimum required information and the 
communication format proposed in Appendix B of this report that is required for netted 
operation of the radar sensor. Two alternate approaches were presented for 
accomplishing the required system modification to the existing radar design. Future 
expansion capabilities for the radar system are suggested. The approach used in 
identifying the netting interface requirements of this radar can find parallels in adapting 
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The AN/PPS-15(B) radar with the signal processor modifications proposed above 
can meet the requirements for an effective netting radar sensor for the near-future 
surveillance requirements of the military. The proposed design changes represent a 
relatively low-risk and low-cost method for obtaining a radar security/surveillance 
capability. 
APPENDIX E 
COMPUTER HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS 
E.1 OVERVIEW.  
In this Appendix, some of the primary considerations for the hardware 
requirements of the data processors will be discussed. In particular, the specific 
functions of each major system component will be outlined along with the corresponding 
demands on the hardware. 
As discussed in Section 2, a modular approach is desired for the system in order to 
provide for flexibility, expandability, and simplicity of development. (The building blocks 
of a modular system are less complex than a completely integrated system.) The basic 
block diagram of the system which was given in Figure 11 is reproduced here as Figure E-
l. The system is composed of three major building blocks in addition to the sensors. 
These include the signal/target processor, the netting computer, and the display system. 
The required characteristics of each of these building blocks are discussed in this 
Appendix. 
E.2 DESCRIPTION OF BUILDING BLOCK HARDWARE  
E.2.1 SIGNAL/TARGET PROCESSOR 
E.2.1.1 Functional Description  
The complexity of the signal/target processor varies with the type of sensor. For 
a point sensor, very little signal processing is required since an alarm detection is usually 
a switch closure. All that needs to be done is to transform the sensor output into the 
proper format for transmission over the data link to the netting computer. However, for 
a radar sensor, the situation is quite different. Typically, the initial data rates for a 
radar sensor can be several Megahertz which is much higher than many digital computers 
can handle. The data rate seen by the signal processor depends on the number of radar 
resolution cells being covered by the radar and the percentage of signal processing 
functions which are performed by analog or digital hardware as opposed to being 
performed in the signal processor. The trade-off between performing these functions in 
hardware versus a computer involves trading high speed and low cost for hardware versus 
hardware simplicity and flexibility for the computer case. Typical functions which may 
need to be performed on radar data either in the radar circuits or the signal processor 
include: (1) integration to improve signal-to-noise or signal-to-clutter ratios; (2) 
































































Figure E-1. General Configuration of a netted radar-fixed sensor system. 
an adaptive CFAR, which adjusts the thresholds based on changing conditions, is needed 
to maintain desired false alarm rates); (3) moving target indication, to separate moving 
targets from fixed targets based on their relative Doppler frequency shifts (this function 
can be performed by a simple delay line canceler which yields position only or a Fourier 
transform which yields both position and radial velocity) (4) target masking, eliminating 
areas within the radar coverage area from processing, for example, a heavily traveled 
road or a high clutter area); and (5) target reports, generating a list of target reports 
based on a signal crossing a threshold from a given radar resolution area (such a report 
might include X coordinate, Y coordinate, velocity vector, and time of report). Figure 
E-2 gives a typical flow chart for the signal processor for the Target Detection Unit 
(TDU), automated radar sensor for detection of waterborne intruders. 4 For the case of 
the TDU, 32,000 radar resolution cells were contained in the active sector and the data 
had to be fully processed every 2.7 seconds. Thus, a very high speed, pipeline digital 
processor had to be used. However, for the AN/PPS-15(B) radar in the proposed 
configuration, the maximum number of resolution cells would be 7 range bins times 45 
azimuth resolution cells for a 270 degree beamwidth, or only 315 resolution cells. The 
data rate for such a radar would be much lower than for the TDU. However, if a true 
track-while-scan implementation for the AN/PPS-15 were developed, then the number of 
resolution cells could approach 3600 for a 4000 m x 270 degree active sector (see 
Appendix D). 
E.2.1.2 Hardware Requirements  
The hardware requirements for the signal/target processor depend on the data 
rates and signal processing needs of the sensor. For a point sensor, a simple 8-bit 
microprocessor such as an Intel 8080 would suffice to perform the required reformatting 
process for the data words. For a radar such as the AN/PPS-5 (see Appendix A), a 
pipeline processor composed of the American Micro Device (AMD) 2900 series bit-sliced 
micrologic would be required to process the large amounts of data. Figure E-3 gives a 
block diagram of a "typical" pipeline processor which might be used for this application. 
Typically, the CFAR and MTI processes would be performed using special purpose digital 
hardware while the other functions are performed in the processor. For the case of the 
AN/PPS-15 radar which falls between the two extremes of a point sensor and the 
AN/PPS-5 radar, a 16-bit microcomputer such as the Motorola 68000 microprocessor 
would suffice. However, for simplicity one might want to specify only two levels of 
processing power, moderate and maximum capability. Thus, the 68000 and the AMD 2900 
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Figure E-3. Block Diagram of an AND -2000 series pipeline 
microprocessor. 
For the case of a radar signal processor, there must be an associated digital 
memory in which to store radar returns from each resolution cell for each scan. Thus, if 
the radar has 32000 resolution cells, then a 32 K RAM memory would be required in 
addition to program and variable memory (2-8 K of RAM memory). Normally, for the 
signal/target processor, program memory would be stored in PROM. In addition to the 
processing speed requirement, another speed consideration involves the time required to 
trans' data from the radar to the processor. Normally, the radar data are stored in 
. gh speed memory and then "read into" the processor through a direct memory access 
(DMA) function. Thus, the signal processor must have this capability. 
E.2.2 NETTING COMPUTER 
E.2.2.1 Functional Description  
The netting computer as shown in Figure E-1 is the heart of the netted system and 
as such would contain the system mass data storage device such as a floppy or hard disk 
system. The netting computer would be expected to perform the following functions: 
1. System Initialization - at system turn on, it would send initialization data such as a 
time reference, grid coordinates of each sensor, operational status, etc., to the 
various signal processors in the system 	It would also initialize the display by 
downloading map parameters from disc into the memory planes of the display. 
2. Target Report Verification and Association - the alarm reports from the various 
sensors have to be decoded and compiled for display purposes. For the case of 
radar sensors, moving target reports must be associated into tracks, and multiple 
reports from two or more radars with overlapping coverage for the same target 
must be weeded out. In addition, it is highly desirable to correlate radar target 
tracks with fixed sensor reports to enhance the integrity of a given intruder report. 
3. Sensor Message Decoding - one of the functions of the netting computer is to 
decode the sensor messages and to initiate proper responses to non-alarm reports 
such as failed self test or tamper. 
4. Display Information - the netting computer performs the functions of the 
generation of messages and animated target information which is periodically 
transmitted to the display. 
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5. 	Operator Interaction - operator comments and responses which are generated on 
the display processor using either a keyboard or light pen may be transmitted to the 
netting computer for servicing. Generally, commands affecting the display only 
would be serviced in the display processor while system commands would be 
serviced by the netting computer. 
E.2.2.2 Hardware Requirements  
As in the case of the signal/target processor, the required complexity of the 
netting computer depends upon the number and type of sensors in the net. For the point 
sensors only case, a small microprocessor with a floppy disk mass storage device (such as 
that used in the FIDS system) will suffice. However, if one or more radars are included 
in the system, then a more powerful system is required. In this case, generally a 16 bit 
minicomputer of the NOVA or PDP-11 class with a hard disc would be required in order 
to perform all of the target association functions and provide the mass storage required 
for a high resolution color display. On three previously developed netted systems 
including LARIAT, the WIDS Target Detection Unit, and the MIT/Lincoln Laboratories 
netted radar, a NOVA 2 16-bit minicomputer has performed the function of the netting 
computer. Such machines are ideally suited for such a function since they are designed 
for high speed data handling. Furthermore, microcomputer versions of these machines 
are becoming available which will reduce the cost and increase the reliability 
characteristics of these systems. Finally, a MIL-qualified machine (the AN/YUK-19) is 
available which executes the NOVA instruction set. 
E.2.3 DISPLAY PROCESSOR 
E.2.3.1 Functional Description  
The display performs two primary functions in the netted system: displaying 
target alarms and system messages and handling interactions with the operator. During 
initialization, images of the display background would be stored in the display memory so 
that different display images can be quickly changed on operator command. During 
operation, the display processor must receive target report updates and message 
information and generate the vector graphics commands to alter the display active 
memory. Also, operator inputs must be screened, and those involving display changes 
must be implemented, while those that involve system changes are passed on to the 
netting computer. To respond to alarms in real time, the display must be capable of 
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changing displayed parameters rapidly, i.e., within one or two seconds after the 
occurrence of a change. If the detailed displays as discussed in Section 4 are to be 
created, then a large amount of on-line RAM memory will probably be required. In 
general, resolution high enough to allow the generation of primary base features and 
details of protected assets as well as color to increase the legibility of the display are 
highly desirable. 
E.2.3.2 Hardware Characteristics  
In order to be capable of displaying the types of features discussed in Section 4, 
the display hardware must include a high resolution (at least 512 X 1024 pixals) color 
output with the data stored in resident memory. One trick that has been used in previous 
systems involve storing the map features in two or three color planes of a display 
memory while animated features such as moving targets are stored in a fourth color 
memory plane. This allows the animated features which are rewritten often to appear to 
move on the display without erasing the map information. Thus, the map could be 
written from disc at turn on and stored in the blue/green memory planes while animated 
targets are written in the red/yellow memory planes resulting in a white color for the 
animated targets. In order to generate the vector graphics and respond to operator 
inputs, the display must include a microprocessor. The system memory would include 
PROM memory for display maintenance software, RAM memory for the displayed 
parameters, and RAM memory for system software. The RAM memory would be booted 
from the Netting Computer. A survey of available display hardware is summarized in 
Appendix C. 
E.3 SUMMARY 
In this Appendix, a brief overview has been given of the functional and hardware 
requirements of the digital processors needed for the Netted System. More details on 
the requirements can be obtained from system description documents prepared for the 
WIDS, TDU, and LARIAT programs. 

